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ABSTRACT

Missing Time: Remembrances of History’s Return
by
Marissa Brostoff

Advisor: Nancy K. Miller

This dissertation chronicles a profound recent shift within the US political left from an
essentially backward-looking orientation to one marked by an unfamiliar sense of timeliness.
Presented chronologically, the essays included here approach the vertiginous American political
landscape since 2016 through readings of cultural phenomena from Bernie Sanders’s short-lived
career as an experimental writer to Caitlyn Jenner’s reality show. They make up a Trump-era
diary haunted by the ghosts of twentieth-century social movements and an intellectual comingof-age story about growing up at the end of the end of history.
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INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 1964, student activists at UC Berkeley faced off with police and
administrators in a dramatic encounter that marked the start of the Free Speech Movement.
Tensions had been building for years over restrictions on political speech on campus. On
October 1, Jack Weinberg, a twenty-four-year-old organizer for the Congress of Racial Equality
and Berkeley alumnus, was arrested while tabling in front of Sproul Hall. For three days,
students surrounded the police car in which he was placed; at one point the student leader Mario
Savio delivered a speech from atop the car, lending the movement its most iconic image. During
an interview in the wake of his arrest, Weinberg later recalled, a reporter “kept asking me who
was ‘really’ behind the actions of students, implying that we were being directed behind the
scenes by the Communists or some other sinister group.” Frustrated, Weinberg snapped: “We
have a saying in the movement that you can’t trust anybody over thirty” (Daily Planet).
No such saying yet existed, but the San Francisco Chronicle picked up the story and
Weinberg’s quip went viral. Adopted by the Situationist-inspired Yippie movement, it became a
slogan and, perhaps, a kind of koan. Uttered by a twenty-four-year-old, the statement promises a
paradox just around the corner, its truth value inevitably eroded by the speaker’s own fidelity to
it, given the passage of a mere six years.
Shortly before my own thirtieth birthday in 2015, I began working on a dissertation that
took the self-devouring logic of “don’t trust anyone over thirty” as its point of departure. The
sentiment expressed in Weinberg’s quip is perhaps the easiest part of Sixties radicalism to
dismiss, not least because it often abjured seriousness itself. For more than fifty years, observers
across much of the political spectrum have derided the New Social Movements of the 1960s for
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allegedly shifting leftist priorities from a universal politics of class struggle to the molecular
demands of youth counterculture; antiracist, anti-imperialist, and feminist struggles, among
others, were (and are) often dismissed as the fantasies of youthful narcissists. In a less-often
remarked phenomenon, the conflation of youth and radicalism also turned the figure of the aging
leftist into a kind of phantom. When Weinberg turned sixty in 2000, the Berkeley Daily Planet
ran a story with the title, “Don’t trust anyone over 30, unless it’s Jack Weinberg” (Daily Planet).
When Bernie Sanders ran for president in 2016, a typical New York Times headline ran: “Don’t
Trust Anyone Over 30, Except Bernie Sanders” (Roller).
I speculated, however, that there was something to be taken seriously even or especially
in the most excessive expressions of Sixties radicalism as a politics of youth. In 1968, the
twenty-five-year-old journalist Jacob Brackman wrote that Sixties youth represented “not a new
generation, but a new notion of generation with new notions of its imperatives. We would not
default, succumb to the certainties of age, gulp pills, compromise maturely, lubricate our
adulthoods with facile resignations” (Brackman). A wild claim—and yet Brackman’s cohort
really did represent a new notion of generation, as both a triumph for the nation and a problem
for the state. An uptick in births in the early 1940s, encouraged by US pronatalist policies,
briefly reversed a hundred-year downward trend in the rate of population growth; the
phenomenon was celebrated as a sign of American vitality even as social scientists bemoaned the
boomers’ arrival as a ticking time bomb liable to destroy the nascent welfare state (Bouk). To
this day, the United States census registers only one generational cohort, encompassing
individuals born between 1946 and 1964, as a unique demographic category (Bump, “Here”).1
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While baby boomers are most commonly identified as persons born in the years following World War II, a
surprising demographic “bulge” in the US population was first identified several years earlier; Life magazine
declared a “baby boom” in 1941, a week before the US entered the war (Bouk 326).
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I imagined that recognizing the genuine biopolitical novelty of the baby boom might help
us to understand the peculiar temporalities ascribed to the long 1960s. An era of self-conscious
rupture, the Sixties have often been understood as a period when temporality turned upside
twice: first with the entry into a period of political chaos and countercultural attempts to subvert
the conventions of linear time, then with the quashing of both revolutionary and normative
visions of the good life at the start of the long downturn in the early 1970s. The critic Jane Elliott
describes this latter shift as the entry into “static time,” a worst-case scenario for the New Social
Movements in which history seemed to have ended while linear time—or, we might add,
aging—continued apace (Elliott).2 At the same time, like Elliott and many other scholars of the
period, I suspected that the shifts in temporality that took place around the 1960s could also be
tracked as a series of narrative problems. How do you tell the story of a revolution that
challenged the constitution of bodies by time—a revolt against plot? What drove some writers
determined to chronicle the period—including those often referred to as the New Journalists—to
eschew the novel altogether in favor of experimental nonfiction?
I continue to think that this is a worthwhile project, and hope to pursue some version of it
in the future. This dissertation, however, is not that project.
What, then, are you looking at instead? The shortest answer to the question is that this is
less a traditional dissertation than a collection of essays, articles, and reviews, most of which
were written in the wake of a decision to leave academia and pursue writing and editing in other
contexts—a decision that roughly coincided with the election of Donald Trump. Much of this
writing is occasional, its content and form largely determined by events in the news. It often
attempts to make sense of spectacles, from Caitlyn Jenner’s coming out to the arrest of Jeffrey
2

This framing, I think, might be a useful intervention into conversations about the fraught historical relationship
between feminism and queer theory, on the one hand, and neoliberalism, on the other, which have troubled
developmental accounts of the life course from different angles.
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Epstein, in light of ongoing realities including the rise of white nationalism and the escalating
persecution of immigrants in the United States.
In another sense, though, these essays represent something like the inversion of my
original project. My own investment in that project had emerged from a lifelong case of what, as
an adult, I learned to call left melancholy: an attachment to the lost causes of another time,
accompanied by an array of morbid symptoms and fetishes. If my acedia had attached itself to
the Sixties in particular, this was less out of any exclusive cathexis to the politics and aesthetics
of the period than it was to its ostensible position as history’s last gasp. The postmodern
condition has often been described as a perpetual present, but for many years I felt as though I
were living in the Sixties’ future. The present dystopia no longer feels this way.
Taken as a whole, then, these essays attempt to chronicle my own shift—surely neither
universalizable nor unique—from an essentially backward-looking orientation to an unfamiliar
sense of living in the present. Presented chronologically, they make up a Trump-era diary
haunted by the ghosts of twentieth-century social movements and an intellectual coming-of-age
story about growing up at the end of the end of history. Many of the concerns of my original
project—cultures of the American left; sexual, reproductive, and generational politics; aging and
nostalgia; celebrity, exposure, and new media; political economies of writing—show up
frequently here. So do persistent interests that I was reluctant to name as such in that initial plan,
particularly around questions of Jewish and transgender identity.
The first two essays in this collection offer studies of several figures—Sanders, Jenner,
the Clintons—whose recent presence on the national stage has dredged up complicated memories
of the sexual politics of the preceding fifty years. “Where the Boys Are” explores the sexual
politics of the 2016 Democratic primaries against the backdrop of a longer history of entangled
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countercultural and feminist visions of the role of desire in political life. “Notes on Caitlyn”
argues that Jenner—an aging Republican celebrity who is also, since coming out in 2015,
perhaps the most famous trans woman in America—should provoke a return to disavowed camp
reading practices as a form of queer literacy.
Several other essays, written as new political logics took hold, revisit cultural phenomena
of the 1990s and early 2000s to explore gaps between that period and the present. “Missing
Time” explores a formative childhood friendship and the postmodern political education I
received from The X-Files as a would-be communist ideologue in middle school in the late
1990s. “The Slow Burn: Sex and the City”—a collaborative project I conceived and edited last
summer for Post45’s experimental criticism series, and from which I’ve excerpted my own
contributions—ruminates on the relationship between SATC’s celebration of neoliberal New
York and Cynthia Nixon’s run for governor as a newly-minted democratic socialist. Another
essay, “True Lies,” reexamines the case of the great literary imposter J.T. LeRoy and finds a
story of thwarted transmasculinity hiding in plain sight.
Other pieces—on The Marvelous Mrs. Maisel, the performance artist Morgan Bassichis,
and Philip Roth—explore the politics of nostalgia through the lens of Jewish comedy. “The
Double’s Allegiance”—written shortly after Congresswoman Ilhan Omar was spuriously
accused of suggesting that American Jews exhibited “dual loyalty”—is an essay about Roth’s
madcap Israeli spy novel Operation Shylock and my own frustrated desire to enlist Roth as an
anti-Zionist Jewish icon.
Two articles written in the summer of 2019 delve into the eugenic logic of contemporary
pronatalist reproductive politics. “The Right Kind of Continuity,” coauthored with Noah Kulwin,
is an attempt to think through Jeffrey Epstein’s longtime prominence within the Jewish
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philanthropic world alongside his plan to inseminate women en masse with his own DNA. “How
White Nationalists Aligned Themselves with the Antiabortion Movement” is an op-ed about the
eugenicist roots of the antiabortion movement and their reappearance in contemporary white
nationalist politics.
The final two pieces included here explore how we tell stories about an unimaginable
present. “Both Sides Now” is a review of reporter Lewis Raven Wallace’s The View From
Somewhere, a history of journalistic objectivity and a critique of the concept’s gatekeeping
function within journalistic institutions today. “Meditations in an Emergency,” a final essay
written as an editorial on behalf of the staff of Jewish Currents, argues that the use of the
Holocaust as the singular metonym for unimaginable catastrophe may be blocking our access to
allegorical language with which to apprehend climate change, and offers Walter Benjamin’s
vision of messianic time—a vision inextricable from the history of fascism but not reducible to
it—as an alternative.

6

Where the Boys Are
In 1960, the American writer Glendon Swarthout, ultimately best known for his novels of
the Old West, published a sex farce about a frank, lusty Midwestern college girl named Merrit
who goes to Fort Lauderdale for spring break to cruise for well-heeled ass. It’s March of 1958,
and across the Straits of Florida Fidel Castro has called for a general revolt against the Batista
regime, but Merrit and her several boyfriends are uninterested. “Most of us had seen stuff about
it in the papers,” she admits in her frank, lusty way, “but had paid no attention because we were
making our own current events” (Swarthout 160). But while getting wasted in a nightclub one
evening, they meet a local stripper who happens to be a committed Castroite and imparts to them
the glories of the Cuban revolution. After hearty debate among the spring breakers about whether
their Silent Generation cool will suffer from the performance of too much “embarrassing” (25)
political fervor, Ivy League asshole Ryder Smith agrees to join his Big Ten and white-ethnic
hipster rivals—and Merrit herself—and use his uncle’s boat to launch an Abraham Lincoln
Brigade manqué: the Lauderdale Legion. The boat immediately crashes into the dock. In an
epilogue, Merrit is stranded in Florida, knocked up and alone but still plucky, hoping that having
her baby will somehow constitute “the spiritual equivalent” (238) of her abortive revolutionary
vacation. Citing the response of a coed asked by Time magazine why she had come to Fort
Lauderdale for spring break, Swarthout called his novel Where the Boys Are.
Girls want to be where the boys are, and boys want to be where politics is. That politics is
where the girls are is irrelevant in this signifying chain, because girls chasing boys is understood
to be about boys, but boys chasing girls is understood to be about sex, and therefore, still about
boys. “The girls are thinking, ‘Where are the boys?’” Gloria Steinem told Bill Maher in
February, weighing in on why young women have been throwing their support to Bernie Sanders
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over Hillary Clinton in their contest for the Democratic presidential nomination. “The boys are
with Bernie” (Rappeport). Indulging the same semantic slippage Swarthout made more than fifty
years ago, Steinem became a lightning rod in a debate that has circled obsessively around the
primaries without speaking its name, about the proper role of feeling—and particularly of erotic
desire—in political life. In an unacknowledged way, her gaffe revealed the contours of the
terrain on which Clinton and Sanders supporters have clashed from the start. What is at stake is
not just gender but sexual politics and their tangled legacy in the left-liberal sphere ever since
American kids began following their erotic ambitions into the realm of radicalism at the dawn of
the Sixties. Sanders, who started college and joined the burgeoning New Left a year after
Swarthout’s characters hit the beach, represents a specter that has haunted respectable American
politics for generations.
For months prior to Steinem’s remark (and a similarly inapt insinuation from Madeleine
Albright the same weekend about “a special place in hell for women who don’t help each other”
[Rappeport]), the dominant meme in the debate over youth, gender, and the Democratic
primaries had been the figure of the “Bernie bro,” a misogynistic white guy ready for socialist
adventure whose anti-Hillary venom confirmed that the left remains an unsafe place for
women—a latter-day incarnation, perhaps, of the Lauderdale Legion. The Bernie babe conjured
by Steinem—the young woman who campaigns against her own interests, so great is her desire
to meet bros—proved such an unconvincing character in the popular imagination that, at least
momentarily, the shoe was on the other foot. Clinton supporters were forced to disown what
appeared to be a rogue version of the specious and sexist logic that had shored up the
construction of the Bernie bro in the first place: the idea that radical politics is, in some inherent
sense, a dude sport.
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A few days before Steinem rhetorically queried the location of the boys, and before
female Sanders supporters replied resoundingly that they were #NotHereForBoys, I discovered
that my gradually waxing enthusiasm for Sanders was about boys. By enthusiasm, I don’t mean
the fact that I plan to vote for Sanders in the New York primaries. I vote in every local-ass
election that comes around, most often in the teeth-gritted way of despondent leftists whose
disaffection cannot overcome an addiction to even the charade of democratic process. What I
mean is that I was feeling the Bern. Feelin’ it. Bernie Sanders is a 74-year-old Jewish socialist,
one of my favorite categories of person, and a charming, galvanizing specimen thereof. Yet
despite my attachment to that person, I live in the 21st century and would love to see the
revolutionary energies that have been building through the Occupy and Black Lives Matter
movements attach themselves to a candidate fomented in our time, attuned to our ways of
framing the problems we face. But for weeks I felt the Bern coming on. Then, the night of the
New Hampshire debate, a friend sent me a picture of Sanders as a young man. His hair is a
Dylanesque mop. His glasses could’ve lost him a midcentury election on egghead grounds. His
corduroy jacket is rumpled. He appears to be haranguing someone. He has nice lips. Then I
understood.
I wanted more pictures, so I did a Google image search for “young Bernie Sanders.”
There were pictures of him speaking at a sit-in in 1962, a few dozen kids (mostly white boys, a
few girls) cross-legged in a hallway at the University of Chicago. There was one from a Liberty
Union Party meeting in Vermont in ’71 in which he’s distractedly holding his two-year-old son,
sideburns prominently displayed; he’s endearingly maternalized by having to perform child care
while haranguing. There were a bunch where he got a bit round-cheeked that I sort of skipped
over. Then I found the story.
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In 1972, Sanders published a piece of writing called “Man—and Woman” in an
alternative newspaper called the Vermont Freeman. Mother Jones dug it up last spring; it’s the
closest thing Sanders has had to an actual sex scandal, which is to say, not very close. “Man—
and Woman” is roughly six hundred words long, and if I had to describe it in genre terms, I
would say it is a piece of experimental feminist fiction. Insofar as it has a narrative, it follows its
archetypally gendered protagonists, “a man” and “a woman,” as their relationship falls apart. It
begins, jarringly, with an introduction to both characters’ sexual fantasies:
A man goes home and masturbates his typical fantasy. A woman on her knees, a woman
tied up, a woman abused.
A woman enjoys intercourse with her man — as she fantasizes being raped by 3 men
simultaneously.
The man and woman get dressed up on Sunday — and go to Church, or maybe to their
“revolutionary” political meeting. (qtd in Murphy)
Here the narrator breaks the fourth wall and spends several paragraphs engaging the
reader in dialogue about the way images of rape eroticize the violence of patriarchy. Things are
changing; “women, for their own preservation, are trying to pull themselves together.” But the
socially enforced “pigness” of men and “slavishness” of women are still locked in a death spiral
that destroys them both. Engaging a highly impressionistic version of the anthropological origins
of patriarchy (a common starting point at the time for feminist thinkers like Shulamith Firestone
and Kate Millett), he writes,
In the beginning there were strong men who killed the animals and brought home the
food — and the dependent women who cooked it. No More! Only the roles remain —
waiting to be shaken off. There are no “human” oppressors. Oppressors have lost their
humanity. On one hand “slavishness,” on the other hand “pigness.” Six of one, half dozen
of the other. Who wins? (qtd in Murphy)
The answer, he concludes, is no one: “Men and women—both are losers.” Women’s liberation
has dredged up paradoxes that neither man nor woman can resolve. “How do you love—without
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being dependent? How do you be gentle—without being subservient?” Our protagonists’
romance turns sour and accusatory. In the end, “they never again made love together (which they
had each liked to do more than anything) or never ever saw each other one more time” (qtd in
Murphy).
Just as Steinem said, I had followed the trail of boys, and just as she didn’t need to say,
where the boys are, sexual violence against girls awaits. When Mother Jones dug up Sanders’s
story last May, a brief controversy followed. A group called the Young Conservatives claimed
that it was hypocritical for Democrats to criticize Republicans’ gender politics in light of “this
atrocious Bernie Sanders quote,” then presented a screenshot from NBC News. One side of the
screen displays the line, “A woman enjoys intercourse with her man—as she fantasizes about
being raped by 3 men simultaneously;” the other shows Sanders’s face (Evon).
But the juxtaposition of text and image made no sense. Huh? Which woman? The syntax
alone posed a problem for manufactured outrage. Forget content—we don’t expect our
candidates to write experimental fiction. Bill Kristol, sensing, perhaps, that the story as such
wouldn’t scan, used it as an occasion to attack Bill Clinton’s wanton sexuality, and, by
extension, Hillary Clinton’s permissiveness (“Asking several experts for comments on
@SenSanders’ essay,” Kristol tweeted at the other Bill. “Care to comment?” [Kristol].) Liberals
tried to split the difference. For NPR, to the extent that the piece was “about liberating people
from harmful gender norms” (Kurtzleben), it was okay. To the extent that it averred the
complexity and violence of desire—Sanders “seems to imply that men fantasize about raping
women or that women fantasize about being raped”—it was not. In Slate, Ben Mathis-Lilley
sensed that something complicated was going on that couldn’t be easily unpacked in our
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contemporary discourse around politics and sexuality; he concluded simply, “The 1970s were a
unique time” (Mathis-Lilley). The story died—or seemed to.
Like Sanders’s story, Steinem’s comment summoned the ghost of debates over sexuality
within feminist and left circles that remade radical politics several times over in the 1960s but
have been largely forgotten since. What we remember instead is the right’s appropriation of
those debates to its own ends during the culture wars, the ceaseless referendum on the legacy of
the Sixties that expressed itself most vividly in the Reagan, Bush père, and Clinton years.
In the run-up to the 2008 election, Barack Obama declared the culture wars over. Sensing
a weariness with their rhetoric, he deftly cast himself as a fresh face without hang-ups over what
he described, in The Audacity of Hope, as “the psychodrama of the baby boom generation—a
tale rooted in old grudges and revenge plots hatched on a handful of college campuses long ago”
(Obama 36). As we have seen in subsequent years, this “psychodrama” could not so easily be
dismissed as intra-generational squabbling. But Obama’s reframing did displace the wars’
boomer-centered narrative, and with it, the drama of the Clintons, who served in the right-wing
imagination as generals leading the enemy flank.
The last thing Hillary Clinton could have expected in this election cycle, then, was an
opponent several years her senior who would take the mantle of the Sixties and start winning
young supporters with it. Sanders’s “clever strategy of shouting the exact same thing for 40
years,” as Holly Wood put it in the Village Voice, has hit an unexpected nerve, and with it,
reopened wounds that had never really healed to begin with. And so in an uncanny, unspoken
twist, the dig long directed at the Clintons from the right—that sexual freedom has turned
America into the site of a collective rape fantasy—has been quietly transformed by Hillary’s
supporters into a line of attack on Sanders. In the New York Times, feminist blogger Jill Filipovic
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doubled down on Steinem’s insinuations, arguing that for the frivolous college girls who support
Bernie, “sexism tends to be linked to sex” (Filipovic)—a category inclusive of everything from
cute outfits to abortion—whereas grown women know that the real fight, Hillary’s fight, is about
breaking the professional glass ceiling. The poet Eileen Myles, meanwhile, resurrected “Man—
and Woman,” suggesting midway through a stream-of-consciousness BuzzFeed polemic that
Sanders’s “love of gang rape” is connected to an intention (details uncited) to defund Planned
Parenthood (Myles). The rhetoric surrounding Clinton’s campaign has become the bearer of a
deeply conservative idea that has long posited itself as a progressive one: women can only be
safe in the public sphere if sex is kept out.
***
The obvious problem with Gloria Steinem’s boy theory was that it could not abide the
idea that young women, thinking for themselves, might for any number of reasons come to
different conclusions than Gloria Steinem. Her comment appeared to be an act of erasure: of
young women as rational actors, people with commitments along lines of identity other than
gender, subjects who might not be boy-oriented at all. There was, however, another way of
understanding what she had to say. What if Steinem were simply making a descriptive claim
(“this is the situation as I see it”), and we had projected onto it a normative addendum (“and
that’s terrible”)? As Katha Pollitt points out, it’s hardly a secret that people make decisions based
on “social and psychological factors” all the time (Pollitt). (In an email to Pollitt, Steinem
endorsed the reading that she meant Bernie babes no harm.) Since when do we believe in rational
actors, anyway?
People who want to upend the social order have always been accused of letting their
passions run away with them; acceding to that idea, and even celebrating it, is not necessarily
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good political strategy. “The fanatic is perpetually incomplete and insecure,” wrote the American
political theorist Eric Hoffer in 1951, the height of a Red Scare moment in which any expression
of political resistance branded its subject as a fanatic. “His passionate attachment is more vital
than the quality of the cause to which he is attached” (Hoffer). During the same period,
American anticommunist crusaders created a panic over the “contagion” of radical politics,
intimating that promiscuous social and, especially, sexual behavior posed a grave risk to national
security. Accepting the terms of the debate, American communists responded by trying to prove
that they were in fact as personally staid, homophobic, and nuclear-family-oriented as the
McCarthyist forces arrayed against them. (Joseph McCarthy and his confederates, for their part,
could moan and wail and weep and gnash their teeth as they pleased.)
Thus we return to the finer point that Steinem put on the question of feelings’ relationship
to politics. Not just sentiment, but sex, she suggested, was driving young ladies to a dangerous
outpost deep in the wilds of the public sphere. Whether Steinem was trying to warn off young
female Sanders supporters by invoking an image of the left as frat house, or teasingly identifying
with them, or a little of both, we’ll never know. Either way, she wouldn’t be the first.
In Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of a New Left, historian
Van Gosse takes Glendon Swarthout’s novel as illustrative of how the erotic allure of the Cuban
revolution for American youth (largely of the white, male, and collegiate variety) jumpstarted the
movement of students, civil rights activists, and antiwar protesters that came to be known as the
New Left (Gosse). In the 1950s youthful disaffection was widespread but mostly untethered from
organized political struggle. In the 1960s, the New Left changed that in part by revising the very
definition of the political, taking personal experience—that is to say, subjective conditions like
the state of alienation produced by advanced industrial society—as its point of departure. “They
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had politics,” Todd Gitlin, a leader of the movement, said derisively of the generation of leftists
that preceded them. “We were politics” (qtd in Szalay).
In his autobiography, Outsider in the House, Sanders tells a familiar New Left story:
upon transferring to the University of Chicago in 1960, he became active in organizations like
the Congress of Racial Equality, the Student Peace Union, and the Young People’s Socialist
League. Shunning schoolwork, he instead (in a likewise familiar boast) studied a self-assigned
syllabus of “Jefferson, Lincoln, Fromm, Dewey, Debs, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Freud,
and Reich” (Sanders 17). The admixture of patriotism and Marxism that sutures this list was oldschool even in 1960, an inheritance of the alliances forged between American communists and
the Democratic party in the 1930s. But the presence of psychoanalysis in the mix, and
particularly of Freud’s radical descendants Erich Fromm and Wilhelm Reich, is pure New Left.
This was the moment of—in Reich’s coinage—“sexual revolution.”
The “Freudian left” of Fromm, Reich, Herbert Marcuse, and a few others originated in
interwar Europe with the idea that the left could only defeat encroaching fascism if it became
“the party of eros” (in the phrase of an American scholar and contemporary of the movement,
Richard King) (King). Unlike orthodox Freudians, who saw the repression of libido as necessary
to the upkeep of civilization, the Freudian left argued that populations forced by moral stricture
to keep sexual energy bottled up expressed that energy through violence—and that undoing
repression would create the opposite effect. For Reich, writing in Weimar Berlin, this literally
meant that at the level of organizing, communists could bring in the youth being lost to the
aesthetic temptations of Nazism by creating spaces where boys and girls could mingle (Reich).
He was rewarded by being kicked out of both the Communist parties of various countries and the
International Psychoanalytic Association. But as part of a wealth of European critical theory that
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made its way to the United States during and after World War II, the notion of sexual
liberation—imagined, this time, as an antidote to the soul-crushing American grind—became
integral to the making of the New Left.
The sexual revolution of the Sixties unleashed vast quantities of libidinal energy and
produced great stores of ecstatic, politically inspiring feeling—for men. Radical feminism
erupted in the late Sixties in large part out of the fury of women in the New Left whose labor
provided the foundation for that movement but who were constantly marginalized within it. A
key critique the women’s liberation movement lodged at what feminist leader Robin Morgan
called the “counterfeit male-dominated Left” was that “the so-called Sexual Revolution” had
simply created a new vector of male control (Morgan). “In addition to suffering sexual
frustration from the inhibitions instilled by repressive parents, fear of pregnancy, and men’s
sexual judgments and exploitative behavior,” Ellen Willis recalled later, “we had to swallow the
same men’s humiliating complaints about how neurotic, frigid, and unliberated we were” (Willis,
“Toward” 180). Yet this critique of ersatz sexual liberation often morphed into a wholesale
rejection of women’s sexuality or certain expressions of it, both gay and straight. A critique of
that critique insisted that sexual liberation needed not to be liberated from its abusers. “What’s a
party without men?” asked Shulamith Firestone (presumably after taking a long drag on her
cigarette) when New York Radical Women, a group she had founded, proposed a gendersegregated soiree (Echols 83). Firestone was no defender of either men or compulsory
heterosexuality. But by reframing radical politics as where the girls were, sex with boys could be
imagined back into the scene on different terms.
As the women’s liberation movement splintered in the 1970s, a hard break with the left
(which Morgan came to call the “boys’ movement”) and a dramatic turn toward gender
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essentialism were often allied in a project by many feminists to redefine the movement as a
quasi-nationalistic advancement of “women’s culture.” Radical feminism had been a largely
white and middle-class movement, but also one deeply engaged, if not always successfully, with
questions of race and class. Cultural feminists—who often took as their mouthpiece Steinem’s
Ms. magazine—tended to argue, by contrast, that racism and class oppression would wither away
on their own if the violent, masculine world order was replaced with the nurturing, maternal
values supposedly natural to women. This was not a part of the movement that had space for the
messiness of sexual fantasy, including women’s. In the Eighties, when “antisex” feminists like
Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon aligned with Reagan affiliates in proposing
legislation against pornography, the connection between the rejection of the left and of sexual
deviance—essentially, a total renunciation of Sixties radicalism in the guise of protecting women
from rape—became painfully clear. The assumption among some feminists “that sexual coercion
is a more important problem for women than sexual repression,” which in its most pronounced
form relied on “a neo-Victorian view of women’s nature,” Willis wrote, thus ironically provided
fodder for a distinctly anti-feminist idea promulgated by Reagan’s New Right: women would be
safe from male aggression only in a return to hearth and home (Willis, “Toward” 183).
And then came Clinton.
***
“I feel your pain,” Bill Clinton told an AIDS activist in 1992, a few years before signing
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the Defense of Marriage Act, meanwhile defending the sanctity of
marriage himself by having tons of extramarital sex with women who mostly, when questioned,
avowed consent, but sometimes didn’t—but those latter charges remain unsubstantiated, and are
currently in circulation largely thanks to the efforts of Donald Trump. While it’s true that the
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most powerful man in the world surely had some leeway to stop rape charges from going
anywhere, the same man had an almost equally powerful coalition of Republicans arrayed
against him who produced a 445-page document condemning his sexual exploits and the worst
thing they could come up with was that a cigar is sometimes not just a cigar. Thinking through
Clinton is not, as the theorist Fred Moten observed in the aftermath of Monicagate, “a top of the
head project.” Moten continued,
Though actually existing American democracy is 99 percent whack, there is a coup going
on; he’s a lecherous harasser but it is obviously important and weird to have an openly
sexual president; he’s a racist and a sexist who has butchered black and poor and female
people, but he doesn’t seem personally to hate or, at least, be sickened, by the presence of
black people or women, by the idea of their having, within the whack American
paradigm, influence and power (Moten 151).
In a perfect inversion of the liberal punditocracy’s claim that Clinton was personally unpalatable
but politically responsible, Moten and the other writers assembled in the collection Our Monica,
Ourselves, feminist and queer theory’s most comprehensive response to the Lewinsky affair,
express dismay with the president’s neoliberal policies but identify with and take pleasure in his
eroticization. In permutations of Toni Morrison’s famous characterization of Clinton as our first
black president, he appears here—“feminized by . . . his weight problems, his teariness, his
physical affection, his interest in feelings, his linkage of intellectual power and emotional
bravado,” as contributor Toby Miller put it—as queer, as woman, as black woman, as Jew
(Miller 122). The majority of American voters that had elected him and kept his approval ratings
up even during the darkest days of the impeachment hearings seemed to feel similarly.
“‘[O]rdinary’ Americans,” Willis points out in her contribution to the volume, “clearly do not
share the Washington elite’s investment in the idea of the president as moral exemplar, charged
with validating the existing structure of (patriarchal) authority”; on the contrary, they had elected
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him as “a member of the ’60s generation, an embodiment of youth and eroticism” (Willis, “’Tis
Pity” 243). What was infuriating was that this was the embodiment we were stuck with.
Sometimes in the extended Clinton era it seemed like not just the president, but all the
middle-aged flaccidly liberal white men you could see in the movies (American Beauty, Ghost
World) or read about in a novel (The Corrections, most books by Philip Roth), had decided to
enshrine the historical memory of the Sixties by having sex with younger women, turning back
the clock on everyone at once. But who’s to say the women in those scenarios didn’t have an
erotic investment in that historical reenactment as well? Lewinsky herself, in the face of a sexual
culture that refused to recognize women as other than objects and victims, unapologetically
insisted that she was a sexual subject who took pleasure in the affair. But then again, how fucked
up would it be if the legacy of sexual revolution was so deeply embedded in the Clintonian body
that there was no other way to access it? In practice, one supposes, women who slept with Bill
had a high likelihood of supporting his policy agenda. In the up-or-down logic of
representational politics, was a vote for eros, in the Nineties, also a vote for welfare reform,
NAFTA, and the crime bill?
Oh yeah, and what about Hillary?
Despite her current iconic status within Steinem’s wing of feminism, Hillary Clinton
remains essentially outside the intra-feminist debates sketched above. A bit of an anachronism in
her own time, Clinton belongs to a different lineage, more connected, in a way, to the long
tradition of women social reformers than to the feminists who emerged in the ’60s. In her
autobiography, Living History—a book in which the F-word is scarcely breathed—Clinton writes
that in 1970, a couple of days after National Guard troops shot four student antiwar protesters at
Kent State University, she spoke at a convention banquet for the League of Women Voters, an
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organization founded in 1920 to support the cause of women’s suffrage (Clinton 46). Two years
earlier, by way of contrast, radical feminists had protested Richard Nixon’s inauguration by
burning their voter registration cards; they were “giving back the vote” (Echols 114).
Yet the “sex wars” within feminism and the culture wars that dogged the Clintons in the
Nineties are intimately connected via the right’s appropriation of feminist rhetoric to end, in one
blow, the remaining legacy of sexual liberation and feminism itself. Today, many of Hillary
Clinton’s supporters—not just responding to continued attacks from the right, but playing
offense with Sanders—are tactfully trying to sever any whiff of a connection between the two.
Gloria Steinem’s comment broke the rules of the game by explicitly alluding to the presence of
women’s sexuality in the public sphere. Part of why her remark was so hard to parse—was she
endorsing this presence or decrying it or simply stating it as fact?—is that her sexual politics
have long been riddled with contradictions. “Gloria Steinem went to bed with Norman Mailer
out of kindness twelve years after he stabbed his wife,” Juliana Spahr reminds us in a recent
poem (Spahr). In the 1980s, she was photographed nude in her bubble bath for People magazine
and joined the crusade against pornography (Heilbrun 345-346).
But mostly, those sorts of ambiguities haven’t risen to the surface. Instead, a safe
disavowal of sexuality has buzzed beneath the surface of an extended attempt to reinforce a
sentimental mode of thinking about feeling toward politics. Despite the complex mixtures of
attraction and repulsion that jizzed all over Bill Clinton’s presidency, Hillary’s supporters have
maintained that political emotion is a straightforward, proper or improper affair. Feeling, when it
supports the right candidate, is pure, noble, and rational. Correctly disciplined sentiment, in this
scenario, is imagined to be precisely aligned with reason, hence the Clinton campaign’s ability to
claim a premium on both inspiration (the first woman president . . .) and pragmatism (. . .will
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obviously be the person who can get things done). When political feeling comes out for the other
guy, however, it is a reminder that affect has no place in electoral politics at all. In this latter
view, political feeling is not just unfair to women because of the sexist content that may come
through in emotionally charged rhetoric, but is also unjust in its very form because women,
forced to be realists, do not deal in the emotional realm. Unlike her opponent, Hillary “doesn’t
get to be all wild hair and yelling,” the writer of a viral piece published on the website Pajiba
complained immediately before hitting caps lock and eschewing lowercase letters for the rest of
her article. Undisciplined passions are idealistic, are unseemly, and are tied to unruly bodies like
Sanders’s, with his wild head of hair that is an affront to all women and their blow-dryers.
Both of these selectively held views rely on a fantasy that voters—that is, responsible
voters, not the kind who fall prey to base desires—navigate a simple, unmediated relationship
between what they like and what should be. Thus, judging by the frequency with which the
argument is made, one of the best things Clinton supporters have going for them is the notion
that Clinton’s unexpected challenges are due to a “likeability problem.” “I Used to Hate Hillary
Clinton. Now I’m Voting for Her,” announces the headline of a Slate article by the liberal
commentator Michelle Goldberg. Goldberg’s politics haven’t changed—they were and remain
close to those of Sanders, she tells us. What changed between 2008, when she excoriated
Clinton’s political sins, and today, was that her emotional attachments grew up:
For a progressive, how you reconcile conflicting truths about Clinton depends, to some
extent, on how much you empathize with her. Supporting Clinton means justifying the
thousands of concessions she’s made to the world as it is, rather than as we want it to be.
Doing this is easier, I think, when you are older, and have made more concessions
yourself. Indeed, sometimes it feels like to defend Clinton is to defend middle age itself,
with all its attenuated expectations and reminders of the uselessness of hindsight
(Goldberg).
“This is in support of Hillary?” a friend asked. Goldberg’s counterintuitive approach to political
rhetoric—We’re the party of defeat!—is in fact the more or less official line of the Clinton
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campaign. Disciplined by the fetters of middle age, Goldberg narrates her march toward reason
as a sentimental journey in which, through a growing identification with Clinton, she comes to
like the way concession feels.
It’s hard to argue with desire, and it’s easy to get votes if desire is something you can call
up. As Freud put it, the unconscious does not have a word for “no.” Erotic fantasy has suffused
this election cycle whether it’s acknowledged, or even recognized, or not. It’s been more explicit
on the Republican side of the aisle: Trump reassured us of the largeness of his dick, and if the fan
fiction he has inspired is any indication, said dick has not gone unappreciated. Clinton’s well of
erotic charge has always been deeply triangulated with her great-triangulator husband’s, and now
that well seems to have run dry. In response, she’s trying to dam it up with other kinds of
feelings, including the feelings mobilized precisely by our feeling her pain as a woman with
waning powers of attraction. The problem with doing so is not that it somehow tarnishes her, but
that it rests on a claim that desire itself is tarnishing, which creates a self-unraveling logic—vote
for me because you don’t want me, and I promise to attenuate your expectations.
I Still Love Hillary Clinton. I Still Don’t Want to Vote for Her. My own profile in
political emotion, all but impossible in the eyes of the Clinton campaign, is not a march toward
reason but a deepening of continued convolution. It’s not just that, having enthusiastically cast
my first ballot for Bill Clinton in my second-grade class mock election in 1992, I have a lifelong
affinity bordering on Camelot-style adoration for both Clintons. It’s also that, having hit puberty
at exactly the right time to learn everything I know about sex from news coverage of the Starr
report, their collective role in my constitution as a sexual subject is second perhaps only to that
other pair of baby boomers who gave birth to me. Hillary’s incredible pathos, her depths of
ambition, the abuse she has borne, her inability to keep her feelings off her face—all the
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supposedly unlikeable personal qualities that Hillary-lovers love about Hillary, I love too. I
challenge you to watch her Oscar lifetime achievement award-ish montage from the 2008
Democratic National Convention—the one where she talks about writing to NASA to find out
how a girl can become a lady astronaut—and not cry. I could look at her all day, would love to
crack open a campaign-trail Bud together (she is supposedly very funny in person), if I were in
therapy right now I’m sure it would not take long to concur that I still want her to fuck me. Yet
for all the reasons of policy and ideology that leftists who don’t want to vote for Hillary don’t
want to vote for Hillary, I don’t want to vote for her either. I will grant that in its details, this
profile may be idiosyncratic. But in its general contours, I don’t think what I am saying is
unrepresentative so much as, within our current discourse, simply unrepresentable.
It’s not, then, that my vote isn’t about feelings. Like all desire, my attachments to both
Sanders and Clinton are weird and hard to pin down: they’re about history and nostalgia and
childhood and identifications of all kinds. What makes my attachment to Sanders different is
that, in the tautological sense that he’s (something like) a socialist, and has the energy of
preexisting social movements behind him, my desire for him is also a desire for the
transformative energies created by social movements themselves. Whereas one thing my
attachment to Clinton is not about is a connection to a vision of feminist collectivity, because she
doesn’t come out of or represent a movement that shares such a vision. Without one, feminists
are ultimately alone together.
***
When we look at Bernie Sanders, what do we see? One way Clinton supporters attempted
to deflect Steinem’s gaffe while holding onto its substance was to argue that Sanders is “cool,”
denigrating him as a dorm-room poster boy but denying that this has anything to do with sex. Of
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course, cool has everything to do with sex, in politics as elsewhere: it’s the best shorthand we’ve
had for the packaging of erotic charge for electoral consumption since Norman Mailer tagged
John F. Kennedy “the Hipster as Presidential Candidate” in 1960 (Mailer). More recently, the
label has stuck to Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. Since cool is a deeply racialized term—Mailer
infamously identified the hipster as “white Negro”—there is a complicated relay here between
the racial appropriation going on when white candidates try to be cool, and the racialized charge
of the accusation that they have succeeded. Given that our Democratic candidates are currently
fighting for the support of a black electorate whose votes they arguably have not earned, a feud
about cool leaves no one looking good.
It’s true, though: Sanders is cool. But why is he cool? Haranguing Jewish socialists have
been out for forty-five years. And since Bill Clinton’s administration, the deployment of the
Sixties in national politics has been a well-established irritant to the generations of voters that
have succeeded the baby boomers. Yet suddenly, Vampire Weekend is performing “This Land is
Your Land” at Sanders fundraisers with the candidate on backup vocals. I think what’s
happening is that Sanders—a New Leftist older than the boomers—is in the process of detaching
the historical memory of the Sixties from the Clintonian narrative of what happened to Sixties
people after the Sixties. A persistent discourse that peaked in the Nineties and waved the flag of
boomerdom cynically maintained that only two options existed, or could exist, for aging radicals:
sell out, or fade into Lebowskian obscurity. Attempts have been made to fit Sanders into both of
these story lines—to tar him either as a tool of the establishment (he’s been in Washington for
twenty-five years) or a dropout from society (he’s only a senator from Vermont—hardly a state,
more like a toy). But like the state of Vermont, the lives that many Sixties movement veterans
have made for themselves in regions at the hazy borders of power and resistance, and the
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institutions they have built there are, in fact, real. The appearance of someone so unreformed on
the national stage has been, I think, a surprising pleasure for many young people—and
conversely perhaps, an unwelcome threat to Hillary’s boomer bloc.
Bill Clinton was a dense, voluptuous representative of the Sixties who held out the
promise of accessing that time by accessing his body. Sanders is spindly and seems, for a
politician, unusually self-sufficient; one meme this year delighted in a video that caught him
dashing spryly through a crowded DC subway station to make the train. But as the Occupy and
Black Lives Matter movements negotiate their own continued survival, what he offers is
something like a grim but seductively existential promise: the struggle will be hard and lonely,
but if you don’t give up, you, too, will stay cool. It’s as though this particular varietal of hip had
been hanging out offstage, forgotten yet exerting a genealogical pull, then suddenly reemerged
Rip Van Winkle-like, aged and yet strikingly intact. Perhaps cool hangs around the aging body
like an afterimage, creating a charisma that picks up where more direct forms of sex appeal leave
off.
In this sense, the erotics of the Sanders campaign are about nostalgia: a new generation of
kids is falling in love with a promise held out by a past one. The problem with nostalgia and the
melancholy crushes it begets is how quickly you forget that the snapshot you hold of the time
before you were born can’t, by definition, include you. When I look at old pictures of young
Bernie Sanders, I want to go back and be where those boys were. But I am mindful of the
feminists who fled the New Left in droves at the close of the 1960s to start their own movement,
who caution me—in yet another historical reverie—it was never for you. And so we have looped
around to the start of our tale.
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What, ultimately, is the legacy of the New Left in relation to feminism? I’ve read and
thought about this question for a long time, and I still don’t quite know how to answer it in the
abstract. But it is precisely at this impasse that Sanders’s brief and bungled career as an
experimental writer gives me hope. “Man—and Woman” is a document of what change within a
social movement looks like. It is messy, cocky, timid, flailing, and, read without recourse to
historical context, almost illegible. If you try score it on a spreadsheet of correct political
opinion, as internet opinion-mongering is wont to do, it will yield an unsatisfying prime number
nowhere near 0 or 100. It is not an unheralded classic of second-wave feminist thought. (Women
“are trying to pull themselves together”?) Yet on an account that I think is vital to a sexually
liberatory feminist analysis—people including women have sexual desires that can’t be cleansed
of a relationship to power, but that doesn’t have to preclude the formation of gratifying
relationships, while what does destroy relationships is the real-life violence of patriarchy—he
gets it exactly right.
Regardless of the feelings Sanders is stirring up in this election cycle, the limits to the
conversation we can have about political emotions have thus far been prescribed by the Clinton
campaign. Within those limits, a story about a rape fantasy never stood a chance. I sent the story
to the friend who sent me the picture of young Bernie Sanders. “Mainstream politics is a series of
magic words being repeated like a ritual incantation— ‘free trade’ ‘values’ ‘security,’” he wrote
back. “‘Rape’ is outside that political vocabulary. It cannot even be contextualized.” The same
goes, I think, for “fantasy,” and this was precisely the argument of the Freudian left and its New
Left and feminist inheritors. Fantasy permeates this election cycle as it permeates all national
life, but it cannot be actively affirmed in public speech, and this is precisely the point at which
utopian thought—say, the mere contemplation of socialist revolution—is arrested. At a moment
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in American history when the rhetoric of fascism blares perhaps more loudly than ever before, it
might be time to let it in.
—n+1
April 2016
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Notes on Caitlyn, or, Genre Trouble:
On the Continued Usefulness of Camp as Queer Method
One night in 2015, queer theory had the strangest dream. A B-list US celebrity, publicly
identified up until this point as male, came out—via a series of high-profile media appearances
and her own reality show—as a trans woman in the process of gender transition. Indeed, Caitlyn
Jenner would position herself not just as a trans woman, but the trans woman, a spokesperson for
trans people everywhere. Competing narratives materialized: was Jenner brave or opportunistic,
speaking her deepest truth or somehow inauthentic? Her sudden appearance on the scene
generated plaudits from odd bedfellows (black transgender actress and activist Laverne Cox,
Republican senator Lindsey Graham) and suspicion from others (second-wave feminist icon—
and notorious transphobe—Germaine Greer, radical trans activists). As the months wore on,
Jenner, high in her isolated Malibu bunker, developed a rocky relationship with what she called
“the community,” alternately affiliating herself with high-profile trans figures and organizations,
and alienating them with discordantly conservative political views. By 2016, Jenner, a lifelong
Republican, had volunteered herself as “trans ambassador” to Republican presidential candidate
Ted Cruz—a supporter of state legislation denying trans people the right to choose public
restrooms in accordance with their gender identity—and, when rebuffed, endorsed Donald
Trump, whom she described as being “very good for women’s issues” (Ennis; “Politically”). Her
little-watched show I Am Cait was canceled after two seasons, and her moment in the spotlight
of LGBT politics appears to have ended.
But for reasons that, I will contend, involve the complex relationship between
transgender, queer politics, and camp aesthetics,3 we have not yet made sense of just how strange
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I use the term queer politics to denote a discursive sphere occupied by a range of constituencies with some relation
to the idea of being part of a sexual and/or gendered counterpublic.
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this dream has been. Caitlyn Jenner, I argue, is at once a classic and a highly contemporary camp
figure who has emerged at a moment when camp as a reading practice has fallen out of fashion.
The version of camp I refer to here has often been theorized as a mode of spectatorship that
celebrates failure—for instance, the failure of a piece of art to produce the aesthetic effect it
intends—as a way of generating a satirical commentary on the conventions of the unattained
effect. Most iconically, intentionally or unintentionally “failed” performances of gender have
been said to efface the conventions of femininity and masculinity.4
What Jenner fails at, however—on I Am Cait and in her performance as transgender
spokeswoman more broadly—is not so much gender but a particular iteration of gender politics.
Because of her transgender body and the leadership role she has chosen to play with it, Jenner is
expected to embody certain political norms, but fails to correctly appropriate their conventions.
In doing so, she sends up the conventions of contemporary queer politics themselves, starting
with the naturalness of the association between subaltern subjects and subversive attitudes. But
the same political imaginary that has naturalized this association has eschewed camp as a queer
method of reading. Jenner is therefore rendered illegible—and the continued usefulness of camp
as a reading method, I argue, becomes palpable via its absence. Let us leave Caitlyn for a
moment, then, and revisit the status of camp within queer theory and its relationship to
transgender.

Camp’s Methods
The notion of camp as a queer method goes back as far as the earliest attempts to unpack
the notoriously hard-to-define term. Critics writing in or concerned with the pre-Stonewall
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period often describe camp as a secret code between queers that functioned as a practice of
collective survival. Thus, for Esther Newton (borrowing from Kenneth Burke), camp is a
“strategy for a situation” (Halperin 218). For Jack Babuscio, it is a “strategy of survival in a
hostile world”; for Richard Dyer, “a form of self-defense” (Shugart 25). Whether they see it as
fundamentally inhering in objects (as a performance of style or sensibility), subjects (as a way of
reading an object’s style of performance), or both, critics tend to view camp as an approach to
being queer in a straight world.
Judith Butler brought camp to the forefront of queer methodological inquiry in a
founding moment of queer theory, the publication of Gender Trouble in 1990. Butler elaborated
the notion that camp uses parody and irony to create odd marriages between terms
conventionally seen as opposed—high/low, masculine/feminine, real/fake, surface/depth—in
order to subvert the social norms that govern identity. In particular, she famously argued, camp’s
affiliation with drag performance empowers it to destabilize the naturalness of gender in the eye
of the beholder. “In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender
itself—as well as its contingency,” Butler wrote. “[G]ender parody reveals that the original
identity after which gender fashions itself is an imitation without an origin” (175).5 In her
account, then, camp is a mode of queer political critique.
But camp’s status as a political method cannot be taken for granted. Though many critics
have taken Susan Sontag to task for the claim in her formative 1964 essay “Notes on Camp” that
camp is essentially apolitical, the longstanding association of liberatory politics with the
assertion of authenticity has rendered camp’s politics suspect since its first theorizations. As
5

What else might camp be good for? The question lies beyond the scope of this essay, but to take a few examples,
critics have seen camp as a method for establishing one’s place at the top of a cultural hierarchy and/or establishing
a democracy of taste by bringing all culture down to the same level (Sontag); for repurposing unwanted cultural
objects from fashion’s rubbish bin (Ross); or for exposing the workings of capital (Tinkcom). Fabio Cleto’s
anthology Camp: Queer Aesthetics and the Performing Subject (1999) provides a good overview.
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Michael Trask notes, Sontag’s idea of “Being-as-Playing-a-Role” (Sontag 56) is not unique to
camp, nor does it automatically undergird a desire to deconstruct social norms. Indeed, in the
postwar period this view was most prominently espoused by apologists for social conformity like
Erving Goffman, for whom “performance [was] not a political matter but simply a way of life
that always leaves the world intact” (Trask 171). The New Social Movements of the 1960s
accepted the equation between role-playing and the apolitical, and responded by trying to strip
performance away from authentic being. Camp, by contrast, with “its zeal for artifice [. . . ] has
often been seen as pre-political, even reactionary. In its commitment to the mimicry of existing
cultural forms [. . . ] the politics of camp fell out of step and even into disrepute (as a kind of
blackface) with the dominant ethos of the women’s and gay liberation movements” (Ross 325).
Gender Trouble bridged a gap between camp performance and liberatory politics via the
“explicit politicization of imitation itself” (Trask 169). This shift to an understanding of camp as
queer political method—“a form of queer deconstruction” (Prosser 25)—was decisive in the
establishment of queer theory as a field. Butler’s vision of camp was further elaborated by critics
like Pamela Robertson and José Esteban Muñoz, who explored the complex ways in which
women and queers of color have utilized camp, challenging a critical commonplace that has
“equate[d] camp with white, urban, gay male taste” (Robertson 4)—a point to which we will
return later in this essay.
Camp’s role in queer theory, however, was in turn troubled by theorists of transgender
who argued that Butler (or readers of Gender Trouble who drew conclusions that Butler did not
necessarily intend) appropriated the transgender body to suture the fragile alliance of camp with
political subversion. In the argument’s schema, Jay Prosser writes, “the constructedness of
straight gender is obscured by the veil of naturalization,” while “queer transgender reveals,
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indeed, explicitly performs, its own constructedness. In other words, queer transgender serves as
heterosexual gender’s subversive foil” (31). Queer theory had thus established a chain of
signifiers in which “transgender/camp/queer/performativity” each imply the presence of the
others (26). This equation forced transgender subjects to shoulder more than their fair share of
the burden of gender performativity. Transgender, as Susan Stryker put it, became “the site in
which to contain all gender trouble, thereby helping secure both homosexuality and
heterosexuality as stable and normative categories of personhood” (“Transgender” 214). Queer
theory’s account of camp could not account for “transsexuals who seek very pointedly to be
nonperformative, to be constative, quite simply, to be” (Prosser 32).
This critique has been unevenly absorbed in the ensuing years, helping to produce an
impasse in queer politics in which transgender subjects remain fetishized (if in a somewhat
different way than before), while camp has once again been deemed problematic. Much work in
queer and transgender studies is governed by an epistemological framework that, as Robyn
Wiegman has argued, “calls for scholars in identity studies to offer cogent and full accounts of
identity’s inherent multiplicity in ways that can exact specificity about human experience
without reproducing exclusion” (2). This version of an intersectional critical project faces an
injunction to continually bifurcate the categories of identity it takes as its objects, driving toward
a horizon beyond which the spiderweb of subaltern identity will be fully articulated, and social
justice (or at least its discursive possibility) will be achieved. The attempt to glimpse the other
side of this horizon can lead to the fetishization of certain kinds of bodies—the contours of
which change over time—as representing an Archimedean endpoint of radical otherness. Within
queer theory and politics, rapid changes in the social location of gays and lesbians have forced
these contours to shift quite rapidly. As a homonormative political vision has made its way to the
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center of US liberal politics and concomitant rights have been granted to some—generally white,
moneyed, and sexually respectable—gay and lesbian subjects, the L, G, and (more ambiguously)
B in the bricolage of queer identity no longer appear to pose, in and of themselves, an existential
challenge to social and political norms. A queer political discourse that remains beholden to the
logic of identity has thus passed the buck along to the T, asking transgender subjects to hold
down the fort of queer difference. The transgender subject—and particularly the figure of the
trans woman of color—has come to figure within these coordinates as “a utensil to reference at
will” when figuring the outer limits of political representability (Vidal-Ortiz 101). As Kate
Millett once wrote of Jean Genet, transwomen of color are seen within this discourse as having
“achieved the lowest status in the world,” and through that “perfection of opprobrium” have
“acquire[d] the pride of the utterly abject, a condition which turns out to be next door to
saintliness” (18).6
All of this has led to what we might call a politics of trans sincerity, in which the gendernonconforming subject is celebrated as transgressive to the extent that her nonconformity can be
read as serious—that is, to the extent that she rejects camp. In the summer of 2015, a few weeks
after Caitlyn Jenner debuted on the cover of Vanity Fair, this posture became explicit when a
Pride parade in Glasgow attempted to ban drag queens from the event out of concern that drag
performers would offend transgender attendees. After an outcry spearheaded by trans
communities online, the restrictions were modified to apply only to cisgender performers and
then lifted altogether. But in order to agitate against the ban, advocates of drag threw camp under
6

This tendency is most pronounced in activist discourse influenced by but not identical with theory produced in and
around the academy. A listicle that circulated on the feminist internet around the time Jenner transitioned, for
instance, speculated on the question of why queer kids today don’t listen to Ani DiFranco like we used to, and
suggested that perhaps “[t]oday’s media landscape boasts so many out, queer-identified famous people that we’re no
longer resigned to projecting our queer dreams and aspirations upon a cis woman who has two babies with a cis
man” (Heil and Pellegrino). The shifting horizon of intersectional politics is represented here as unidirectional
progress—and uncomfortably implies that trans media personalities currently function as a screen onto which the
fantasy of the antinormative body can be projected.
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the bus. Drag performers, as the organizer of an international drag festival put it, “have been
there at every Pride march and benefit raising countless amounts of money for charity and
fighting for equal rights. I think that because drag can be seen as camp, low-brow and comedic,
we forget about this” (Strochlic). Camp, in other words, is once again a byword for
“uncommitted and artificial” (Trask 1); gender-bending performance is salvageable only in spite
of its associations with camp (and because of performers’ instrumental function as a draw for
funders). And so things have come full circle: once maligned as misogynistic, camp performance
now risks being seen as transphobic. Authenticity has once again become the byword of
liberatory gender politics, but attached, this time around, to the transgender body itself.
This new vision of transgender evokes David Halperin’s account of a contemporary
homonormative sociality in which sex and desire have switched places with culture and
sensibility as tokens of admission into gay male life. Whereas once, Halperin quips, gay men hid
their porn collections in the closet and framed their Broadway Playbills, now they hide their
Playbills in the closet and frame their porn (95). Yet this state of affairs—which, in the case of
both transgender (particularly trans feminine) and gay male aesthetics, pivots on the status of
camp—exists in tension with one that has been more often remarked upon: the self-conscious
absorption of camp aesthetics into a wide swath of mainstream media productions, from Lady
Gaga to RuPaul’s Drag Race, which in turn bear a complex and varied relationship to queer
audiences. In Halperin’s account, such productions testify to the survival of gay culture, however
disavowed, after several generations of denial that it still exists or still matters.
I would amend this argument to claim that, though camp performance is in fact
ubiquitous, camp reading practices—techniques for interpreting a performance, cross-gendered
or otherwise, as camp—have been pushed back into the closet. “What Camp taste responds to is
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‘instant character,’” Sontag writes, “understood as a state of continual incandescence—a person
being one, very intense thing” (61). You may not be the gender you were assigned at birth, but
according to the ontology of camp, you are really something. (And most likely you are—as my
grandmother would say, with the emphasis on both words—really something.) Camp taste’s
response to such incandescence may take on a range of affective and epistemological guises. It
can appear as an intimate act of aggression, as in the drag spectator’s “read”—her knowing look
at a performance that shows its seams (Butler, Bodies 129). But it can manifest, too, as what Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick calls camp-recognition, in which the encounter with a tacky or overwrought
object elicits a gesture of sympathetic identification from the viewer who—instead of distancing
herself from the scene of aesthetic disaster—asks, “What if whoever made this was gay, too?”
(Epistemology 156). Either way, camp reading—forsaken or forgotten within much queer
political discourse today—marks an attempt to grasp its object as a whole.

Caitlyn’s Genre Trouble
Enter Caitlyn.
In one sense, Caitlyn Jenner is—as the publicity around her coming out insisted—the
perfect celebrity trans woman for our time. She perpetually frames herself in the language of
authenticity; in media appearances, her performance of femininity is earnest and consistent but
not flamboyant or over-the-top. Indeed, her move from long-suffering husband and father on
Keeping Up with the Kardashians to self-actualized woman on I Am Cait encapsulates the way
in which camp performance sometimes seems to be everywhere but the transgender body. Even
by the demanding standards of reality television, Keeping Up with the Kardashians is a very
campy show (and arguably a subversive one, in its foregrounding of the labor involved in the
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daily manufacture of the Kardashian gals’ perfect bodies). In the outrageously feminine
environment of this clan, Jenner (then known as Bruce)7 functioned as—in every sense—the
straight man. Caitlyn, despite her high-femme visage, comes across in much the same way—
direct, no-nonsense, a bit affectively flat, happiest when sports equipment is nearby. But since
she is, this time, the star—and since the show aspires to educate viewers on the proper ways to
think about trans life—camp aesthetics are not present in any obvious way.
Superficially, then, Jenner fits in well with the pieties that have long governed official
LGBT politics. Her media presence has been packaged as the latest in a wave of television
offerings—Amazon’s brilliant dramedy Transparent; Netflix’s disappointing one, Grace and
Frankie; ABC Family’s dismal reality show Becoming Us—of baby boomers coming out as
transgender or gay on the cusp of retirement age. Neoliberalism has for some time now taken its
own interest in the transgender body: having figured out how to sell “bodily flexibility [as] a
commodity (in the case of cosmetic surgeries for example),” it is eager to celebrate transgender
“as futurity itself, a kind of heroic fulfillment of the postmodern promises of gender flexibility”
(Halberstam, In a Queer 18-19). By undergoing a personal renaissance later in life, the fictitious
and real characters on these shows prove that it’s never too late to transform, rebel, self-fulfill,
sculpt your upper arms. This figuration becomes particularly explicit when older characters
transition, literally stepping out into a new body. In Jenner’s official narrative, then, she is the
ultimate rejuvenated senior, a woman whose most soul-searing dreams have come true at age
sixty-five through the marriage of money and technology to bravery and self-exposure. Beautiful

7

I use Jenner’s birth name, or deadname (a term proposed and debated within transgender communities), cautiously,
mindful of the fact that one position within trans political discourse sees doing so as an act of erasure,
delegitimation, or disrespect to the continuity of trans selfhood. Because Jenner has long been a public figure,
however, and because she has herself often invoked her former name when discussing her transition (as in an
instance we will shortly see), I will occasionally refer for clarity to “Bruce Jenner,” a celebrity with a distinct
persona who also, like all reality television stars, shared her name with a quasi-fictional character.
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Caitlyn; age-defying Caitlyn; Caitlyn who, as commentators noted, has not only a youthful new
body but a name fit for a millennial. Bruce Jenner was sixty-five; Caitlyn Jenner is, from a
certain perspective, no longer a baby boomer but a baby. In 2045, when Bruce would have been
ninety-five, Caitlyn will be thirty.
But the facts of her life constantly threaten to exceed this narrative. Jenner’s fans love her
for being renewed at the dawn of old age, but the decades she spent in the closet bring with them
the shadow of the melancholic, uncanny queer past that, as Heather Love argued in work that
presaged Halperin’s analysis, post-Stonewall queer identity is structured around repressing. For,
seen in a different light—the absinthe light of camp—Jenner appears as the heroine of an oldfashioned melodrama: celebrated, self-loathing, paranoid, reactionary, richer than God, a victim
and a victimizer, and yet possessed with an irrepressible will to become herself. Jenner’s 2015
Vanity Fair profile vacillates between the “It Gets Better” narrative she has sought to promote
and a much darker story, full of abjection and cruelty and Hollywood’s hall of mirrors
(Bissinger). Once a symbol of all-American masculinity who beat the Reds at the 1976
Olympics, Jenner’s life appears to have been overwhelmingly determined by the weird
vicissitudes of gender and media.8 Rich and famous, coasting on the proceeds of the hypermasculine persona she longs to shake off, wracked with indecision over whether and to what
extent to transition, crippled with social anxiety, she starts two families only to abandon them for
a metalife on Keeping Up With the Kardashians. On that show, she ridicules and is ridiculed by
her wife, Kris Jenner, and her daughters and stepdaughters, whose family business—
manufacturing outré femininity—staid Bruce can never be a partner in. She owns guns, and has
sometimes thought of taking her life with one. “I hope Caitlyn is a better person than Bruce,” she
It’s worth noting that Jenner, who once appeared in short shorts in a video with the Village People, attained her
stature as masculine icon in a period notable within recent US history for the wiggle room in its images of straight
masculinity.
8

37

told Vanity Fair; Jenner herself concurred (Bissinger 53; “Caitlyn”). Jenner and her four
previously estranged pre-Kardashian children reconciled after she came out, then fell out again
when she insisted that they appear on I Am Cait. They refused.
These narratives collide via Jenner’s eccentric relationship to transgender politics.
Successful transition under the sign of “transexuality” had been understood as the ability to
naturalize one’s gender identity—that is, to pass. The transgender politics that developed in the
1990s, by contrast, were defined by “the willingness of transgender folk to put themselves out
there and be visible, trading “passing for being read” and “the comfort of genetic-sexed
belonging for the platform of a political subjectivity” (Prosser 174). Like the queer politics with
which they emerged in tandem (though drawing on much longer genealogies in both cases), trans
politics entailed an avowed commitment to antinormativity. Kate Bornstein, a public intellectual
of the trans movement who helped to articulate its politics in her refusal to place herself on either
side of the gender binary, described herself early on as a “gender outlaw” (the title of her 1994
memoir); Susan Stryker sparked the formation of transgender studies in the academy that same
year with work on “genderfuck drag” and “transgender rage” (“My Words” 252).
Jenner, by contrast, could scarcely be less of a raging outlaw. “The question,” she muses
in one episode of I Am Cait, gazing from her terrace at the lush golf course below, “is will I be
able to swing a golf club with boobs?” (The answer: she will! [“The Road Trip: Part 1”].) Yet the
primary plotline of I Am Cait concerns her attempt to assimilate not into normatively cisgender
society but into the transgender community. In a surreal twist, Stryker served as a consultant for
Jenner’s coming-out interview with Diane Sawyer while Bornstein joined the cast of I Am Cait,
initially summoned to mentor Jenner about the politics of (anti)normativity (“Family”). A
heavily tattooed punk pixie in her sixties holding court in Jenner’s tasteful living room, she
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welcomes Jenner warmly as a new member of “the club” and counsels her cheerfully that “we
are freaks to a lot of the world” and the trick is to “own it.” Jenner, once again appearing baffled,
tries to correct her. “I feel like what we’re really trying to do here,” she retorts, “is kind of
normalize this as much as we possibly can.” Bornstein, as elder stateswoman, has the final word
in the conversation, but Jenner, as producer and star, ultimately frames the scene for her
audience. When Bornstein leaves, Jenner turns to the camera. Transgender activists, she says
wonderingly, “want to change society’s perception of gender identity, and to be honest with you,
they’re so normal, I can’t stand it.” Jenner can tolerate gender self-ascription—indeed, the
demand that such self-ascriptions be socially recognized is at the heart of her “normalizing”
vision for trans politics—but she cannot accept that the puckish former Scientologist in rainbowhued John Lennon glasses beside her on the couch understands herself as weird. Protesting too
much, I Am Cait constantly demonstrates just how abnormal the normative—that mode of
performance which claims normalcy—is wont to be.
A telling contrast might be drawn here with an earlier reality television star, Pedro
Zamora, a young gay Latino man living with AIDS who appeared on a season of The Real World
filmed shortly before his death in 1994. “Unlike his queer predecessors, [Zamora] exploited
MTV in politically efficacious ways; he used MTV more than it used him,” Muñoz wrote later.
“What started out as tokenized representation became something larger, more spacious—a mirror
that served as a prop for subjects to imagine and rehearse identity. This, in part, enable[d] the
production of counterpublics” (152-154). Twenty years later, Jenner—a figure with
conspicuously greater privilege and less charm, contending with the feedback loop of internet
reaction that has corroded the wall separating televisual representation and audience response—
attempted on her show to curate a friendly counterpublic herself. In other words, she assembled a
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squad.
In the second episode of I Am Cait, Jenner recruits a new group of friends, transwomen
all, and invites them to her mansion for dinner and girl talk (“The Road Trip: Part 1”). The
women are semidiverse, racially and otherwise: they include former sex workers, organizers, and
a Barnard professor, and they have different and sometimes conflicting ideas about what it
means to be trans. But all besides Jenner share a fluency in the mores of “the community” and
perform a belongingness to it, and (not coincidentally) all share a deep familiarity with structural
inequality. Jenner, it turns out, does not even have a shallow one. She frankly asks her guests to
do the pedagogical work of cluing her into the byways of trans life, and they graciously take up
the challenge, not just for the evening but for the duration of the show. But a pattern of gentle
callouts, reaction shots, and asides to the camera suggest that they have not anticipated just how
remedial that pedagogy will have to be. Over wine and cheese, actress Candis Cayne (later to
become Jenner’s purported love interest) tries to illustrate some of the struggles faced by noncelebrity transwomen, like paying rent and accessing health care. A sour look comes over
Jenner’s face and she opens her mouth to interject. Cayne continues, telling a story about a recent
encounter with a transphobic doctor. The group bubbles with familiarity and outrage. Jenner has
her tongue between her teeth, she is concentrating hard. “Really, that happened to you,” she says
stonily. Chandi Moore, a community health educator, rolls her eyes. “Yes, Cait, that happens all
the time. A day in the life of being trans.” Jenner’s suspicion turns to alarm, which spills out in
voiceover. “Hearing Candis’s story is shocking to me. I can’t believe some people would act that
way.” The camera zooms in as she kneads her beautifully manicured hands. “Honestly, this is
really scaring me. I have been catapulted into the spotlight, becoming a spokesperson for the
transgender community. But oh my God, what if people turn on me like that?” She is saved by
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the dinner bell before she can find out.
What if people turn on me like that? No matter how high the walls of her fortress, Jenner
cannot, of course, be guaranteed a life free of transphobic attacks. Yet her response exhibits a
glaring category error, confusing the material conditions of everyday trans life (in which many
transwomen are denied health care as a basic given of their existence) with the sphere of media
representation (in which “people” are liable to “turn” on a public figure, perhaps doing them
unwarranted psychic injury, but probably not threatening their insurance coverage). Many
similar moments follow as the series unfolds. In one episode, Jenner attends a support group for
transgender youth, facilitated by Chaz Bono, at the Los Angeles LGBT Center (“Family”). Some
teens in the group have been kicked out of their homes by their parents. Jenner tells them she
understands how rough it can be when your family rejects you; she has family problems, too.
Indeed, we have seen her struggle with these problems earlier in the episode. Kris Jenner and a
number of their children are angry at Caitlyn because she has said insulting things about them in
Vanity Fair. Kim Kardashian comes over for wine and on-camera emotional processing. “You
got the fame, but you’re losing your family,” says Kim. “I’ll do anything,” Jenner replies. “You
think a tweet?”
Jenner’s welcome among trans and queer audiences was always provisional, and it did
not take long for her to wear it out. A few months after coming out, she definitively broke ranks
with the LGBT community by telling Ellen DeGeneres about her reservations, as a
“traditionalist,” about marriages not conducted between “a man and a woman” (Episode 1,
Season 13).9 I Am Cait’s second season is framed as a tale of redemption in which politically

9

Around the same time, Jenner appeared likely to face manslaughter charges—later dropped—for hitting and killing
a pedestrian with her SUV a few weeks before publicly coming out. Asked by Today host Matt Lauer to respond to
the allegations, Jenner tersely shifted the conversation to the issue of transwomen incarcerated in men’s prisons
(Dillon and Ramisetti).
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incorrect Caitlyn gets another chance to learn to listen to the community, while the community
would learn, collectively, to listen to her. The season, which began airing just after Jenner
offered Ted Cruz her ambassadorship, follows Jenner and her squad on a road trip across the
Midwest. Outside a gala for a Chicago LGBT organization where she is being honored, Jenner
condescends to queer of color protesters holding signs with messages like “We Ain’t Cait”; she
seems more at home on a visit to her alma mater, a conservative Christian college in Iowa
(“Great Debate”). The question that animates the first several episodes, though, is whether Jenner
will be able to behave herself at a Democratic primary debate in Des Moines. Lounging in the
back of a private bus, Jenner exasperates her girlfriends with aggressive but vague right-wing
positions on government spending, immigration, Hillary Clinton, and a Republican Party
committed, Jenner argues, to transgender rights. “Some of these girls think that now that I’ve
transitioned I have to be a liberal, I can no longer be conservative,” Jenner reflects. “I don’t
believe that! I can keep all of my views the same, because I feel in my heart that that’s the best
way to go” (“Politically”). At such moments, the articulation of a transnormativity aligned with
class and race interests is rendered so explicit that the show nearly grinds to a halt.10 The squad
gives up on arguing with Jenner about what she says and reaches for the lower-hanging fruit of
how she says it; everyone hugs and agrees to be better listeners. Solemnly skating on the surface
of ideology with nowhere else to go, the show, canceled at the end of the season, was ultimately
less outrageous than boring—“like watching nail polish dry,” according to one critic (Laike). A
flimsy provocation in a news cycle saturated with spectacle, I Am Cait could not even keep up
with the Kardashians.

10

That Jenner might be read as a textbook study of the overwhelming power of class interests to determine ideology
has been argued most effectively by Adolph Reed Jr.
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Encountering the outré in the guise of the respectable, Jenner’s critics have struggled to
articulate precisely the nature of her offense. Leaving aside her haters on the violently
transphobic right, Jenner has faced two main camps of dissenters, representing warring accounts
of gender politics today. On the one hand, some feminists (sometimes referred to by their
opponents as Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminists, or TERFs) have tarred Jenner as an
imposter setting back the clock by reifying the link between womanhood and conventional
markers of femininity. (The hatefulness often implicit or explicit in this rhetoric should not be
understated: Greer, for instance, responded to Jenner’s coming out with the pronouncement that
“[j]ust because you lop off your dick and then wear a dress doesn't make you a fucking woman”
[qtd. in Abeni].) On the other, many queer and trans activists warily applauded Jenner’s coming
out but questioned the airtime it directed to a figure possessed of extraordinary privilege. Despite
being at loggerheads, these camps share an important critique: both see Jenner as having usurped
decades of political work done by others. “Jenner’s a rich white bitch—she can pay for
everything she needs,” Janetta Johnson, an advocate for transgender prisoners, told the
Guardian. “But I think she now needs to put some of that money back into the transgender
community as she has taken a lot. All these years we have been abused and battered, yet she has
used none of her power to help the community and bring about change” (qtd. in Pilkington).
What is noteworthy here is not that the complaint against Jenner has been lodged, but the
modesty of that complaint. Calling Caitlyn Jenner “a rich white bitch” is a little like calling
Donald Trump “some douchebag.” It’s not wrong, but its reduction of a highly singular character
to the most general typology serves less to deconstruct power than to obscure it, a sort of
missing-the-trees-for-the-forest. It irons Jenner into a set of identity formations that radically
understate the case, rendering her fabulousness and awfulness opaque. Jenner is not, as Sedgwick
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would say, “kinda subversive, kinda hegemonic” (Sedgwick and Frank 5). She’s deliciously
awful.
What no one is saying is that Jenner has uncomfortably and, it seems, unwittingly,
brought transgender back into relation with camp. For Jenner belongs in an entirely different
imaginative universe than the one LGBT and feminist communities today officially inhabit. She
is a Myra Breckenridge of our time, Dorian Gray without the attic. Warhol would have painted
her. She belongs in a lineage of fabulous, tragic, sometimes triumphant, often terrible rich white
bitches from Bette and Joan to Betsy and Ivanka. The women in this lineage, icons of what
Michael Trask calls “mean camp,” “are compelling precisely because they fail to transition, to
make the exchanges—surgical, sartorial, intellectual—that are basic to the culture of
redemption” (179). But this cannot, at the moment, be spoken within the terms of queer and trans
politics. Jenner is open to critique within the extant terms of these politics because she waltzed
into a world she appeared not to understand and, in a rather appallingly colonial maneuver,
attempted to claim it for herself. But because the same discourse is consumed by aspirations to
seriousness and authenticity, it wants to tell this story in the form of the manifesto or the
tragedy—anything but the melodrama. If transgender, for Jay Prosser writing in the 1990s,
marked the return of what was then queer theory’s repressed—the sexed body that lies beyond
the reach of language—today we might say that Jenner marks the return of queer theory’s current
disavowed object by bringing with her the genre conventions of camp.
I am arguing, to put a finer point on it, that when a rich, well-meaning, but slightly
villainous trans woman colonizes the spaces made with the blood, sweat, and tears of poor,
community-minded trans women over many decades, and she looks younger than they do
because she can afford better plastic surgery, it cannot not be camp. To my eye, moreover, I Am
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Cait’s attempt to displace this read was so ham-fisted that its flight from camp became camp
again, albeit at a new dialectical level. “It's not all in the eye of the beholder,” Sontag notes,
making the point that “not everything can be seen as camp” (54). The tenacity of our aesthetic
categories, I would add as a corollary, means that an object or a figure can insist upon its
campiness regardless of audience acknowledgment. If we recognize that aesthetic form is
historical, we must also grant that Jenner’s read precedes her. And thus, vital as it is that we
insist on the primacy of the trans subject of trans life, we also cannot, and should not, wish away
the persistence of the trans object of queer culture. To do so would be as narrow in its political
vision as banning drag queens from Pride.
At a moment when the gay white nationalist provocateur Milo Yiannopoulos spews hate
against trans people, immigrants, people of color, and women under the banner of a speaking
tour called “Dangerous Faggot,” it is probably safe to say that queer theory’s early optimism
about the subversive power of camp understated the implications of its political fungibility. But
to reject this queer method wholesale is to dispose of an excellent tool for dealing with precisely
the complexities of power and dispossession that intersectional queer and trans critique seeks to
tease out. Detached from the bourgeois white gay milieu with which it is often associated, camp
can function as a tool of what Muñoz called disidentification, “the hermeneutical performance of
decoding mass, high, or any other cultural field from the perspective of a minority subject who is
disempowered in such a representational hierarchy”—in other words, a way of relating to objects
that signify for the minoritarian subject as “both liberatory and horrible” (25, 15). These
“mediated and vexed identification[s]” serve as “survival strateg[ies]” for minoritarian viewers
faced with a media landscape awash in images of whiteness and power (18)—much as camp, for
earlier critics, allowed queers to strategically reinterpret the straight world as one they could
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inhabit.11
Practices of disidentification remind us that performers are not the only ones who wear
masks. It is also possible, as Pamela Robertson argues with regard to feminist camp, “‘to
masquerade as a spectator [. . .] [t]o assume the mask in order to see in a different way’” (14).
And so we return, finally, to the relationship between the camp object and the camp gaze—the
question of camp as a technique of reading. As an interpretive technique borrowed from drag
spectatorship, the read is enabled when a performance’s “approximation of realness” seems to
falter, such that “the artifice of the performance can be read as artifice” (Butler, Bodies 129). The
realness deficiency that constitutes the empty center of Jenner’s performance of politics is easily
exposed if we read her, taking her in all at once, instead of trying to break her down into her
component parts and then adding them up again in order to produce a verdict: hero or interloper,
real or fake.12 If the problematic of intersectional analysis, methodologically speaking, is that it
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Muñoz takes as a primary example James Baldwin’s recollection of seeing a Bette Davis movie on television as a
child: “I sensed something menacing and unhealthy (for me, certainly) in the face on the screen…but I was held, just
the same, by the tense intelligence of the forehead, the disaster of the lips: and when she moved, she moved just like
a nigger” (15). This scene, he notes, is a motif in narratives of cinema-going by queers and women of color; he cites,
too, Michele Wallace’s account of looking at Rita Hayworth or Lana Turner and thinking, “she is so beautiful, she
looks Black” (29). Elsewhere, Hiram Perez devotes an essay to his lifelong, ambivalent obsession with Imitation of
Life, tragic mulattos and all. And Hilton Als remembers that in Gone With the Wind, “Vivien Leigh as Scarlett
suffers, and says she will never suffer again, and I loved her so much I didn’t want her to suffer” despite the fact that
women like Scarlett “could lynch a nigger to pay for all their hardship” (143).
12 That this attempt has largely succeeded in producing a series of irresolvable antinomies perhaps became clearest
in the wake of a contretemps over an article by Rebecca Tuvel published in the feminist philosophy journal Hypatia
contending—as many popular commentators had done earlier—that recognition of Jenner’s (or any transgender
individual’s) gender identity should logically entail as well at least “the possibility” that Rachel Dolezal (or any
individual who understands herself as transracial) ought to be recognized for her ostensibly equivalent selfidentification (269). This question, and the question of whether the question can legitimately be asked, has been
thoughtfully taken up by scholars including Reed, Stryker (“Caitlyn”), and—directly addressing the Hypatia
controversy—Ani Dutta (qtd. in Duggan). I want to suggest simply that the kind of positivism involved in Tuvel’s
argument—the myopia of which derives from its failure to account for the social or the political, producing the kind
of thought experiment where the rules look something like “let’s pretend we live in a test tube and then forget we’re
pretending”—in fact mirrors the atomization of identity performed by some of the most vociferous criticisms of
Tuvel, Dolezal, and indeed Jenner in the name of intersectional analysis. Dutta identifies several typical instances of
the either/or logic that tends to play out in such conversations as a result, like the competing and unbridgeable
claims that “either all trans women have (or have had) male privilege, or no trans women have male privilege and
saying so is transmisogyny.” Lisa Duggan has compiled Dutta’s analysis and several likeminded critiques in a
helpful blog post.
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always demands more, the trouble with camp is that it declares victory too soon; working
through the structure of a joke, it thinks it’s already won. But by the same token, camp’s method
gives us great insight into the difficulty, given our stubborn incandescence, of doing politics—
which we all continually fail at. Caitlyn Jenner, a practitioner not of political camp but of campy
politics, just fails better.
For now, in the absence of a camp reading method, we continue to scream past each
other, as Caitlyn, frozen in the pages of Vanity Fair, sits alone in her bunker, wearing a ball
gown, drinking champagne, waiting for her new life to begin.
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Missing Time

S. was the one who usually wrote our fanfic. It’s all there in my files, packed into the box
my mom sends me from the Valley when I decide to write about the show. It tends to be in
screenplay form, and leans toward the carnivalesque. It’s 1970s night at the Haunted Mansion
and we are all together: Mulder and Scully, me and S.; their nemesis the Cigarette Smoking man,
a deep-state puppeteer responsible for countless acts of violence, and our nemesis Ms. Simonds,
an English teacher at Gaspar de Portola Middle School whose crimes I cannot recall. Exene
Cervenka of the legendary LA punk band X makes a cameo appearance. After a few tequila-andopiums, the gang throws open the gold-plated doors at a members-only club hidden
in Disneyland's New Orleans Square and discovers we’ve passed through a portal to the Life
Café, where everyone hangs out in RENT. We order soydogs and sing.
My stuff sounds stilted and self-conscious by comparison. My one real contribution to the
genre was a naïve first attempt, a fanfic that could not yet speak its name, which appears as a
notebook entry from the beginning of seventh grade.
9/22/97
Dear B.,
God, we have a lot of catching up to do. Well, first of all, between now and maybe
a month ago or so, I became an obsessive X-Files fan. Call it hanging out with S. too
much, but it is seriously the best show ever made. I even have a completely screwed up,
totally bogus theory about it. This is it:
The X-Files is not a Fox 11 TV show as commonly thought by a vast majority of
sane people in the world. It is instead written and produced by the secret government.
Now, Marissa, you may ask, what the hell are you talking about? Well, according to my
theory, this Secret Government began around the time of World War II. What they
intended was to gradually build suspicion about their existence until people began
rebelling. Then they could declare the rebels, who would be the majority of the American
people, a threat to society, and have them vaporized. (Am I starting to sound just a wee
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bit like a militia member here?) Unfortunately for them, the cold war and McCarthyist
policies and stuff started. So people got their attention off the Secret Government, and
vented their anger at the Russians instead. OK, skip to the ’80s. The cold war is almost
over, and the SG (you figure it out) guys are thinking, OK, now we can get down to
business. So they create fictitious people like George Bush and Bill Clinton to lure the
people into a false sense of security. But all the while, they’re dropping hints to get
people neurotic. So there should be a surge of UFO sightings soon (which, of course, are
just planted by the SG) and that’s how The X-Files started!!!!! Don’t you just love my
logic?!?
Anyway. I started the coolest club. It’s called the Messed Up People Club.
Things continue in this vein.
Sixth grade had not gone well. Around the beginning of the school year, I had become an
ardent communist. I knew about communism from musicals and Jewish historical fiction and the
night of the big earthquake when I was 8, when everyone left their houses at four in the morning
to loop past the palms on March Avenue in silent procession because the location of safety had
moved outside. A few months later, a big tacky house that only appeared to have cracked in a
few places went on sale nearby, in the foothills at the far edge of the Valley, and we moved in.
My mom spoke glowingly of our proximity to nature. Rabbits ate the lawn, and sometimes
coyotes ate the rabbits. My parents hired a gardener to replace the grass with AstroTurf. It was
the mid-1990s, but like a lot of people, we lived outside historical time.
As for the ardency, who can say? Like everything I started wanting in the months before
my first period, the desire for communism seemed both endogenous and alien, secret and selfevident. To me it seemed to explain a lot of things, but I tried to keep quiet about it because it
was, as we said at the time, very random. I found a Marxist reader in the den among my father’s
college books; it was too hard for me but I buried it like a fetish under my bed. It had always
been my custom to hide the media that could hurt me, like novels with bees or Nazis, around the
house. The philosopher Ernst Bloch distinguished between two currents of Marxism, one warm
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and one cold. The cold current—“the detective glance at history”—was about where capitalism
came from, how it worked, and ways it could be overthrown, and about all this I knew very little.
My current was the warm one, all strikes and hammers and bread and roses, a child’s
communism. Sometimes, if I started having too much fun being with other people, I laughed so
hard I peed in my pants, and a warm current froze into a cold one down my legs.
People think that only adults felt groggy and homesick after the end of history, but
children were sad, too. In the Valley, you could dress up as any decade. Kids were covered in
meaning. Or, I thought we were. Obviously I was bullied. Every day after school I sat at my desk
drawing automated rows of smiling girls and tried to divine who would eat whom, just from
looking. My only friends, B. and the other fuzzy glowworms who lived in my stomach, formed a
council to address the crisis, and schismed. At the end of the school year, I addressed them
sternly in my notebook.
6/5/97
A Letter to B.:
I am writing this because I don’t think you should be a communist any more. In that
Marxist book or whatever it is that Daddy has it says that the main idea in communism is
to abolish private property. Well, obviously, that has to do with economics and all that. I
think when we grow up we should focus on something less extreme and something that
will actually be paid attention to by regular people. Here’s a list of practical causes and
stuff that I can protest/advocate at some point in time:
Fur
Abortion
Gun control
Death penalty
Drugs (but not heavy ones)
Assisted suicide
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love,
marissa
The following entry, from August, concerns a birthday party to which I was not invited. By
September there was S., and The X-Files.
***
Something had happened, and we could not remember what it was. In Missing Time, a
1981 bestseller that helped establish the conventions of the alien abduction memoir, ufologist
Budd Hopkins explained that evidence of an extraterrestrial visitation often took the form of
precisely this sort of mysterious gap in experience (Hopkins). Abduction was a way of
describing rupture in its purest form, a literal wrinkle in time. I could relate: it wasn’t like I had a
better excuse for being such an old-fashioned girl. But I was not alone. In the 1990s, anyone
could be abducted, though the aliens seemed to have a thing for white girls, and a way of making
men feel like white girls even though they weren’t. Weird syndromes coagulated everywhere.
The deeper in the suburbs they appeared, the more mysterious they seemed, like signs from
another world. A postwar infrastructure of office buildings and tract homes designed to cordon
off the white middle class from the contagious city turned out to be built from noxious materials
that made people sick. Asbestos, formaldehyde, and 4-phenylcyclohexene, or “new carpet
smell,” dewed up in moldy corners beneath the level of perception (Murphy 81). Veterans
returning from Iraq complained of a rash of problems—memory loss, respiratory trouble—that
they attributed to chemical exposure. When no physical marker could be found for Gulf War
Syndrome, Mass Psychogenic Illness, a new term for hysteria, was extended for the first time to
men (92-93).
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The X-Files was born into this biosphere in 1993 on Fox, an upstart network trying to
figure out how to undercut its more established rivals with fan-based programming from The
Simpsons to the Fox News Channel, which came on the air in 1996. A seriously ambitious
program, The X-Files “made TV cinematic” as critic Theresa Geller put it in a recent monograph
(102), inspiring waves of cerebral genre programming and launching the careers of showrunners
like Vince Gilligan (Breaking Bad) and Frank Spotnitz (The Man in the High Castle). But the
show was also a quasi-respectable cousin of Jerry Springer at a time when reality, too, was
remaking TV. In this sense the series wasn’t science-fictional at all, but took place in a world just
like our own, where women being poisoned by their microwaves floated around with Lyndon
LaRouche supporters and AIDS denialists and 12-year-old excommunists in dubious pursuit of a
history of the present. There they all were, serially archived on a single flashing screen, from the
Loch Ness monster and the chupacabra to the JFK assassination and the defamation of Anita
Hill. In the last years of the 20th century, this solar system of conspiratorial thinking was where
the postmodern condition lived its best life. You could find yourself in cozy exile there, social
theorists said, if you’d tried too hard to picture technoscientific global capitalism and your brain
broke. I’d barely begun to try, and mine already had.
On The X-Files, the United States government was a shell company for extraterrestrial
interests in our GDP of biopolitical slop: neurons and wombs, oil fields and cornfields, radio
towers and internet cables, Nazis and bees. The cold war wasn’t really over, but it had also never
really begun, the whole thing having been, as Thomas Pynchon put it in Gravity’s Rainbow
twenty years earlier, a front for the war of multinational technology cartels against everyone else
(521). Now, in the Nineties, world-historical conflict farted in its fresh grave as hoax and scandal
filled the deregulated airwaves. Cable news proved such a deadly carrier of “subliminal
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messages” that in one episode, people in a D.C. suburb watch TV pundits weigh in on Bosnia
and are hypnotized into homicidal rage against their loved ones (“Wetwired”). In other words,
paranormal activity caused by US–alien collusion manifested on a day-to-day basis as
unaccountable violent symptoms bugging out the collective sensorium. In the parlance of the
show, this sort of thing was an X-file, a local mystery with national implications that the federal
government didn’t want to solve. Such cases fell to an odd couple of FBI agents: Fox Mulder
(doofy, irreproachable David Duchovny), a believer bent on avenging a government cover-up of
his sister’s abduction, and Dana Scully (acute, deadpan Gillian Anderson), a medically trained
skeptic assigned to spy on him. Mulder and Scully spend the series investigating strange
phenomena, from a 120-year-old serial killer who hibernates between meals of human liver to an
American luxury liner perpetually invaded by Germans because it’s always 1939 in the Bermuda
Triangle, on behalf of a regime that wants to snort their brains. The X-Files may not have been
the best postmodern novel ever written but it was, despite stiff competition, perhaps the longest.
The show ran until a few months after September 11, 2001. It spawned two forgettable
feature films and started up again as a series in 2016 in a painful nostalgia exercise; this spring it
has ostensibly been laid to rest for good. The X-Files’ creator, Chris Carter—a SoCal boy who
spent thirteen years at Surfing Magazine before he started the show—shot episodes like small
movies where the sublime architecture of conspiracy in the post-Watergate thriller entered the
orbit of Lynchian Americana: All the President’s Men Meet the Log Lady. Some episodes
layered one aesthetic atop the other: in countless scenes, girls in white nightgowns run barefoot
through the woods illuminated by the glare of spacecrafts or SWAT teams. Others seemed
located halfway in between, in endless gray suburbs where Washington and Main Street alike
flicker in between commercials on a half-watched screen before a working mom is gobbled up
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by a swarm of irradiated cockroaches. Either way, everything looks like Vancouver, where the
show was shot through its fifth season, creating the uncanny impression that, in the Nineties, the
entire country was a Northwestern logging town haunted by industry. The show’s devotees
created an online subculture largely driven by female X-philes, who debated the relationship
between its conspiracy-driven “mythology” arc and its less sweeping but often more satisfying
“Monster of the Week” one-offs, as well as the persistent question of whether Mulder and Scully
should bang. (“Shippers” said yes, “no-romos” said it would ruin the show.) At a time when
being obsessed with stuff on the internet was still the province of freaks and geeks, the show’s
producers winked back, turning losers into collaborators.
Teetering between police procedural and science fiction, The X-Files, Geller notes,
foregoes the positivistic comforts of a regular forensic drama, in which truth can be discovered
and justice served in the space of a single episode. The show’s collision of genres, she writes,
conscripts Mulder and Scully into the role of social detective—Fredric Jameson’s term for a
sleuth, sometimes a policeman or a journalist, but sometimes a Jane Q. Public or even a whole
community—who, motivated by forces beyond the need to file a report, approaches “society as a
whole” as “the mystery to be solved” (qtd in Geller 22). As such, our heroes stumble through
each X-file in a state of epistemological crisis. Halfway through the pilot episode, driving one
stormy night down a back road in an Oregon town zapped with extraterrestrial enterprise, the
agents are enveloped by a halo of light and their car goes dead. When the light subsides, Mulder
checks his watch and squeals that nine minutes have vanished into thin air. “Time can’t just
disappear!” Scully, panicked for the first time, stammers through the rain at her giddy partner.
“It’s a universal invariant!” Mulder, riveted beyond gloating, pants back, “Not in this zip code”
(Pilot).
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By granting impressive measures of scientific reasoning to one and gestalt interpretation
to the other, the show gives its leads a basic measure of dramatic and intellectual equality.
Neither agent is Sherlock to the other’s Watson, and each contends with the harassment that
befalls women who do autopsies and men who read tea leaves. Both are smart, stubborn, lonely,
and brave. At the same time, a persistent sleight of hand gives ontological priority to Mulder: it’s
his world we’re visiting, and in the final instance, his research methods tend to be the ones that
work. (Not coincidentally, Anderson is a serious, thoughtful actress who would go on to play
Lily Bart and Nora Helmer. Duchovny, at his best, just kind of is Fox Mulder. Had he not
dropped out of Yale to play gender-bending roles in Twin Peaks and porny indie films, he might
have finished his dissertation on Pynchon and his peers, “Magic and Technology in
Contemporary Fiction and Poetry” [Sweet].)
To be Scully—or, in a more archetypal sense, to be “a Scully”—is to insist on the laws of
physics even as the aliens stretch you out on board their ship. It’s to begin a sentence, as she does
in “Die Hand Die Verletzt” (The One Where Devil Worshippers Run the School Board), “I mean
there’s nothing odd about—” only to be cut off by toads falling from the sky. It’s to climb the
rungs of an institution that seeks to push you off the ladder, to stoically salute your authoritarian
father’s coffin, to relax by studying the DSM-IV on a Friday night over a glass of wine, and still
to somehow find yourself among mutants, the odd girl in a different boys’ club than the one
you’d intended to join. As with her predecessor Clarice Starling, Jodie Foster’s dogged young
criminologist in The Silence of the Lambs, Scully dares to look into the hearts of the coldest
killers, and they alone dare to look back.
To be a Mulder, on the other hand, means your ears buzz with white noise but your
sacred duty is to keep it Real. Because you’re obsessed with getting outside you take a job way
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on the inside, put on the grey suit you were born in, and work both for and against the (Cigarette
Smoking) Man, who considers vaping you every eighth episode but then just maims you again
like a favorite broken toy. Your basement office under the panopticon is so close to where the
maps are made, it’s off the map. A polonium-tipped dart’s throw from knowledge but so far from
power that they don’t even bother harassing you half the time, you curl up in the belly of your
own surveillance, eat sunflower seeds out of the bag, jerk off at your desk beneath your iconic
poster of a grainy UFO with its block-lettered caption, “I Want to Believe.” “It’s interesting,” a
shape-shifting rapist tells him in an episode called “Small Potatoes” (The One Where Mulder
Gets Impersonated By a Man with a Tail). “I was born a loser. But you’re one by choice.” To be
a Mulder is to be a kind of idiot, and to be right. In many episodes, he crumples to the ground as
though literally stricken by the force of terrible knowledge. I did that too, I bragged to my
journal. And I liked to watch.
***
In our book, even in the late section titled “The Great List of Differences,” S. and I never
quite come out and say that she is a Scully and I a Mulder. This might appear in retrospect like a
correction for the show’s own bias, a critique of how contemporary metaphysics still estranges
science from magic after all these years, or a mature recognition that Mulder and Scully aren’t
real. In fact, I think S. was happy to acknowledge her own allegiance to the latter, while I was
too uneasy to admit to such a fundamental split.
I had known S. since the second grade. We liked each other because we were both
serious, but for the same reason didn’t play together much. Once I borrowed an armload of her
books, then forgot about them for so long that we had outgrown them by the time I brought them
back. In middle school we became part of the same carpool, and at the start of seventh grade she
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became what, had we been paranormal investigators, I would have called my partner. It was
1997. Earlier that year, the thirty-eight remaining members of Heaven’s Gate, a UFO cult that
started in the Seventies, washed down phenobarbital with vodka for the same reason everyone
did what we did in those days: the millennium was coming.
My mom, a special-ed teacher, only diagnosed me with autism spectrum disorders when I
was getting on her nerves, which in those days I usually was. S. presented her with a complicated
case. At school, most kids on the spectrum had trouble getting along, or only hung out with each
other. S. gravitated in their direction, but she was as cool as an algorithm, or a brand, and could
sense the same quality in the objects around us as disinterestedly as a nurse checking for fever.
Later, when there were more of us, we spent years trying to account for her unaccountability, as
though she had joined us from another planet. In retrospect, though, she was simply from a
feminist cyberpunk future that never quite happened. She was a tiny child, pale with freckles and
acne, who wore a spiked dog collar and soft bright T-shirts from babyhood, and who seemed to
have more processing power available to her than anyone anyone had ever met. She learned
programming languages and, like the girls who took Korean lessons after school, turned her
handwriting into a font. At one point she tried to make pocket protectors happen and almost
succeeded; if we’d had more internet in those days, she might have. She was mean to boys and
they fell in love with her; if we’d had more internet in those days, she might have become one
herself. When she wrote about middle school as an adult, her alter ego was a secret robot.
To her great frustration S. had to share a small room with her sister, but in my mind her
house was, if not a portal to the Life Café, at least a peephole. Through it could be glimpsed a
full-spectrum pastiche of cultural politics: her aunts and uncles on one side included Marxist art
historians and a regional leader of the Objectivist society; on the other, a Sonic Youth producer
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with a bathtub full of records. It was her father, who drank wine and watched baseball and read
John Barth, who informed me one day in our carpool, “Work is hell.” S. and I silently agreed that
I would come as close as possible to taking on her tastes, habits, and Meyers-Briggs
classification (INTP: The Logician), and use the results to establish our superiority to the
normies around us. Throughout my files from this time, our belief in the typological power of
codes we had made up ourselves appears with a conspiracist’s selective rigor. (“I’ve finally
figured out why my mom and I don’t get along,” I wrote. “She’s an ESFP!”) In the notebooks I
manically maintained in the fall of seventh grade, I claimed that we had become so close, we
seemed to be merging into one.
I kept, for those months, not one but two journals. In my regular journal, I fantasized
about making a suicide pact with a boy in a Pearl Jam shirt, and global annihilation as an
antidote to slow violence. I copied S. I complained about my mom, who compared me during
one fight, I reported indignantly, to another young woman lacking in “fundamental values”:
Squeaky Fromme, the Manson girl who’d plotted murder from Spahn Ranch just a few miles up
the canyon from our house. In my X-Files journal, which opens with an apology for “my everinsistent urges to write even more rambling pages” about the show, I traced David Duchovny’s
face out of Us Weekly, hit critical walls (what was the proper level of detail to include in an
episode recap for which I was the only reader?), and tried to suck a political education out my
television.
***
History, we were told in the 1990s, was something that happened to other people. The
recent past was littered with code-named police actions that, rendered pointless by the
evaporation of the cold war, no longer even had the dignity of the unmentionable. Conservatives
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kept building monuments to the death of communism that no one wanted to visit (Wiener).
Liberals wanted to forget the whole messy business and gave themselves endless Oscars for
movies about World War II. Only fools with sheaves of Xeroxed newsletters thought they were
smart enough to construct a narrative out of a deafening drone. The more distant past, upon
inspection, turned out to be much the same, leading some to suspect that history had never
happened at all. There were however exceptions to the rule: events taken to be unique in their
world-shattering horror, and exceptional people who had come near them and gotten away no
longer quite themselves. We, too, could be exceptional: if we were good and listened hard,
history could become something that happened, though only by proxy, to us. Every year on the
Day of Remembrance, survivors came to Hebrew school and asked us to feel on our skin the
licks of the Shoah’s eternal flame, and to guard with our lives its redemption in the birth of a
handsome nation. In history class in regular school, we learned nothing at all. And yet the past
kept ghosting through like reruns.
Reruns were the form in which I watched the show, already four seasons in and
beginning its long decline by the time I got onboard. Seeing its already baffling conspiracy arc
unfold out of order saved me the hassle of getting fully invested in a plot that often made no
sense. True to its times, The X-Files lacked a show bible, the reference guide typically used to
maintain consistency over the course of a series (EW Staff). Yet even at its most labyrinthine the
program imparted the crucial thesis that cataclysmic violence was not merely the stuff of
historical memory, but an ongoing process of natural history still ravaging lands and bodies
zoned for continuous extraction. “Something just clicked about the whole Holocaust,” I wrote,
shaken, after watching season two’s searing “Anasazi” trilogy (The Ones Where Mulder Gets
Decolonized), in which we learn that the Kissinger-era State Department collaborated with ex-

59

Nazi scientists on the production of human-alien hybrids, using tribal populations as test
subjects. When Mulder finds evidence, the government destroys the tape, but Navajo code
talkers have already memorized its contents. The Final Solution, the episodes suggested,
emerged not from the depths of an unfathomable hell but had a logic that preceded the camps
and survived their dismantling; maybe it was even right at home in the United States. Here, if
memory stood a chance at enduring through the body, it was lodged in throats intubated by
colonial force.
Did I get all that, or did it go over my head entirely? Was it even there to begin with? The
X-Files, a show whose social detectives are at the end of the day still cops, occupied a cunningly
ambiguous slot in the ideological lineup of its equivocating era: symptomology without
diagnosis, conspiracy without collectivity, paranoia for its own sake, a bossa nova
accelerationism for a rainy evening with an eclectic drug collection and nowhere to go all night.
Critics spanning the political spectrum loved it, especially those concentrated at its weirdo ends
like S.’s aunts and uncles. The appeal to academics on the left of a series about intrepid
hauntologists trapped in an institutional maze run by evil overlords perhaps goes without saying.
The show was like Duchovny: if it hadn’t landed on Fox, it would have just taught cultural
studies. Many of its most poignant, sophisticated episodes are seminars on the power, and the
limits, of Mulder’s methods for patiently sifting through piles of cultural detritus on the lookout
for connections between dubious Monsters of the Week and tortuous conspiracy arcs. On the
dust jacket of her excellent cultural history of ufology, the Marxist political theorist Jodi Dean
broke the fourth wall of scholarly detachment entirely, posing in front of an “I Want to Believe”
poster and appearing to suppress a giggle. But the libertarian right boasted hardcore fans as well,
and for similar reasons. The show represented resistance to neoliberal governmentality in the
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form of clandestine cells: hacker collectives, militias, cults practicing archaic magics bright and
dark. In doing so, it seemed to beckon its own cult following, wrote the libertarian scholar Paul
Cantor, who has devoted hundreds of admiring pages to The X-Files, “as if it were trying to
replicate in its audience what it shows in the world at large.”
For me, too, The X-Files held out the promise of subculture, the meaning of style. I
studied Mulder’s methods—suspend disbelief when doing fieldwork, wink at your interview
subjects—and tried to make them my own. But because I was twelve and had never heard of
anything, the show functioned even more literally as a dictionary of esoteric knowledge from
which America could be inferred. The secrets made me giddy and desperate, like hearing an
incredible bit of gossip over a wiretap. S. and I got on the phone every Sunday night after the
show ended and talked for hours.
Fandom was a way of organizing knowledge and desire, a kind of epidemiology. You
learned from the cluster of objects that drew near you what kind of person you were. The internet
was like that, too: it sorted. S. loved it there, and from it brought back news of our cult. From her
I learned of the epic online battles between shippers and no-romos, and S. and I took up the
cause of the latter with the passion of hardheaded agents who thought romance was for little
girls. Around the beginning of seventh grade, men from the phone company had come to my
house, too, and installed our own beeping, flashing modem. My journal makes no mention of the
internet’s installation, but by the end of the year, it’s there in every entry, a thrilling, ugly hassle.
I went through the motions of fury with my parents for limiting my access to its catacombs, but
even S. knew I basically agreed with them: I wanted it to leave us, and hoped it still might.
Sometimes, through the entropy of perversion, curiosity, a hunch, I found myself in bad
company. “I finally managed to subscribe to the INTJ page, and they’re all Ayn Rand freaks!” I
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complained to my journal. “‘Mercy is a trait that only an F can possess!’” And yet my diary
itself, in the moments it draws most clearly from my X-Files notebook, sounds unnervingly like
the adolescent fascism of 4chan. There is a story about the Pentagon “vaporizing” rebels in
Montana, a state my mother often used to illustrate the point that even in the Nineties, a Jew
could not go everywhere. There is a poem called “Awaken” in which the speaker steps into
reality, “where bureaucrats are not cheerful pink bunnies/And dreamers do not rule the world.” It
wasn’t that I’d switched sides in my private political pantomime where communists and fascists
were still at war. If anything, I probably rested too easy in the assumption that I never could. It
was simply that my enemies had the advantage of actually existing, at least in larval form, filling
the Web with paeans to the intellectual superiority of white men who liked to code. I dabbled in
their language because, as far as I knew, I did not.
On New Years Day, I described a fight with my parents in which I lost access to language
and became “a dead circuit.” Chunks of the recent past had gone missing, and the cloud of
absence threatened the borders of the present. The visitors had landed, Jodi Dean wrote that year:
The internet was changing people; it had gotten into our blood, scrambling codes (5-11). Just as
Budd Hopkins, the ufologist, had promised, we were no longer the watchers but the ones being
watched. I still have information sickness. I don’t know what it’s really called.
On January 2, though, I had better news. I took out what amounted to full-page ads in
both my regular and X-Files journals, indicating in giant purple letters that something had
changed in my house, something that meant I would now be able to watch the show every night:
WE
GOT
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FX!!!
And then, for months, I barely wrote at all.
***
When my journal picks up again around the start of eighth grade, a new kid has emerged,
kind of hyper, in the midst of a willful cultural discovery process. I loved Sylvia Plath and the
Violent Femmes and “anarchists” and my JNCOs. My mapping had become more focused; there
were fewer global conspiracies and more genealogies of punk. An X-Files soundtrack had
introduced me to Nick Cave and a Nick Cave CD had a cover of “All Tomorrow’s Parties” and
“All Tomorrow’s Parties” led me down the stairs to the Velvet Underground. At some point in
the process I no longer needed the show: I could read lots of things now. It was 1998. In
Calabasas, where the rich girls from Hebrew school lived behind locked gates, a new outdoor
mall was built in the shape of a fake 19th-century French plaza. They called it The Commons.
By the time S. and I graduated from middle school, we had built a world together. M. and S.’s
Book, made one long weekend after graduation in the summer of 1999, catalogued that world
before it was destroyed, as we knew it would be, by our departure for different high schools: a
math-and-science magnet for her, a humanities one for me. Like an eponymous first album, it did
not have another name. Its cover is adorned with cutouts and stickers—a Lisa Frank palm tree,
Beck, the Ayatollah Khomeini, a potato. Its handwritten, Xeroxed pages are filled with song
lyrics and comics and fanfic and assessments of our friends and endless inventories of our
universe.
Things We Want (in S.’s writing), No. 41: No tongue so I can sound like the Sex Pistols
(M. thought of this first).
Stuff That Scares Us (S. again), No. 31: Obsessive fans-turned-assassins. Where the hell
is your brain, I’m talking to you, Mark David Chapman.

63

Things That Depress Me (my writing), No. 14: How Columbine made all these shitty laws
happen and now you can’t wear trench coats and stuff.
___ No. 15: How my dad fucked my computer and I can’t get in.
___ No. 16: How communism didn’t work.
We wanted to distribute our book widely, but my mom read it, noted that it was, among
other things, a burn book—Oh, and her choreography sucks, S. wrote of one friend—and
forbade this, instead driving us to Staples to print the only two copies in existence. “It’s just me
and S. again,” I wrote in my journal at the end of that summer, “and god we had the most
depressing conversation tonight. About how we’re so worried about everything: high school,
college, life. How this era totally sucks and even our parents admit they had it easy, but at the
same time we are so lame cuz all our music is old and we act like it came out yesterday. We are
obsessed with old dead people. Everyone is fuckin dead or they own stores in places like Silver
Lake.” On bad days, I admitted, “I completely lose myself in time.”
***
Mulder and Scully’s partnership could not survive the turn of the millennium and neither
could mine and S.’s. In the show’s final seasons, the agents finally seem to be sleeping together,
ruining an important source of dramatic tension exactly as we knew it would. Both leads had
pulled back from the series and were partially replaced by generic opposite-gendered
investigators. George W. Bush was elected, the twin towers fell, and the national appetite for
conspiratorial fantasy was sated, for a while, by the nightly news.
By that time I had stopped watching. S. stuck with the original series until the end; I quit
when the going got tough. She wanted to remain an extraordinary child and I was trying to
become a more ordinary miserable teenager. Neither of us could keep up with the other and we
suffered and quarreled. For S., computing offered safe passage to wonder; the beauty of form
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was on the inside. I remained locked out; computers break when I come near. At Armenian
church camp one summer she welcomed Jesus into her heart and kept him there for a few years,
and I discovered my own terror in the face of belief. She was celibate; I just couldn’t get laid.
We each loved other girls but not quite, we decided, each other. Later, she would study
engineering and I would study its critiques. Later still, she would move to the Pacific Northwest,
build brains for a big company, and fill a mansion with marvelous toys and then children to play
with them. I moved across the country to my city, where I wander around staring
uncomprehendingly at objects and waiting for them to stare back. I still have my “I Want to
Believe” poster over my desk. It was the first thing I ever bought online.
What is easier to see with greater distance is that, like the relationship between Mulder
and Scully, or between conspiratorial fantasy and real life, the epistemological tension that had
held the show together—the coy flirtation between magic and science—had been consummated
too, literalized into a strange new lifeworld entirely saturated by computer technology. The XFiles filled its characters with alien-manufactured microchips, but it never really caught up to a
world with smartphones. Detective work on The X-Files had happened in the dark, the agents’
flashlights casting single beams across a blackened screen. But by the turn of the millennium, the
night was fading. In Russia, a space company made plans to dot the sky with satellites that would
reflect sunshine back to earth at all hours, creating “daylight all night long” (Crary 4). The
satellites never launched, but it didn’t matter: the new order of things had eliminated shadows,
and with them, an entire methodology for seeing in the dark.
The X-Files reboot first aired in the early months of 2016, when the air was humid with
denial. Fittingly, the real problem is the lighting. Anderson has a new self-help book out;
Duchovny, back from rehab for sex addiction, wrote a novel in which farm animals representing
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Israel and Palestine make friends, and has a Twitter account for his dog. In the new episodes,
they uncannily seemed to be playing themselves—her with sharpened cheekbones, him with
an open top button on a crisp white shirt—like they’d just come from brunch in Santa
Monica. But an influx of daylight created a problem for the series on another level, too. In
“My Struggle” and its sequels (The Ones That Felt Longer Than a Karl Ove Knausgaard
Novel), the show’s new myth arc revolves around our heroes’ attempt to deal with a strange
new bedfellow, a popular right-wing conspiracy peddler on the model of Alex Jones, who is
both clearly odious and possibly onto something. For all the original program’s storied selfreflexivity, the new show could not figure out how to live up to its twist, both jaw-dropping
and enragingly inevitable, on the old one: Fox Mulder Meets Fox News. The call is coming,
all too obviously, from inside the house.
The reboot rebooted again in early 2018, its problems further magnified by everything
we’ve learned in the past two years. Season eleven, does, however, include one all-time great
episode, “The Lost Art of Forehead Sweat” (The One Where an Alien Does a Trump
Monologue), a bittersweet film essay on the impossibility of The X-Files in a “post-conspiracy”
age when power refuses to go through the motions of concealing its most violent machinations.
In one montage that stretches across the Bush and Obama years, a nebbishy paper pusher evolves
from a bored postal clerk to a napping Securities and Exchange Commission operative to a CIA
agent casually waterboarding a bound man to a drone operator accidentally bombing a far-off
wedding, all from the comfort of the same cubicle. At the episode’s end, Mulder and Scully meet
a bedazzled extraterrestrial ambassador who has arrived in a flying saucer to inform them that
the aliens’ study of earth is complete; the intergalactic confederation no longer wants anything to
do with us. “We are building a wall,” he intones cordially but firmly. As a parting gesture, he
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gives Mulder a trim, leather-bound book called All the Answers, “in case you have any questions
remaining.”
“It’s okay, Mulder,” Scully reassures her stunned partner when the spaceship has whizzed
off. “There will always be more X-files.” “No! It’s not true!” Mulder howls, hurling the book
and crumpling to the ground” (“The Lost Art”).
The New York Times recently reported that the Pentagon has spent millions of dollars on
UFO research in the past decade. Weird objects are appearing in the sky again, or maybe they’re
just Teslas. It’s all been met with a collective shrug.
As usual, Mulder was right.
***
In the months before the election, I lost my method, too. I was trying to write my own
dissertation about magic and technology in contemporary literature, and left my city to be alone
with my devices. Keeping myself safe from stories and refusing to stumble on mysteries, my
information sickness spread until I could not know things at all. A dead circuit. Instead of a map,
his giant face.
That November, the earth opened and we fell through the cracks, picking up speed. It
wasn’t one big hole but endless small ones, like gas coming up through the tundra, or like our
house in the Valley with its network of hidden fissures that opened up one day twenty years after
the earthquake. Broken clocks floated by. They were melted but no longer missing. I am a
communist again, like lots of kids. As I write this, children across the country are marching out
of their schools together because the location of safety has moved outside. The rich are planning
missions to the stars.
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The world felt strange in the late 20th century when politics coagulated into fandom, like
being haunted by ghosts. Now that fandom on the right has melted back into politics, it feels
psychotic, like being stalked by monsters or chased by cartoon frogs. When we get accustomed
to the political unconscious becoming conscious, the imperceptible perceptible, we say we are
woke; the Nazis say red-pilled. It is uncanny to remember a time when we spoke only through
the things we liked and wore, like looking back at cultists who think they have outgrown the
swaddling of history, but in fact simply will not speak the names of their devils and gods. When
alt-right thinkers complain about a specter they call “postmodernism,” I wonder if they miss it.
It’s hard to say whether the new show we are living in is a sequel to the old one, or just its
reboot. We were in the park at night: a different friend and me, a different time. I’d tangled
myself in a swing and was spinning round and round when he told me about Roko’s basilisk. The
basilisk, born on an internet chat forum for the philosophical wing of the new tide of fascism, is a
super-powerful artificial intelligence from the future. The basilisk wants you, earthling, to work
toward his establishment as a supreme being ruling a neofeudal order. If you didn’t know this
before, you know it now, and are in his grasp. Like the medieval Christians who spared select
heathens born before the time of Christ from hellfire, the basilisk won’t bug you if you do not
know his name. But once you do, you’re in or you’re out, and if you’re out he will fuck you up
even if he has to rebuild your consciousness out of machine dust in order to do it. The basilisk is
a folktale of our time. In him, we meet the ultimate conspirator in the shape of a chintzy Monster
of the Week. Like a bit of malware in your head, he insists his story be passed on.
“Let him come,” I said to my friend. “If we refuse to speak of him, we give him the
power of our childhood phantasms. The enemy has revealed himself. Now we can fight.”
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“You are a white girl in the park on acid,” he said. “On the border, they are building
camps.”
I put my foot out sharply and stopped spinning. One looks at one’s friends and neighbors
and wonders who will turn. One turns to oneself.
I do not know if we can organize from a place this disorganized. But I want to believe.
—n+1
April 2018
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The Slow Burn: Sex and the City

Introduction
Earlier this year, I came up with the best idea I have ever had: a web series to be
called Stoned Herstory. It is what it sounds like, but even better. In the cult web-turned-ComedyCentral series Drunk History, comedians studied up on Nikola Tesla or Frederick Douglass, then
got wasted and adlibbed crackpot disquisitions that were in turn dramatized in Monty Pythonstyle vignettes. Stoned Herstory would improve upon perfection not only by upgrading to weed
and women, but by taking a different approach to the basic premise of the original, which was
that learning history is hard, and even when you get it, you're liable to fuck it up at the drop of a
glass. Drunk History had treated the uncanny existence of the historical past as itself a kind of
hallucinatory joke. Stoned Herstory, on the other hand, would be extremely funny but also dead
serious: it would be about what happened when you had a burning need to know how we
collectively got here, yet found the process of accessing this understanding to be much like
joking, or dreaming.
I got my friends to say we could do it. Then I got them say we could really do it. Then a
wise collaborator actually bothered to google “stoned herstory,” which of course turned out to
have been done before—badly, but irrevocably. “It's not too late,” I said. “Ours will be different.
Ours will be like Godard.” I had just seen D.A. Pennebaker and Jean-Luc Godard’s 1972
film One P.M.—in which movement intellectuals like Eldridge Cleaver and Tom Hayden riff
hypnotically on racial capitalism or Vietnam—and was feeling inspired. “I hear what you're
saying,” said my very patient roommate. “But I'm not sure ‘become Godard’ can just be your
Plan B.” And so, a historically great idea was laid to rest.
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In its wake, I was left wondering why had I become obsessed with this conceit—how a
gimmick had tumbled into a real desire—and realized I was feeling desperate to
disseminate images of women thinking out loud. What do women look like when we're thinking,
anyway—and particularly when we're engaged in the act of what used to be called consciousness
raising, thinking about our lives in historical perspective, and thinking about history as a way of
understanding our lives? How is the craving for such images produced and commodified? Must
it fold in on itself, the problem of seeing ourselves—our chins, our breasts, our hair—
compounding the difficulty of raising our consciousness in the first place?
This isn’t far from the concept behind the Slow Burn, Post45’s annual experiment in
serialized, collaborative critical writing, which for the past three summers has tried to capture the
process of criticism in motion. Each year, the Slow Burn has organized a group of writers to
document their engagement with a long, dense, contemporary text—Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan
novels, Karl Ove Knausgaard’s My Struggle, the 2017 revival of Twin Peaks—in real time,
before they know how the story ends. Their well-chosen texts have lent themselves generously to
this kind of reading. Ferrante's tetralogy, for instance, is itself a record of two women thinking
together, and watching each other think—heroically, meanderingly, brutally—over the decades,
as their city, Naples, is transformed by the shocks of history.
All of which is to say that when I was asked this year if I wanted to run this summer's
Slow Burn, I found myself asking in turn, “Okay can it be a series of video diaries documenting
the experience of watching Sex and the City for the first time in order to assess Cynthia Nixon as
candidate for governor of New York?”
***
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A “bad object,” in the lingo of cultural studies, usually denotes a work of art or pop that a
critic finds herself aesthetically attached to but politically conflicted about, particularly when it is
her own subject position that is undermined by the attachment. Sex and the City—which debuted
on HBO in 1998, and has recently spawned a host of critical (and not-so-critical) reflections on
the occasion of its twentieth birthday—is a high-ranking bad object for a whole subculture of
feminist fans; note, for instance, the popular “Woke Charlotte” meme, which imagines
what SATC would look like if its resident priggish WASP underwent a political education.

For me, though, SATC had been a different kind of bad object: one that I was so concerned
would hurt me that, other than a few episodes watched anxiously from a friend's air mattress one
night in college, I avoided it altogether. As I understood it, the show was a commercial for a new
New York—a glistening GiulianiLand—and the women who belonged there, and it cast an
ominous cloud over my own aspiration to get to the city and somehow slip myself into an older
one. I don't, however, wish to cast this refusal as a point of pride. Rather, I see it pointing to a
blind spot, a denial of the ways the show interpellated me regardless of whether I watched it or
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wanted it—a bit, perhaps, in the way that serving as an agent of gentrification is often a role not
experienced as agential. What, then, would it mean to go back to it now?
At the same time, what does it mean that Nixon, a longtime New York City activist who
in March announced her run as a progressive challenger to incumbent governor Andrew Cuomo,
is bringing us all back? Over the past few weeks, Nixon has gone from a candidate whose past
on Sex and the City made it embarrassing for some observers to take her political objectives
seriously, to one whose ahead-of-the-curve positions in the midst of a deepening political
crisis—she called early to abolish ICE, and to support Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's bid for
Congress—have prompted fans to retroactively cast Miranda, the sardonic pragmatist she played
on SATC, as always already a politician. Nixon's campaign knows this too, but it must navigate
an awkward question: how to recuperate SATC's elegant urbanism in a bid against the neoliberal
New York for which the show had served as a ticker-tape parade?
As they say on television: I couldn't help but wonder.
Now, a season-and-change into the show, I can confirm that it is awfully fun, totally
fucked up, and off the charts both in its single-minded pursuit of visual pleasure, and in its
commitment to surveying the philosophy of love via discourse only lightly dusted with drama, as
though Pedro Almodóvar had disguised Plato's Symposium as a soap opera. In other words, it is
nothing if not a show about the thrill of watching women think out loud—though not, for reasons
we shall investigate in our Slow Burn, getting very far. Over the next few months, Lakshmi
Padmanabhan, Ned Riseley, and Andrea Long Chu—would-be Stoned Herstory alumnae, Sex
and the City virgins, and brilliant writers all—will join me in trying to get a little further.
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I.
“I'm not gay,” Miranda announces in the Sex and the City Season One episode “Bay of
Married Pigs,” committing a speech act that, as is well known, convinces all prospective listeners
that the speaker is definitely not gay (“Bay”).
In the episode's central plotline, Miranda’s coworker, misreading her as a lesbian, tries to
set her up with a cute butch at a law firm softball game. The misrecognition spirals into a
comedy of errors when Miranda’s indifferent boss takes a sudden interest in her and her
assumed-to-be partner and invites them to a dinner party; eager for the professional opportunity,
Miranda goes along with the charade, and her amiable beard goes along for the ride. Alas, the
subterfuge hits a wall at the barrier of desire: Miranda does eventually kiss the girl, but she does
not, unfortunately, like it.
It is the nature of the closet, of course, to produce double vision in the eye of the
beholder: is Miranda a straight woman passing as a dyke, or a dyke passing as a straight woman,
passing as a dyke? The genuinely uncanny thing about the episode, though, viewed twenty years
after it first aired, is the way that the closet here is itself doubled by our retrospective knowledge
that its doors were in the process of swinging open. Ellen had come out a year earlier
on Ellen; Will and Grace had just begun. Two opposed interpretations of the episode thus seem
equally plausible. Is “Married Pigs” in fact doing exactly what it claims to be doing and using
Miranda's queer affect as bait for a send-up of what would soon come to be known as
homonormativity? Miranda's hijinks inspire Carrie to argue, in her column for the week, that the
homo/hetero division has been displaced by a “secret cold war between marrieds and singles”;
polite society no longer cares about the gender of your dinner date, as long as it's got you
“figured out.” (Shortly after beginning these speculations, Carrie runs into an ex and his male
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partner. Without skipping a beat, they ask if she'd consider donating an egg.) Maybe Miranda
really isn't into pussy, and doesn't owe anyone an explanation for her perfectly reasonable habits
of wearing overalls and hating men. On the other hand, maybe the episode is just a plain old nohomo routine, where the joke is simply that Miranda is a lesbian hiding in plain sight. Which is
the surface reading, which is the depth?
The pivot between these readings is Cynthia Nixon's disarming performance as a smart
woman stuck in a very dumb social order, an ancien régime as richly sketched and hermetically
sealed as an Edith Wharton parlor, if not, perhaps, as carefully preserved by the flash-freeze
technology of satire. ("Welcome to the age of un-innocence," Carrie quips in the pilot [“Sex”],
making me shudder with the memory of those years when some fervidly entropic cultural force
seemed to be ironizing its way straight out of irony.) Miranda is incoherent to herself, or
coherent only as a comic figure whose power femme visage raises eyebrows but not hackles, so
clearly ill at ease is she with actual power: regardless of what it is she wants, she seems resigned
to not getting it. A figure who—and let's recall here that Miranda's job is to advocate for the legal
rights of corporations—might be described as gutsy but not particularly brave. For all of Carrie's
outré performance of narration, it's Miranda who winks us into the Sex and the City universe by
seeming to float above her own life in astonishment that this is what it's really like. As Lakshmi,
Ned, and Andrea all noted in their first reflections on SATC, Miranda gives the distinct
impression that, regardless of whether we've got her "figured out" by the end of any given
episode, she seems in a larger sense to be on the wrong show (Padmanabhan; Riseley; Chu,
“Sex”).
In 2004, shortly after Sex and the City ended, Nixon became romantically involved with
Christine Marinoni, a New York community organizer who is today her wife and coparent. If it
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strains perception now to read Miranda as not-gay, it is in part because the closet was about to
open for Nixon, too. Except that that's not how Nixon talks about her life at all. In 2012, the
actress—by then an organizer herself—caused a minor dustup by refusing an interviewer's
attempt to write her into a coming-out story of same-sex desire hidden and revealed. “[P]eople
think I was walking around in a cloud and didn't realize I was gay, which I find really offensive,”
she told the New York Times, adding that she identified as a lesbian not because earlier
relationships with men had been illegitimate, but because of the political work effected by the
term (qtd in Witchel). “Why can't it be a choice?”
It would be another fourteen years before Nixon came out again, this time as a socialist—
but I think she’d probably wince at that description the second time, too.
***
Cynthia Nixon announced her newly minted political identification early last month
while bidding for an electoral endorsement from the New York City chapter of the Democratic
Socialists of America. The organization's membership and visibility spiked in June after
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, a Bronx-based grassroots candidate it had supported, won a longshot
Democratic congressional primary against powerful incumbent Joseph Crowley. Nixon wanted
the endorsement badly, and the organization was sharply split over whether it wanted her back.
In a series of closed but well-publicized debates over the course of several weeks, members
weighed Nixon's platform—which includes universal rent control and health care, and has
pushed Governor Andrew Cuomo to the left on issues like marijuana legalization—against her
class position and ties to developers, in light of broader questions about electoral strategy
(Aronoff). At a Brooklyn branch meeting that I attended in late June in my neighborhood, a key
issue for members who opposed the endorsement was that Nixon had never identified herself as
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a socialist. Why, they argued, should a political body committed to the dismantling of capitalism
support a candidate who was not? (I sat in as a member of the organization; the press was not
invited, but this was a month ago already, and they didn't say anything about historians.)
Then in early July, a few hours before Nixon and her running mate Jumaane Williams, a
Brooklyn city councilman campaigning for the position of lieutenant governor, addressed DSA
in person, Nixon did something unexpected: she publicly declared herself a democratic socialist
(Nichols).
As a candidate, Nixon tends to evince the same eye-rolling bemusement she brought to
her role on Sex and the City, which her campaign has milked through Miranda-themed
fundraisers even as Nixon has acknowledged the show's most obviously problematic aspects
(Read and Yotka). Can you believe these people? Miranda seemed to be saying on SATC, though
it was never quite clear why “these people” wouldn't also include herself. Can you believe this
power structure? she seems to be saying now, asking her audiences to again allow her an
exemption. Sometimes, they do. At a Staten Island brewery where I saw Nixon rail against
private control of public transit one blistering Saturday afternoon last month, she killed it. She
had just the right amount of star power; people wanted to touch her, and they could.
Speaking to DSA, though, in a Manhattan office space filled primarily with younger
activists in the novel situation of having a celebrity candidate fawn over them, Nixon seemed
nervous; it was as though the crowd had bored through the fourth wall that enabled her signature
performance as an outsider on the inside. It came as no surprise, then, that internal debate was
heated again that night after the candidates departed. And yet I was struck at first by the fact that
some endorsement opponents who had objected the previous week to Nixon’s lack of socialist
self-ascription—members who had claimed at the branch meeting, in other words, that the
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signifier mattered in excess of any policy proposals in its service—were not placated by its
arrival, however abrupt. Wasn’t the whole idea of hegemony that the signifier would be empty—
indeed for democratic purposes had to be empty—until everyone debated themselves silly
calling a new political formation into being? Weren't failures of signification—in reviving the
name of “socialism” after it was put out to pasture at the end of the twentieth century, as much as
in denaturalizing gender by performing its norms off-key—central to the disruption of
sedimented political realities?13 Wasn't it a win if Cynthia Nixon wanted to play a socialist on
TV, and asked DSA to write the script? Yes, a bit cringe-inducing all around; but seriously,
like, what is the political?
Then a young white man in a crisp white polo shirt came to the mic to voice his support
for Nixon. After all, he said, “How many of you in this room can say you identified as a socialist
five years ago?” Half the hands in the room went up. Amid the young people, the Bernie recruits,
the rising would-be managerial class on Medicaid that needs to be very careful—and I include
myself in this admonition—not to proclaim that the party’s started because they’ve shown up,
there were also almost certainly organizers present who had identified as socialists since before
he was born. “Oh,” he said, a bit hangdog, “that was more than I thought.” And then I
understood a little better. Nixon isn't polo shirt man, but she's a related kind of political actor
who, as Corey Robin noted recently, tends to emerge in ideologically chaotic times, a subject
who dramatically changes her worldview “without remarking upon the change, without
explaining it, leaving the impression that this is what they believed all along” (Robin, “Moving”).
A kind of actor that any growing movement should welcome without interrogation, but whose
13

The complex relationship between theories of hegemony and performativity is explored in depth
in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (Verso, 2000), a book-length conversation between Judith
Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek.
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insistence in the face of all evidence to the contrary that she is the master of her own politics,
responding judiciously to the world as it turns, can be, as Robin put it, “unsettling, even eerie.”
Nixon, then, is in an odd position: given the unlikelihood that she will actually win the
governorship, her bread is buttered on the side of speech acts; and yet even in her headlinegrabbing moment of political rearticulation, she seemed determined to slide in to the
performative, as though it were a sort of happy coincidence that her own preexisting positions
“in support of a millionaires tax, Medicare for all, fully funding our public schools, housing for
all and rejecting all corporation donations” just so happened to "align with democratic socialist
principles.”
And yet, in the days that followed, commentators—particularly conservatives perhaps
hoping to remind us of something—regularly referred to Nixon's “coming out” (MonroeHamilton).
Well then: why can't it be a choice?
—Post45
August 16, 2018
II.
Meanwhile, downtown, queer theory was falling apart at the seams.
Lakshmi, Ned, Andrea: I meant to finish the second half of this post weeks ago—and
then everything changed, again. And so let me back up. In our last episode, Cynthia Nixon was
attempting a sanguine slip into socialism, intriguingly echoing her earlier decision to begin
identifying as a lesbian without going through the motions of “coming out.” And I was about to
tell you about my own coming out this year, as an “aspiring communist mystic,” on Tinder.
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I started thinking about the sexual politics of the contemporary left in the months before the 2016
Democratic primaries, when a moral panic bubbled up about the supposedly amorous pull of the
Sanders campaign on young women. I wrote at the time that this panic not only denied women
political and sexual agency, but engaged in a dubious long-running battle to cleanse politics of
erotics altogether (Brostoff). But all of that was two long years ago. The sexual imaginary in
which girls were being whisked away by lascivious Bernie bros makes no sense in the era of
Ayanna Pressley and Rashida Tlaib and Summer Lee and Julia Salazar and Alexandria OcasioCortez and Cynthia Nixon. It was before you could open the New York Times to an op-ed
asserting the continued resonance of Irving Howe and Lewis Coser’s 1954 declaration,
“Socialism is the name of our desire” (Robin, “New”). It was before we seemed to be popping up
everywhere, including Tinder, where that desire has engendered new apertures of recognition,
red roses strewn across profiles like a hanky code.
Oddly, though, I’ve sometimes found myself reacting to this transformed landscape with
a slightly melancholy sense of déjà vu—because my time spent chilling under the sign of a
Tinder communism this hot dystopian summer often felt, of all things, awfully familiar: the
quick intimacies; the gossip; the sensitivity to spots where trauma flips into fetish and can also
flip back out again; the baseline suspicion that maybe no one is sexually compatible (after which
acknowledgment, sex can be weird and fun); the absurdist but also dead serious relationship to
futurity conceived outside the contours of the knowable (let alone the nuclear family); the part
where I try to remember if “narcissism” is “bad.” Familiar because—on a good day, in a good
summer—that’s not revolutionary, that’s just queerness. And melancholy because when you’re a
cis girl who tends to date cis boys, it’s a good summer indeed when you’re able to occupy that
position in a way that doesn’t feel straight.
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We were supposed to be here already; or maybe we were here before, not so long ago, in
a city much like this one except completely different, in which some kind of urban commons had
not yet been fully partitioned; or maybe queerness lay just beyond the rainbow. I can’t remember
exactly what they told us in college when I first encountered queer theory, but I am pretty sure
that when they let us use “queer” as a verb, they were saying that straightness was over, if we
wanted it. I wanted it. It was the early 2000s, and there was, of course, another fantastical
panorama available to young women who feared they might be attracted to men: it was called
Sex and the City. For all the retrospective hypervisibility of Miranda’s dykiness, SATC’s gay
vibes have been indexed much more often to the idea that the show was “actually” about the
male gays. Sex and the City extended the franchise of a burgeoning neoliberalized gay culture to
straight women, who were invited to create a self-protective distance from what Jane Ward calls
the tragedy of heterosexuality by experiencing it as a kind of immersive drag performance
(Ward). But I was busy avoiding the show the same way that a few years later, when I worked at
an office in Soho, I instinctively avoided certain shop windows, because I would be overcome
with the impulse to shatter them with a brick and free the beautiful clothes inside. And so
instead, I read about 1920s drag balls in George Chauncey’s Gay New York and the “selfshattering” experience of anal sex in Leo Bersani’s “Is the Rectum a Grave?” But mostly, I read
Eve Sedgwick.
Sedgwick’s Epistemology of the Closet came out in 1990, the same year as Judith
Butler’s Gender Trouble, and like the latter, it helped to establish queer theory as a field that
understood gender and sexuality as defined, and redefined, through their performance. For
Sedgwick, this meant understanding homosexuality—a historical formation forged in the late
nineteenth century that posited the shadowy existence of a special kind of man marked by
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aberrant same-sex desires—as a relationship to privileged knowledge: is he or isn’t he? The
closet, site of the half-articulations and open secrets that attached to him, enunciated “the speech
act of a silence,” Sedgwick wrote, “not a particular silence, but a silence that accrues particularly
by fits and starts” (3). To be a homosexual, then, was to be vulnerable to the closet’s motto, the
schoolyard taunt, “it takes one to know one”—and, potentially, to feel welcomed by it (156). The
amazing part of this, for me, was that anyone could feel taunted or welcomed by this call.
Sedgwick—a self-avowed “sexual pervert” (63) who was also, as we whispered among
ourselves, married to a man!—never asks us to validate her own insistent understanding of
herself “‘as’ a gay man” (Tendencies 209). Instead, her work compels the reader to grant this
performative claim: it took one to know one, and boy did she ever know one. As, I thought, did I.
In Sedgwick’s conception, then, and in much queer theory and culture that followed, the
closet became the site of a reimagined commons. It was the place that we—whoever felt
included in that we—could be fags together; it could make heterosexuality so strange to itself
that it wasn’t even straight anymore. This involved a certain historical sleight of hand. The first
rule of “really” being in the closet is not talking about the closet, the very notion of which (as
Sedgwick readily admitted) became available only thanks to the post-Stonewall discourse of
coming out (Epistemology 14). But if seeking an imaginative home there could thus be read as
paradoxical to the point of perverse, it may curiously have come to seem less so over time, as
gay life became increasingly gentrified, and coming out narratives became a tool of American
empire (Puar). Particularly in and after the 1990s, the critic Nishant Shahani argued later, queer
writers and artists recast the closet as a “provisional homeland” (20) fit for a diasporist
imaginary, an anti-nationalist origin story in which “the stigma of persecution in the past
[became] a seductive site for the embrace of otherness in the present” (17). By the time I read
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Sedgwick—whose class on Remembrance of Things Past I later had the insane luck to audit,
shortly before the end of Eve’s life—the closet seemed so nearly evacuated of those residents
willing and able to assimilate, it made perfect sense to me to imagine queers as squatters of
history, camping out in the confines of an impossible past.
But this summer I’ve been wondering if perhaps we were wrong—not, precisely, about
the epistemology of the closet, but about the inextricable question of its geography. What if the
closet was not in fact in the process of becoming a historical relic by the time of Epistemology,
but a cultural logic still very much in force—even for sophisticated New Yorkers, even for the
closet’s own theorists? What if the desire for socialism was in there all along, a dusty left side of
the self-same chamber, mostly overlooked—the speech act of a silence, accruing in fits and
starts? What would happen now if we came out?
***
The case isn’t hard to make historically. It has been well-documented that, most
notoriously during the Red Scare in the United States, “commies and queers”—in Senator Joseph
McCarthy’s not-so-affectionate phrase—were thrown together into one big closet. The architects
of the Cold War held that all manner of slippery cosmopolitans—unmarried women, racemixers, Jews—opened up lesions in the body politic that Russian infiltrators could slip through.
But they drew a particularly explicit analogy between communism and homosexuality,
overlapping conspiracies of nervous, sickly men primed to infiltrate the government through
their knack for hiding in plain sight. American communists “can identify each other…on casual
meeting by the use of certain phrases, the names of certain friends, by certain enthusiasms and
certain silences,” Arthur Schlesinger wrote in his 1946 manifesto The Vital Center, observing
that comrades’ coded speech reminded him of “the famous scene in Proust where the Baron
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Charlus and the tailor Jupien suddenly recognize their common corruption.” (Takes one to know
one, n’est-ce pas?) Communism “perverts politics into something secret, sweaty and furtive,”
Schlesinger concluded, not unlike “homosexuality in a boys’ school” (qtd in Dean 68). Such
sentiments were further militarized in the 1950s, as conservative and liberal government factions
battled over who could most successfully root out and persecute queers using the same draconian
mechanisms employed to terrorize suspected communists.
Under this kind of pressure, commies and queers seeking respectability tried to distance
themselves from each other, adopting their own iterations of McCarthyist logic in the process.
Recalling her time in the Communist party, Audre Lorde wrote later, “I could imagine these
comrades, Black and white, among whom color and racial differences could be openly examined
and talked about, nonetheless one day asking me accusingly, ‘Are you or have you ever been a
member of a homosexual relationship?’” Queerness, after all, “made you ‘more susceptible to
the FBI’” (Lorde 149). At the same time, homophile groups like the Mattachine Society, which
developed a political vision of homosexuals as an oppressed minority, attempted to leave behind
their own Communist party roots by requiring members to sign patriotic loyalty oaths;
Mattachine even considered creating its own miniature House Un-American Activities
Committee (D’Emilio 85).
The more difficult question to answer is what happened to this double-sided closet after
gay liberation and the end of the Cold War. It’s not, precisely, that it was forgotten. If anything,
as Shahani observed, the 1950s—the moment when queerness was most relentlessly produced
and politicized as stigma—are ubiquitous within late-twentieth-century queer writing and
performance that turned to the pre-Stonewall past (Shahani 19). Think, for instance, of Tony
Kushner’s 1991 play Angels in America, in which Ethel Rosenberg becomes the ghostly adoptive
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mother of a man whose partner is dying of AIDS. The historical memory of American
communism is transmitted, here, as a secret inheritance. But we might also observe that this
image of haunting is undergirded by a basic historical assumption that communism was then and
queerness is now, just as the basic assumption that makes it possible to imagine your community
into the closet is that you don’t, technically, live there.
Yet now that socialism is “back,”14 it feels increasingly plausible to posit, instead, the
ongoing existence of a psychic structure that I’ve been thinking of as internalized
anticommunism, which speaks in a voice noticeably similar to the voice of internalized
homophobia: why do you want that; stop wanting that; you wouldn’t know how to enjoy the
thing you wanted if you got it; you’re acting like a girl; you’re acting like a faggot; this is about
your mom; you’re so extra; you need to calm down; you’re confused; this is a phase; your
parents are worried about you; this is for people with structural privilege that you don’t have;
you hate those people. This last point, I think, is key. A closet is a technology for restricting
(while also anxiously heightening) a field of social vision. People in a closet find each other even
if they have to pretend they weren’t looking, but they do so under circumstances of shame and
duress that may make them wish they hadn’t. If someone had asked polo shirt guy from the DSA
meeting if he was a socialist five years ago, even if he didn’t know what they were talking about,
I bet he would have blushed.
It might seem almost a bit smug to start referring now, in this moment of mordant
enthusiasm on the left, to a socialist closet, as though some preexisting formation had begun to
14

The relationship between “communist” and “socialist” movements and parties in the United States is complex—
not least because at several historical moments, including this one, these terms are sometimes used casually as quasisynonyms, and sometimes denote different and even opposed tendencies. But it was, of course, “communists” called
to testify before HUAC in the 1950s, and it is “socialists” who are running for office in 2018, and so I’ve tried to
toggle between these terms as historically appropriate. I’ve been known to describe myself both ways, depending
upon context, and plan to continue doing so until ordered to stop. “Communist,” imho, is the correct term to use
when describing oneself on Tinder.
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see the sun. But a closet doesn’t always appear as a closed door with a party in full swing behind
it. It doesn’t necessarily look like an underground, and Cynthia Nixon is almost certainly not a
Manchurian candidate (though how fun would that be?) This, I think, is why Nixon’s lack of
interest in narrating her socialist turn, much like her description of lesbianism as a choice, has
been both inspiring and frustrating: her speech act courts failure precisely through its refusal to
recognize the closet as its staging ground in the first place. Let’s keep in mind that before she
was a socialist, Nixon was in show business, and that last time entertainers tried to occupy both
of these positions at once, the McCarthy regime was so freaked out by how fun it looked, they
made a whole blacklist in response. These days, you can open the Washington Post to an op-ed
by a conservative who, shaken by the success of Boots Riley’s Sorry to Bother You, extols the
CIA’s Cold War-era “culture war,” and suggests the agency ought to start a new one. If Nixon
has been an activist for fifteen years and it never occurred to her before that socialism was the
name of her desire, there might be a historical reason for it.
***
When I started working on Part I of this post this summer, I wanted to bring some oldfashioned insights of queer theory to the weird succession of images produced around Cynthia
Nixon: Miranda, the unconvincing straight woman; Cynthia, the emerging lesbian; would-be
Governor Nixon, the post-Ocasio socialist. I imagine them in a row, standing hazily in a
succession of doorways like the fuzzy figure on the cover of Epistemology of the Closet. When I
picture them this way, I find it hard to see either a genuine progress narrative or a cynical,
coercive one. Instead, these images appear as a tableau in a backstage horror movie, wardrobe
doors pried open from within to reveal further sets of doors, a subterranean network of dressing
rooms beneath a set of Sex and the City the exact size and shape of New York, and a very
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determined lifelong actress convinced she knows the set so well, she can find her way through in
the dark. All of which made me want to turn the question around, and to ask queer theory if in
fact the closet might be shaped differently than we tend to think.
And then, mitten drinnen, another figure appeared on the scene. “How are you doing with
the whole Avital thing?” a friend I hadn’t spoken to in awhile texted one day in mid-August. I
didn’t quite understand the question at first; I didn’t know Ronell personally, had heard rumors a
few months earlier and read a salacious Times story that week, but the grand guignol special
effects so overwhelmed my reading that it hadn’t cut too close. By the end of the week, I was
losing my mind over it, as was much of academia and then some. A member of our own little
SATC-blogging groupuscule became a leading voice for graduate students trying to explain
exactly why we were so upset (Chu, “I Worked”). Yet still the accusing question lingers of why
we care so much about this one; why this one, why the one starring a queer woman and a gay
man, why not the other guys. And this is where it gets really real, because of course the reason
we care about this one is that—tautologically—we care about this one. Ronell is not a queer
theorist herself. But her former student Nimrod Reitman’s Title IX complaint against her centers
on ornately detailed allegations of verbal harassment that, according to Ronell and some
observers of the case, must be understood as coded queer speech askew to dominant relations of
knowledge and power (Mangan). And since queerness, in some of its most powerful
formulations, is its speech acts, the stakes of this question are high.
Queerness was supposed to save us, to give us a backward to look forward to, to carry us
away from Sex and the City. A new world in the shell of the old; an Oneida; an Oz. Many of us
went to grad school because we cared about this vision of queer transgression and saw academia
as the place it was being kept alive or, at least, mourned for. And this has, in crucial ways, been
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true. But it has also been true that apprenticing ourselves to institutional life via tales of old New
York without a practicable vision for a new one, as though the queer past was an elite club
accepting job applications, functioned for a long time to keep a lid on our rage. An off-Broadway
play running steadily since the Nineties: the chosen family transformed by property, adult
children squabbling over the fate of a rent-controlled apartment. The commune crumbling under
the pressure of its own social reproduction, the small religious order that can’t quite be
abandoned but no longer commands belief. And at the center of the saga, a wounded, treacherous
matriarch—Tilda Swinton ideally, though Cynthia Nixon could play her in a pinch—caught
doing everything in her outsized power to articulate herself outside of straightness by loving,
identifying with, talking like, mothering, mentoring, abusing, gay men.
“Both Reitman and Ronell are gay, and playful and over-the-top banter is how she talks
with her friends in Manhattan’s West Village,” one journalist wrote, reporting the latter’s side of
the story (Mangan). We grimaced at each other: who was going to tell them? A couple weeks
later, in a televised debate, Andrew Cuomo accused Nixon of having meddled in city affairs by
trying to help Sarah Jessica Parker save her favorite Greenwich Avenue tea place from eviction.
A couple days after that, the Village Voice—purchased in 2015 by Peter Barbey, a retail magnate
who owns a $26 million apartment in a luxury building that replaced St. Vincent’s Hospital,
known for its pioneering AIDS clinic, in Manhattan’s West Village—shut down for good. “My
cock-er spaniel,” I imagine Samantha cooing to one of her young men as they stroll arm in arm
through the neighborhood now owned by NYU. “I just need more rhetorical cushioning from
you,” I imagine Carrie saying to Big in a cab stuck on Jane Street. I imagine Charlotte, drunk,
sneaking into an office at a gallery opening and dialing a number over and over again. I imagine
Miranda at a party full of bankers, dreaming only of brunch.
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The fissures that have opened up around the Ronell affair have been bracing, ugly, and
probably necessary. The graduate student and adjunct labor movement is growing, and the anger
being voiced by contingent academic workers and our supporters coalesced this past month into
a powerful collective speech act in its own right, a retort to anyone in the industry insulated
enough to express shock regarding the allegations: we know something you don’t know. But the
contretemps has also at moments recapitulated old beefs between queer theory and Marxist
analysis—who denies the importance of “culture,” who denies the existence of “structure”—and
I think we have a chance to do it differently this time. Speculating about a socialist closet
suggests an alternate set of relations, in which the McCarthyist crackdown on the everyday life
of the left, precisely at the point where commie met queer, created layers of shame that we
haven’t even begun to work through—and queer theory, for which shame is a specialty, could be
a vital resource for doing so. And working from the opposite direction, I wonder if socialist
movement-building could become a new site for queer communizing if we were to recognize
that—in ways we seem to feel both deeply uncomfortable with and much in search of—it makes
us feel super gay. And whether, for those of us to whom this matters, it might create a set of
entry points to faggotry that don’t depend upon recognition from gay men.
I am not proposing that we throw open the doors of the left side of the closet and march
out proudly to take our seats in a new social order that comes to exist through our righteous
presence alone. It’s rather that I catch glimpses of what things could look like if the whole rotten
edifice collapsed, or if we blew it up. Whether a capacious vision of queerness, developed by the
generations just before mine in part as a way of imagining autonomy outside the precincts of
mass political organization, might now be recirculated and extended through new configurations
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of organized political life. Whether we have, and should take seriously, an opportunity to rethink
our relationships to—I’m sorry but you all walked right into this—sex, and the city.
—Post45
September 13, 2018
III.
We knew right away. None of us worked in film or television, but a draft of the script for
the pilot of Girls found its way into our inboxes anyway in early 2011, a year before the show
premiered on HBO. Someone sent it to Leon, my complicated best friend and on-and-off
roommate since college, who sent it to me with a concession (“Pretty funny, actually”) and a
caveat (“Don't forward, I’m probably breaking some rules by forwarding to you”). We
exchanged a few more messages in a spirit of grudging appreciation; I confirmed on Wikipedia
that Lena Dunham was a full year younger than us. At the end of our email chain, I forwarded
the script, wordlessly, to our roommate Allison.
We had been characters in search of an author, and then, suddenly, we had one, whether
we liked it or not. People came over to our apartment in Brooklyn that night and we watched
Dunham’s earlier film Tiny Furniture, to see what we were in for. I remember how mad I was,
and how impressed. I remember feeling grimly resigned to the loss of the selves we had been
before our cohort had inspired anyone to the task of representation, before the cloistered delirium
of Dunham’s haute art kid milieu, through some trick of the light, had become mistakable for our
own.
Sex and the City had been a fantasy about wealthy white women and urban space tailored
to the production of their desires. Girls, the show’s millennial descendant, presented itself as a
self-conscious response to the persistence of that fantasy several years into a recession that had
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made it strange. As Iván noted, the newer show took a potshot at the older one in its very first
episode (Ramos). Jessa, a glamorous grifter, sees an SATC poster on the wall of her manically
dorky cousin Shoshanna’s apartment and professes to know nothing about the show. “You’re
definitely like a Carrie, with like some Samantha aspects? And Charlotte hair. It’s like a really
good combination,” Shoshanna responds in a single breath. “I think I’m definitely a Carrie at
heart, but like sometimes…Samantha kind of comes out. And then I mean when I’m at school I
definitely try to put on my Miranda hat.”
In literary terms, Sex and the City, like the tales of passion and fortune that once drove
Emma Bovary insane, was a romance. Girls, self-reflexively featuring characters like Shoshanna,
a dissociated Emma B in Uggs, was a novel. At least, that’s what I’d thought.
***
Television, with its episodic structure, has lent itself particularly well to capturing the
texture of everyday life in the gig economy. As Annie McClanahan recently wrote, shows from
High Maintenance to Insecure to Vanderpump Rules have focused on characters working
multiple contingent jobs, for low pay, often adjacent to the tech industry: they are office temps at
startups, baristas in gentrified neighborhoods, and Task Rabbits for other Task Rabbits. This
shift, McClanahan argues, has had consequences not just for TV’s content, but also for its form.
Traditionally, sitcoms have been characterized by “repetitive continuity,” a “correlative of
endless, unchanging, but also stable waged or salaried work”; in the typical drama, meanwhile,
white-collar professionals develop as characters over the course of a series-long plot arc. But a
broad swath of contemporary television doesn’t fit neatly into either of these categories. Instead,
the “episodic, discontinuous, and occasionally surrealist structures” of series like Broad City or
Atlanta feel more like “the episodic, fragmented, and profoundly insecure experience” of
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contingent work itself. McClanahan describes them as picaresques, a term originally applied to
novels in which the central character—often a ne’er-do-well, scammer, or prostitute—is thrown
from situation to situation rather than developing over time like a respectable protagonist.
Romances in which the romance is gone.
Girls felt hyperreal when it came on the air in 2012 in part because it was among the first
programs in this genre to make it to prime time. Its novelty wore off after a few seasons, as other
shows emerged with sharper, darker perspectives on the lives of weed delivery guys and personal
assistants. But the series did have something indelible to say about one gig in particular: the
work of internet-style confessional writing. Dunham’s alter ego Hannah Horvath wants to be a
writer, and what that paradigmatically looks like for someone of her age, gender, and social class
when we meet her is that she will farm content in the service of what Jia Tolentino has called the
“personal essay boom”: an onslaught of click-driven, poorly-compensated, much-maligned, and
often comically harrowing first-person tales about incest or unsettlingly lost tampons that for
several years dominated websites from Salon to xoJane, and made their way onto the page in
tell-alls by media-world diarists like Sloane Crosley and Cat Marnell.
Hannah has a kind of superpower that suits her to this brand of work: a combination of
“perspective,” in the sense of literary voice, to spare—she is highly attuned to her own
perceptions and can report on them with cleverness and candor—and no perspective at all, in the
sense of a broader vision of the world and her place in it. Hannah is ridiculous, and familiar,
because she has no sense of scale: all slights, all outrages, are created equal. Nor can she
differentiate between work and leisure. Dunham’s character is best known for her unearned
grandiosity: in the show’s pilot episode, she solemnly informs her parents that she may be “the
writer of my generation—or at least a writer, of a generation,” then presents them with a printout
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of her memoir-in-progress, which appears to be about twelve pages long. But Hannah is also a
lowkey workaholic who is never off the clock. To the annoyance of her friends and lovers, she
cannot stop taking notes, even while fucking or fighting or trying cocaine (which she does in
order to review it for a Vice-style web magazine). Every experience is a standing reserve of
content, though the act of actually lying down with her laptop to write tends to lead to disaster. In
one unforgettable sequence, Hannah tries to finish her book, spirals into obsessive-compulsive
madness, shoves a Q-tip down her ear canal, and ends up in the ER.
Throughout the second half of my twenties, when I imagined myself as a writer I could
not conceive of speaking with a voice that did not already belong to her.
***
What is the work of a sex columnist? Here, in the first episode of Sex and the City, in the
first conversation between Big and Carrie, is a clue that the answer’s complicated:
BIG: So what have you been doing lately?
CARRIE: You mean, besides going out every night?
BIG: Yeah, I mean, what do you do for work?
CARRIE: Well, this is my work. I’m kind of a sexual anthropologist.
BIG: You mean, like a hooker?
CARRIE: No. Um, I write a column called Sex and the City. Right now, I’m researching
women who have sex like men? You know—they have sex, and afterward, they feel
nothing. (“Sex”)
There is something vertigo-inducing about the whole thing. Maybe it’s a kind of
redundancy. If the distinction between work and leisure is already attenuated for writers (and
others) in an economy bent on the total monetization of experience, it becomes blurrier still when
writing is specifically tied to dating—a practice that, since its emergence in the early twentieth
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century, has positioned “women who have sex like men” as targets of what Moira Weigel calls
“prostitution anxiety,” the suspicion that only a fine line separates the trade of sex for money
from the more nebulous systems of exchange around which heterosexual dating has been defined
(96). What is there to say, then, about Carrie’s job—going out every night, sorting the specimens
of social life she encounters, and reflecting on her own relationships with them—besides the fact
that, for a character best known as an icon of consumption, she seems to be working overtime?
What could be drawn from thinking about Carrie Bradshaw as a worker, other than concern that
the discourse around emotional labor has spun out of control?
My hunch is that reading Sex and the City as a funny kind of workplace comedy can help
us understand a basic weirdness of the show, which we’ve returned to many times on this blog:
the way it’s structured by a tension between picaresque and marriage plot, with the women at its
center making up a kind of ongoing focus group on the subject. Charlotte wants to be alwaysalready married and pregnant (and so the gods of SATC grant her divorce and infertility).
Samantha is dead-set against any relationship to relationships besides the episodic (which is why
aging causes her such particular grief: its relentless temporal axis causes her life to change, when
all she wants is for it to remain the same). And Carrie and Miranda, who spend most of the series
navigating a less stable terrain of desire, most directly experience what Lakshmi describes as the
show’s central concern with the “anxiety of freedom” for the heterosexual women of their time:
they like the way they are—perennially restless—but don’t want to be that way forever
(Padmanabhan). For Miranda, the conflicting demands of present and future constitute an ass
pain, a time suck. The suspense isn’t killing her any time soon, but it threatens to eventually bore
her to death. For Carrie, however, the traits and feelings called up by the shifting tides of her
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romantic life and the lives of her friends—indecision, curiosity, stubbornness, giddiness, longing,
indignation—constitute captivating material. Carrie is a narrator—for a living.
As Sex and the City viewers, we don’t know how Carrie became a sex columnist. We
don’t know whether she’d do it for free if she wasn’t on payroll at the fictitious New York Star
(though we do know that if she were around today, she’d likely be the kind of online influencer
who creates reams of free content hoping to cash in further down the road). We don’t know what
the “real” financial stakes would be for her if she stopped. But within the laws of the SATC
universe, Carrie’s income comes from her column, and this means she has to keep writing
whether she likes it or not—and, by extension, that she has to keep dating as well. In order for
the show to go on, she has to keep looking for love; she also needs it to keep slipping through her
fingers.
At the start of the Season 5 episode “Plus One is the Loneliest Number,” Carrie, dressed
in spring linens, descends a spiral staircase, her gaze alighting upon elegant floral arrangements,
as her event planner—lifted directly from Charlotte’s first wedding— assures her that
everything, the flowers and the tablecloths and the food, will be “W-H-I-T-E, white.” Over the
sounds of a waltz, she explains in a voiceover, “There is one day even the most cynical New
York woman dreams of all her life. She imagines what she’ll wear, the photographers, the toasts.
Everybody celebrating the fact that she finally found”—
—dramatic pause—
“a publisher.
“It’s her book release party.” (“Plus One”)
If Sex and the City were more straightforward in its feminist signaling—and more pat and
self-satisfied—the show would have ended right there, with Carrie happily marrying her career.
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Instead, SATC keeps going for another season-and-a-half. Carrie’s book party, like Charlotte’s
white weddings, turns out to be a blip of concentrated feeling in a longer, less shapely story—in
part because Carrie, like a runaway bride, gets cold feet about playing the role of romantic lead
her own book casts her in. As a weekly columnist, Carrie can bounce from situation to situation,
illuminating each while committing to none; this is the classic position, as McClanahan notes, of
the picara, the picaresque heroine who, in classic works like Moll Flanders, often makes her way
through the world as a sex worker. Put together, however, Carrie’s columns add up to more than
the sum of their parts.
Or so says the character Andrea once described as “an old meal, a slice of tilapia, a
lonely, tremendous badger” (Chu, “‘Sex,’ August 30”). Carrie and Mr. Big are broken up and out
of touch when Carrie’s book comes out. He has moved to Napa, under cover of “the wine
business.” Carrie, obviously hoping for a rendezvous, schedules a reading in northern California.
Big shows up. The book has affected him deeply. Yes, he says, he has read her columns before,
gradually, as they came out. But now, confronted with them in aggregate, he understands for the
first time “that I hurt you so much.” These are, Dilara writes, “the words every girl dreams of
hearing”; they indicate that he has listened (O’Neil). Confronted with the consummation of this
fantasy, Carrie stares at Big in alarm. “Oh, c’mon!” she says brightly, like a child who has just
discovered it’s possible to lie to yourself. “It’s fiction!”
They go to bed together. Big continues to seek exoneration for the crimes laid out in
Carrie’s book. She wants to drop it, and then, once again, wants to drop him. Can’t be done, says
Big. “You’re going to need material for the sequel.”
It is a come-on, a threat, and Big’s closest reading yet; it explains why Carrie can’t really
leave her book, or Big himself, at the altar. Carrie’s friends can remain single or marry, jet to Rio
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or reproduce; her life alone must lend itself to the production of “a sequel.” One wonders
whether being a professional narrator has also led Carrie Bradshaw—like Hannah Horvath later
on—to become a steadfastly unreliable one, unable to differentiate between her desires and the
simple demand to keep her story in motion at all costs. A story that, at the nexus of picaresque
and marriage plot, offers only, in the end, repetition. Unable to resolve this tension, television
would default increasingly, in the years that followed, to picaresque.
***
I came into this project trying to understand what seemed to be a bafflingly large gap
between Sex and the City’s moment and the one we occupy today. How did we get from there to
here? I think I understand it a little better now.
SATC is set in an unapologetic gilded age New York in which beautiful, talented women
organize their lives around sucking the dicks of grotesque finance guys in terrible suits. Whether
we ultimately read it as an advertisement, a satire, or an object lesson in the inseparability of the
two, the romantic side of capitalist realism exists today only in zombie form: house-flipping
shows, Melania Trump’s Christmas cards, Fyre Festival. But Carrie, our Virgil of Hell’s Kitchen,
prefigured a set of narrative problems that would only intensify in the years that followed the end
of the show. Tolentino describes the personal essay boom as a bubble, one that inflated around
the time of the 2008 recession, as reporting budgets were slashed and a generation of writers who
learned their trade on LiveJournal became old enough to hire on the cheap. If stripped of her
rent-controlled apartment and her dizzy-dame optimism, Carrie comes to look at lot like her
stubbornly infantile goddaughter Hannah Horvath: bumbling through psychic economies on
pocket money, a speculative bubble in the shape of a girl.
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The personal essay bubble burst around the time of the 2016 elections, according to
Tolentino’s periodization, as readers and writers lost patience with the genre’s narrow aperture.
On the face of it, I think she is correct—not just about the discrete patterns of online publishing,
but in terms of the larger cultural shifts they track. It’s certainly true that today, popular
consensus even among hardcore SATC fans holds that Carrie, once an object of aspiration, is in
fact “literally the worst” (Breslaw). Lena Dunham—a serious talent whose inherited riches, as in
a fable, first blessed and then cursed her—has effectively cancelled herself (Davis). The widely
circulated term “white feminism” itself might be said to index a political blockage in distinctly
narrative form. It describes a pathology in which the subject’s sense of protagonicity—her belief
that she is the “main character” in her “own story”—has become bloated to the point that she
mistakes this story for the story.
By the same token, though, I wonder if this narratorial mode has simply gone on sale. In
her book Paraliterary, Merve Emre writes that the elite women’s clubs that flourished in the
early twentieth-century United States were devoted in part to the proposition, developed by
writers like Henry James, that to become cultivated, American women had to learn to speak,
think, and act more like literary heroines (54-93). Today, in New York and an expanding list of
other cities, women with sufficiently cultured answers to a membership application and a couple
hundred dollars a month to spare can congregate at the Wing, an all-girl coworking-space-cumsocial-club founded by Dunham’s best frenemy Audrey Gelman, which has attempted to revive
the spirit of the women’s clubs of old. (Its first location opened in 2016 in a stretch of
Manhattan’s Flatiron district once so replete with these clubs that it was known as “Ladies’
Mile.” [Fleming].) The Wing marks the clearest indication that any distinction between the
worlds of Sex and the City and Girls—between leisure and precarity, pre- and post-recession
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New York, Charlotte and Woke Charlotte—has collapsed, for women who can afford it, into a
single lifestyle brand. At its Flatiron location, in a color-coded library of women’s writing, books
by Emma Goldman and Ayn Rand, with their matching red spines, sit side by side. At long tables
between the library and the juice bar, marketing consultants rub laptop cords with aspiring
writers.
I know these last details because I tried to infiltrate the Wing once, around the time the
club first opened, at an open house shortly after Donald Trump was elected president. I hovered
on the edges of a sort of consciousness-raising group. The women gathered appeared to be very
young, very privileged, and not very smart, and I assume that they made me heartsick in part
because I hardly had a better idea than they did about what the fuck we were supposed to do
now. In one corner, a station had been set up where you could compose a love letter to Hillary
Clinton. Everything was pink and extremely clean. It seemed important at the time to say
something about how awful it all was. I had a fantasy of writing a juicy tell-all, or a serious
ethnography: what kind of narratives would issue from these laptops? What fantasies about the
cushier side of the gig economy were being spun, and who were their heroines?
Then at some point I realized I didn’t really care about the Wing, even about taking it
down. That what I actually cared about was the desire for a different kind of feminist work
space: a cooperative affordable for freelancers struggling to make ends meet; a place where I
could hang out with all of you, and maybe get some writing done; a collective worthy of New
York. Last summer, while running for governor, Cynthia Nixon held a campaign event at the
Wing. I felt a little sad and a little smug. I didn’t go.
—Post45
January 21, 2019
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Is The Marvelous Mrs. Maisel in on the Joke?

My favorite moment thus far in The Marvelous Mrs. Maisel comes midway through its
second season, which premiered on Amazon this week. The titular Miriam Maisel, an Upper
West Side mother of two still sufficiently young and gay, in the old-fashioned sense, to be
described as adorable (“marvelous” strikes me as too matronly for her), has been separated for a
year from her husband, and is on her first date with another man. As her marriage unraveled in
Season 1, Miriam embarked on a double life as a downtown underground comic. Tonight, daring
her two personas to exist within one room, she has brought her suitor, an arrogant physician, to a
midtown Manhattan comedy club, where her friend Lenny Bruce (Luke Kirby) is finishing a set.
“A doctor!” Lenny beams at Miriam when they get a moment alone. “Your parents must be
kvelling” (“Midnight”).
They are in on something together, Miriam and Lenny. Criminal activity, for one thing.
The night of her comedic debut, Miriam goes so hard that the cops show up and lead her away in
handcuffs. (She’s mimed a blow job and shown her tits—but for a joke.) She and Lenny, who is
regularly arrested for his act, wind up in the same squad car; soon, they’re bailing each other out
of jail, and he’s helping launch her career. Arguably, shared obscenity charges alone mark the
two as partners in a Jewish conspiracy against American decency (Lambert). Bruce, who insisted on
cursing in both English and Yiddish, and was heavily pursued by law enforcement for his vulgar
and godless act, has often been seen as exemplary of a postwar moment at which American
Jewish artists and agitators reveled in the association of “dirty” and “Jew.” His protégés included
the sweetly scandalous Joan Rivers—a key inspiration, according to Mrs. Maisel’s creators Amy
Sherman-Palladino and her husband Daniel Palladino, for Miriam (Busis).
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But Miriam and Lenny also share a sharp ear for the more mundane peccadilloes of
American Jews—not to mention goyim—and a willingness to spill the beans about them. “The
Army is goyish. The Navy is goyish. The Marine Corps is goyish. The Air Force? Jewish,”
Lenny explains to a packed house in an episode early in Season 1. “Kool-Aid: goyish. Instant
potatoes: scary goyish” (“Because”). It’s a classic Bruce bit, still hilarious after all these years
because it’s delivered with the authority of someone who understands that his own culture both
inarguably exists and is entirely made up. Bruce and company were not, of course, the first
performers to flaunt their Jewishness on stage and screen, and yet to say “kvelling” in public
signifies differently if you have already run afoul of the law for saying “cocksucker.” Lenny,
teasing Miriam, merely whispers it—“kvelling,” I mean—quietly recognizing the simultaneity of
her two lives, and, by extension, his own. It is a lovely, intimate moment that flips
transgression’s script—not the obvious apostasy of eating a ham sandwich in a kosher kitchen,
but the more delectable sin of savoring your grandmother’s noodle kugel behind the stained
velvet curtain of a strip club. Unfortunately, in this show, there aren’t enough like it.
***
I don’t actually hate The Marvelous Mrs. Maisel—not at all, not even as a grinch who
never quite understood the charms of Stars Hollow, the life-sized snow globe that ShermanPalladino’s most famous creations, the Gilmore girls, call home. I thought I might. The
gratuitous alliteration of that title, conjuring a long-lost Technicolor Mary Poppins rip-off about
a Jewish fairy godmother, is a lot to handle. But it is a whacky pleasure to watch Miriam—a
coiled spring, at the outset of the series, who checks her circumferences every day with a tape
measure and writes them down in a little book—set herself, however partially, free. Mrs.
Maisel’s tale of self-invention involves a clever reversal: Miriam gets revenge on
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her schmendrick husband by snatching his own dumb hobby—he regularly bombs open mic
night at a Greenwich Village haunt called the Gaslight Café (get it?)—and transforming it into
art. By Season 2, Miriam is playing venues from a sleazy New Jersey joint full of heckling male
comics to Polynesian Night at a Catskills resort; her delightfully deranged performances tend to
be the highlights of the show. Lenny’s sets, and acts from characters based on other 1950s
nightlife fixtures like Red Skelton, further flesh out a seductive basement world where uptown
and downtown audiences, black, white, and Jewish, gather to laugh at themselves.
Too often, though, Mrs. Maisel itself feels like a variety hour in need of a trustworthy
emcee. Its domestic scenes are heavily mannered, teetering on the line between sitcom antics and
high melodrama. Halfway through the show’s pilot, Miriam’s absentminded-Columbia-professor
father, Abe—the beloved character actor Tony Shalhoub—establishes Mrs. Maisel’s high bar for
“standard reaction to bad news”: upon learning that his son-in-law is a scoundrel, he slams the
doors of his study and starts banging out a Rachmaninoff concerto on the piano. (When
characters really get upset, we discover early in the show’s second season, they move to Paris
without telling anyone.) Sometimes Mrs. Maisel resembles a musical without enough musical
numbers, sumptuous but unsatisfying. I don’t just mean this metaphorically. The first voice we
hear in Season 2 is Barbra Streisand’s, belting out Hello, Dolly’s anthem of feminine
competence, “Just Leave Everything to Me,” as the camera whooshes around B. Altman’s
immaculate makeup counters and then down to its switchboard room, where rows of perfectly
coiffed telephone operators direct calls with the precision of a chorus line in swivel chairs
(“Simone”). The choreography is ravishing, but the players never quite break into song.
Perhaps it is fitting that Mrs. Maisel wobbles a bit histrionically between genres. After
all, the same could be said of its characters, who haven’t decided whether wealthy, assimilated
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Jews are actually just gaudier Episcopalians. Often, though, it seems that the show’s Jewishness
merely functions as an excuse for its tonal incoherence, like bad synagogue architecture. As
in Gilmore Girls, Mrs. Maisel relishes the spectacle of arrested development produced when
prodigal children are forced to return to the nests they’ve fled—in the wake of their separation,
both Miriam and Joel end up in their childhood rooms back at their respective parents’. Mrs.
Maisel’s ethnic twist suggests that the postmodern family looks suspiciously like a premodern
one: Anatevka on the Upper West Side. It’s a promising observation—after all, what was the
nuclear family but a fantasy about whiteness and modernity on which midcentury Jews had only
a slippery hold? But Mrs. Maisel declines to pursue this insight further, falling back instead on
tired tropes: dueling machatunim, overbearing Jewish mothers. Mrs. Maisel may be the dinner
theater of award-winning television: sometimes jarringly glib, at other times highly entertaining,
but often not much more.
***
Mrs. Maisel’s second season departs from its first largely by mixing up the setting. First,
we find ourselves in Paris, then at a Catskills resort called Camp Steiner, a mesmerizingly culty
place that, with its unfiltered shtetl gossip, Germanic levels of organized fun, and omnipresent
PA system, offers perhaps the most compelling read on American Jewish culture of anything the
show has yet offered. The Borscht Belt, of course, was also the proving ground for Jewish
comics from Jerry Lewis to Andy Kaufman—a fact that does not go unnoticed by Miriam’s
manager Susie Myerson (Alex Borstein), a hardboiled showbiz vet in a newsboy cap and
suspenders who serves as our heroine’s prole foil.
Miriam, for her part, remains spasmodically committed to keeping her uptown world
from discovering her downtown alter ego, but has also become addicted to the limelight. And so,
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like a wine mom downing fourteen Dixie cups of rosé at a birthday picnic, she has simply begun
launching into comedy routines everywhere she goes, and regardless of whether they are
welcome. On some occasions—like a friend’s Catholic wedding, where Miriam discharges a
torrent of sex jokes in the form of a toast—they emphatically are not. Mrs. Maisel seems to
understand this behavior as eccentric, but has not inquired more deeply into the shape of its
pathology, the way a series like Crazy Ex-Girlfriend would. This is a shame, because it leaves
underexplored what might be the most interesting question raised by its premise:
what would happen to a woman split down the middle this way, importing humiliations from her
domestic life and exporting them, transformed into jokes, to hungry audiences—only to find the
proceeds of this labor unspendable back at home?
From the very first episode of Mrs. Maisel, all of which I’ve watched in the past few
weeks, I found myself thinking about Nanette, Australian comic Hannah Gadsby’s standup
special released by Netflix this past summer. A sort of meta-comedic performance
lecture, Nanette turns its critical gaze on standup itself. Comics are allowed to tell ugly truths
onstage, Gadsby contends in her act, but only if they pivot to a punchline before things start
getting too real—thus effectively sugarcoating experiences of violence and trauma. Nanette was
extensively praised as offering a queer, feminist critique of comedy’s silencing effects. But in
one of the few negative reviews the special garnered, the writer P.E. Moskowitz argued
that Nanette effected its own kind of erasure. What of the long history of comedy, standup and
otherwise, that marginalized subjects have used to work through trauma, not around it? What,
Moskowitz asks, about American Jews?
Mrs. Maisel might be read as offering a similar riposte to Gadsby’s theory of the joke.
Comedy changes Miriam, and Miriam—channeling pathbreaking 1960s comediennes like Rivers
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and Phyllis Diller—changes comedy. But as Mrs. Maisel goes on, its eagerness to credit the
cathartic effects of standup for the fact that Miriam is doing just fine, thank you, can feel like
protesting too much. Addressing a Parisian nightclub in the show’s Season 2 premiere, Miriam—
who has invited herself onstage, as is her wont—triumphantly describes how comedy saved her
when her “perfect life” fell apart the year before. Ironically enough, her spoken-word selfrighteousness in this scene reminds me a bit of the tone that pervades Nanette.
There is, it’s only fair to say, a twist. At first, Miriam has the crowd in the palm of her
hand. But by the end of her monologue she has lost them; she has stopped telling jokes, and
become simply an American woman complaining about her ex-husband to a confused French
audience. When she awkwardly departs the stage, some listeners weep with her, but nobody
claps. Afterward, her impromptu translator for the evening hands her a psychiatrist’s card. “He’s
done wonders for my friend Sylvia Plath,” the woman says (“Simone”). It’s a wicked, wild
moment that hints at something darker than the show is ordinarily willing to countenance. And
yet it seems to support Gadsby’s idea that a truly authentic comedic production is one with the
punchlines taken out. It’s a Kool-Aid and instant potatoes vision of performance—and it’s why,
for all the genuine affection Mrs. Maisel showers on Jewish comedy, I’m not convinced this
show is entirely in on the joke.
—Jewish Currents
December 17, 2018
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The Double’s Allegiance: Philip Roth and the Question of Zion

Midway through Philip Roth’s brilliant and maddening 1993 novel Operation Shylock,
Roth’s alter ego — who this time around is simply named Philip Roth — takes a road trip from
Jerusalem to Ramallah with a long-lost friend, a Palestinian intellectual named George Ziad. All
the way there, past innumerable checkpoints, Ziad rants about the corrosive psychic effects of
Israeli apartheid — on Jews. In Ziad’s view, hegemonic support for the Zionist project has
rendered the Jewish people tragically “goylike” (132). He wonders whether they can snap out of
it. “What happens,” Ziad demands, “when American Jews discover that they have been duped,
that they have constructed an allegiance to Israel on the basis of irrational guilt, of vengeful
fantasies, above all, above all, based on the most naïve delusions about the moral identity of the
state?” (135). Philip doesn’t answer. The friends arrive at their destination, the military tribunal
of a Palestinian teenager accused of throwing Molotov cocktails at Israeli soldiers. Israeli army
personnel have injected the boy with drugs to prevent him from speaking at his own trial.
A furor erupted last month when Ilhan Omar, a freshman congresswoman from
Minnesota, described the obstacles she has faced as an outspoken Muslim supporter of
Palestinian liberation. Omar observed that support for Israel — like loyalty to the gun or fossil
fuel industries — remains entrenched in American political life thanks to the efforts of a
powerful lobby. “I want to talk about the political influence in this country that says it is okay for
people to push for allegiance to a foreign country,” Omar said (qtd in Goldman). Never mind that
supporters of the Israeli government often speak of a “special relationship” between Israel and
the United States. Omar’s opponents seized on the word “allegiance,” claiming that it could only
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signify one thing: anti-Semitism. Democratic lawmakers responded treacherously, proposing a
resolution against anti-Semitism designed to censure their colleague.
But the smear campaign against Omar did not go as planned. Young Jewish leftists
disagreed with its premise forcefully enough that their response, along with resistance from
within the legislature led by the Congressional Black and Progressive Caucuses, forced party
leaders to retreat. As though intent on playing out a twist from a Philip Roth novel in the writer’s
memory—Roth died last year at the age of 85—Democrats amended their resolution at the last
minute to condemn hate itself (Stolberg).
When the rising generation of unapologetically anti-Zionist Jews looks for its ancestors,
will they remember Roth for asking the question: now what happens? Or will they remember his
silence in the face of it?
***
I read Operation Shylock, an unhinged entry in the Roth canon poised at the juncture of
his midcareer metafiction and his historically sweeping late work, several months after his death,
and for an admittedly vulgar reason: I wanted to know if, with regard to the moral identity of the
Jewish state, we were on the same furious team. I already knew that Roth was important to me.
As a teenager, I first read Portnoy’s Complaint (1969), a standup special in the shape of a novel
in which, over the course of a single therapy session, a young man recounts a life so bloated with
“shame and shame and shame and shame” that he suspects he’s stuck “in the middle of a Jewish
joke” (50, 36). I remember being glued to it in the car on the way to the religious school I
attended for four hours after regular school every Tuesday and another four hours on Sunday
mornings, which I hated but did not realize I could quit. Later, my favorite Roth novel was The
Ghost Writer (1979), a work in which Anne Frank may or may not be alive, hot, and living in the
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Berkshires. In that book, a short story by Roth’s alter ego Nathan Zuckerman skewering Jewish
life in his hometown earns him a stern letter from Judge Leopold Wapter, one of the most
prominent Jews in all Newark, complete with a numbered list of leading questions:
1. If you had been living in Nazi Germany in the thirties, would you have written such a
story?
6. What set of aesthetic values makes you think that the cheap is more valid than the
noble and the slimy is more truthful than the sublime?
8. Can you explain why in your story, in which a rabbi appears, there is nowhere the
grandeur of oratory with which Stephen S. Wise and Abba Hillel Silver and Zvi
Masliansky have stirred and touched their audiences? (102-103)
All these questions capture the easily wounded pride barely concealed behind discount
mandarinism characteristic of postwar American Jewish respectability politics. But the one about
Stephen S. Wise, an early-twentieth-century Reform rabbi who lent his name to a large
synagogue in Los Angeles that we didn’t go to, still makes me blush harder than any joke about
jerking off into chopped liver. Respectability can be doubly shameful because its banality hardly
seems worth the desecration. Roth showed me my life was worth profaning.
Allegiance to Israel was an intrinsic element of a stretch of American Jewish life that
encompassed both the aspirational midcentury milieu Roth frequently took on, and the
comfortable suburbs I grew up in at the century’s end. Ilhan Omar was talking about military aid,
but I am talking about summer camp, where once, in a forced-choice game, we were asked, “If
America and Israel went to war, whose side would you fight on?” (I assume we were meant to
draw the conclusion that America and Israel must never go to war.) Many of us were brought up
to believe that our real home lay in a country where only Jews belonged. But the increasingly
confident anti-Zionist Jewish left in the United States has rejected the idea that our lives are
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given meaning by the bloody realities of Jewish settlement on the colonial frontier. We are
diasporists: we believe we make our homes through solidarity with the stateless wherever we are.
I wondered if Roth might be one of us. The author mostly wrote about Jews in America,
but Israel hovers around the edges of many of his novels. Portnoy’s Complaint, for instance,
ends with Alexander Portnoy visiting the holy land. He finds it difficult to take the place
seriously. “In their short pants,” Alex muses, “the men remind me of the head counselors at the
Jewish summer camps I worked at during college vacations — only this isn’t summer camp,
either. It’s home!” The sheer ubiquity of Jews in the country reminds him of a familiar racial
hierarchy, too: “Hey, here we’re the WASPs!” (253-254). In the end, Alex finds that — in a
punchline to the joke that is his life — he is unable to get an erection in the Jewish state. “Where
other Jews flourish,” he proclaims, “I now expire!” (271). In Roth’s 1989 novel The Counterlife,
meanwhile, Nathan Zuckerman flies to Israel to confront his philandering brother, who has
abandoned his family in Newark to become a West Bank settler.
Roth was typically more of an aesthetic than a political radical even in his youth, and the
grand old manhood that graced his last decades marked a progression, not a break. But I
suspected that, beyond the pleasures of endlessly refracted representation, he also offered a
resource for Jewish anti-Zionism hidden in plain sight. And so Roth died and, bored of the
lionizing obits about the prince of American Jewish letters, I decided to read Operation Shylock,
which I knew concerned a Philip Roth impersonator peddling a political program called
diasporism. As it turned out, Operation Shylock had seen me coming from a mile away.
***
Operation Shylock is about a writer, Philip Roth, who discovers that a huckster calling
himself “Philip Roth” is on the loose in Israel, using the writer’s brand to raise money for his
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own cause. Fake Roth, whose true origins are shrouded in mystery, has been traveling the world
proclaiming Israel “the gravest threat to Jewish survival since the end of World War Two” (41).
Well, fair enough. But Fake Roth believes, further, that Jews should return en masse from Israel
to eastern Europe, and has met with Lech Walesa, who led Poland’s Solidarity movement, to
discuss their repatriation—a dubious notion, not least because many Jews do not descend from
eastern Europe to begin with. More dubious still is Fake Roth’s reasoning: “horrendous as Hitler
was,” he argues, the Third Reich was only a flash in the pan—whereas the hatred of Arabs for
Jews is intractable, cosmic, racial (32). The imposter’s sought-after allies include Meir Kahane,
real-life leader of the Jewish Defense League, a militant Jewish supremacist organization that
birthed a far-right Israeli political party now caucusing with Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party
in the Knesset. Zionism’s ultimate mistake, Fake Roth concludes, is that, by settling in the
Middle East, Jews have reneged on fulfilling “the great Jewish European destiny” (32-33). (Oh.)
Upon learning all this, Real Roth flies to Jerusalem to confront his doppelgänger. Considerable
hijinks ensue.
The trap was set and I fell in. I had wanted Roth — the real real Roth — to articulate a
diasporist politics for me, and the very premise of Operation Shylock suggested that he felt this
demand and scoffed at it. For the first few chapters of the book, I was impressed by his
devilishness in forcing me into company with a character for whom “diasporism” is simply the
name of a rebranded white supremacy. But I was also disappointed. Fake Roth is a stunted
schmendrick; Real Roth — let’s call him Philip from now on to keep ourselves sane —
nicknames him “Moishe Pipik,” Yiddish for “Moses Bellybutton.” It seemed to me that there
was something stunted, too, about Roth’s take on diasporism, an epic troll standing in for real
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thought. But then George Ziad showed up — with his own never-mentioned double, Edward
Said, hovering behind him.
Ziad, a beloved graduate school classmate of Philip’s who long ago gave up a
professorship in the United States and moved home to Palestine, quickly comes to occupy the
heart of the novel. Out of touch for decades, the men encounter each other by chance (or is it?) in
the Jerusalem shuk and warmly reunite. Ziad is brilliant and inconsolable regarding the fate of
his people under Israeli rule. And, even in the terms given to us by Operation Shylock, he is a
diasporist.
In the remarkable scene in which Philip and Ziad drive to Ramallah, Ziad, who has
confused Philip with his pretender, declares himself to his companion as a devoted follower. In
one sense, Ziad’s support for the odious Moishe Pipik is strategic, even diplomatic: he desires
the end of Jewish sovereignty in his homeland, and Pipik’s debased diasporism promises a path
toward this end. Yet he also shares with Pipik — and, it seems, with Philip and with Roth — a
conviction that, for Jews, the creation of Israel has meant the tragic loss of diaspora itself. In
Palestinian history, the year 1948 marks the nakba, or catastrophe, in which Zionist militants
razed hundreds of villages, massacring their inhabitants and creating nearly a million refugees. In
Israeli history, it marks the birth of an independent state. But Ziad claims to speak from the
perspective of Jewish history; in his telling, 1948 becomes a kind of nakba of the Jewish soul,
the outcome of an “unthinkable interrelationship, bordering on complicity” between Nazis and
Zionists who shared the dream of wiping out the cultural, social, intellectual, and political life of
diaspora Jewry and all it stood for: ambivalence, absurdism, emasculation (130-131).
For Ziad, diasporic Jewishness survived the birth of Israel only as a phantom. American
Jews, wracked with survivors’ guilt in the wake of the Holocaust, pinned their sense of

111

peoplehood to an identification with “a Jewish military state gloating and triumphant” and
dedicated themselves to justifying the continued expansion of that state by consecrating a lost
sense of victimhood. Other than that, they had pretty much assimilated. “Green lawns, white
Jews — you wrote about it,” Ziad tells Philip. “You crystallized it in your first book” (132).
Ziad’s impassioned postcolonial reading of Philip’s oeuvre — which is, of course, identical to
Roth’s — finally descends into fawning desperation. “Philip, you are a Jewish prophet and you
always have been,” he concludes. “How can I serve you?” (137).
At the end of Operation Shylock, Philip is abducted by the Mossad and asked to become
a spy for the Jewish state. His handler takes a dark view of his own work. “I am a ruthless man
working in a ruthless job for a ruthless country,” Agent Smilesburger tells his captive (351). But
at least, Smilesburger adds pointedly, he’s not trying to wheedle out of the charge by performing
political agonies. Philip takes the job, which leads to Ziad’s death and ultimately to the
bowdlerization of the very novel we are reading. At the request of his handler, Philip tells us, he
has excised a chapter about his mission, the titular Operation Shylock. We know only that he has
infiltrated a PLO meeting in Athens in order to obtain intelligence about “Jewish anti-Zionist
elements threatening the security of Israel (358).
I came to Operation Shylock hoping it would offer evidence toward an anti-Zionist
interpretation of Roth’s work; Roth laughed, wrote the exegesis himself, and fed it into the
shredder. Within the world of the novel, Pipik’s epic trolling and Ziad’s strong reading are
inextricable: the latter draws its strength from the slapstick and yet deeply serious
misunderstanding enabled by the former. Ziad radicalizes Roth’s own hysterical vision of
postwar American Jewishness, drawing out of it a language with which to resist Israeli
occupation. Pipik’s diasporism is a doppelgänger of this critique—a straw man, a fetish, an idol
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for Roth to break. Pipik reveals that behind every refusal of ethnonationalism lies another
ethnonationalism. This is, of course, a fascist lie. But by presenting diasporism as a seduction
that Philip resists, Roth can reframe his alter ego’s quietism as negation. For all its surreal
trappings, the novel slides into what C. Wright Mills called “crackpot realism,” an ideological
mode in which complicity with power is recast as the refusal of illusion. As the critic Moustafa
Bayoumi observes, this mode would become central to “the late aesthetics of the War on Terror”
in thrillers like Homeland and Zero Dark Thirty, in which toughminded American government
agents discover that there is no alternative to the torture of Muslim enemies (239). We might
recall here that Philip Roth is a favorite novelist of Barack Obama.
***
For much of his career, Roth’s muse was his own status as a pariah in the American
Jewish community. Roth’s detractors, especially after Portnoy’s Complaint, ran the gamut from
local rabbis to intellectual leaders like Irving Howe and Gershom Scholem. In many of his
novels, these critics were repurposed as interlocutors. “If you had been living in Nazi Germany
in the thirties,” they ask him, “would you have written such a story?” This maneuver puts the
meta in Roth’s metafiction. It compels us to understand literary self-consciousness not as a trick
but as a record, one side of a writer’s long-running spat with the world.
This approach to gathering literary material also required Roth to exaggerate the terms of
his excommunication. The scandalized reviews and pulpit denunciations he received were real
— but so were the Jewish book prizes he began winning in 1959 with Goodbye, Columbus, and
wrote about much less often (Omer-Sherman 196-203; Cooper 5).15 In Operation Shylock, he
calls his own bluff: at one point, Pipik smirks that Philip is “coming back into the Jewish fold
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again because he wants a Nobel Prize” (255). Roth’s stature, even or especially in the
establishment precincts of American Jewish life, only increased in the decades that followed
Operation Shylock, as the writer turned his hand to national epics like American Pastoral (1997)
and The Plot Against America (2004).
But even Roth’s most outré work has been kosher ever since the old politics of
respectability gave way, in the Jewish world as elsewhere in American life, to the cynical
cooption of dissent. This reclamation has occasionally bordered on the grotesque. Shortly after
the arrest of Harvey Weinstein on sexual assault charges, a hot take in the Jewish web magazine
Tablet used Portnoy’s Complaint to justify describing Weinstein, almost fondly, as “a deeply
Jewish kind of pervert” (Oppenheimer). The article’s author, the religion journalist Mark
Oppenheimer, noted that Portnoy lusted after all-American white girls; Weinstein, likewise,
assaulted many non-Jewish women. Oppenheimer argued that Weinstein’s sexual pursuits, like
Portnoy’s, signified an anxious celebration of Jewish entry into the promised land of whiteness—
although Oppenheimer used the deracinated term “power,” the better to continue the celebration.
It was a reading worthy of Moishe Pipik, and the magazine was forced to apologize.
Green lawns, white Jews. A triumphant march toward empire, with some hang-ups mixed
in. It would be a great loss if Roth were remembered as an exponent of this vision for American
Jewry rather than its sharpest satirist—if he were buried, essentially, in one of his own traps. At
the same time, I don’t think we can look to him as a diasporist forebear. This is not, in the end,
because I suspect Roth of more than a grudging allegiance to Israel. It is, rather, because his
allegiance to America ran so deep. Throughout Roth’s work, not Israel but the United States is a
Jewish haven that must be safeguarded. In Operation Shylock, Philip sacrifices Ziad not because
he hates Palestinians but because, when his adventure is over, he can go home. We might look
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instead to the real Edward Said, who could not. For good reason, Said sometimes described
himself as “the last Jew” (qtd in Marquand).16
Late last month, Israel began bombing Gaza again. Donald Trump recognized Israel’s
illegal occupation of the Golan Heights, while at the AIPAC conference in Washington, D.C.,
Netanyahu lashed out at Ilhan Omar as Democrats stood by. We are allowed to speak about this
now — some of us, sometimes. I remember when the silence was louder, when bombs fell on
Gaza in 2008, and the rambunctious newsroom at the Jewish Daily Forward, the newspaper
where I worked as a reporter, grew quiet and withdrawn. I remember accompanying a Birthright
Israel trip sponsored by Tablet, where I worked a little later, laughingly assured by my editor that
I could staff the trip and write the exposé. I remember how much time I spent imagining I was a
spy, then discovering I was just a patsy.
It is a relief to have blown our cover. But we should be wary of the special dispensation
to speak, as the lost children of Zionists, as others continue to be silenced. I am looking forward
to the return of the Jews, and watchful already for false prophets of diasporism.
—Post45
April 12, 2019
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See also Bryan Cheyette’s Diasporas of the Mind (18-22), for a discussion of Said’s well-known comment, in an
interview with an Israeli newspaper, proclaiming himself the “last Jewish intellectual.”
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Morgan Bassichis’s Haunted American Songbook

Sitting at the piano midway through their performance More Protest Songs, Morgan
Bassichis introduced their next number as “a protest song I would love to see, like, elementary
school students do. Preschool? Super young” (Bassichis, More).
Everyone cracked up. Between verses, Bassichis drew out their fantasy of inspiring a
youth insurrection: “A lot of little kids flooding everywhere.… They’re, like, tugging on
people’s pants…overturning desks.”
The song itself was just two lines repeated between broken piano chords: “We cast you
out / We send you away.” It might have been an incantation meant to expel an evil force, or a
message from a community exiling a troublesome member—a children’s council, perhaps,
deciding who would be the first to go.
Like much of Bassichis’s work, the power of “We Cast You Out” comes from its shivery
mix of political feelings. Bassichis is not the only contemporary artist exploring the nature of
everyday existence in such overwhelming times, but they are among the first to plumb the
jumbled unconscious of today’s growing left social movements from within. Bassichis is a
longtime activist with prison-abolition and Palestine-solidarity groups, whose performances call
up the delight, despair, and dizzying contradictions that shape life on the (queer, Jewish) left.
They are also a virtuosic improviser, able to free associate across moods from the petty to the
oceanic; the thrill of marching in the streets, the relief of getting home to watch TV.
Bassichis—who’s amassed a devoted following in the art world—writes gorgeous,
unadorned songs that would be at home in a haunted version of the American songbook. Their
performances combine music and comedy to create surreal, unsettling, partly improvised, and
very funny cabaret shows. In More Protest Songs, performed and recorded as an album in 2017,
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they reimagined an old-fashioned genre of musical dissent with strange, dark songs that began
their life as lullabies. In The Faggots and Their Friends Between Revolutions: The Musical, they
co-created a theatrical adaptation of Larry Mitchell’s 1977 cult classic, an allegory about gay life
in a declining empire called Ramrod. Damned if You Duet, a variety show Bassichis presented
last fall with a series of collaborators, investigated the narcissism of collaboration itself. A
Morgan Bassichis performance can feel like a night at the piano bar in the middle of a siege.
It can also feel like children’s theater for adults. Onstage, Bassichis, a mesmerizing
presence, becomes a maddening, lovable, overgrown kid (and often works with actual young
performers). They describe their persona as “delusional, childlike, somehow earnest, totally
narcissistic.” (“Is it you?” I asked. “Yes and no. A turned-up, distorted version,” they said
[Bassichis, Personal Interview].) Artforum called them as a “millennial Candide” (Krasinski).
Bassichis could be envisioned making a cameo on Sesame Street, with a soulful singing
voice that slips, for effect, into a tone reminiscent of Kermit the Frog. They are ungainly—again,
perhaps deliberately—like a tall child or, well, a big bird. A running joke in Damned if You
Duet involved them distractedly taking off items of clothing and putting different ones—
stockings and ballet flats but no pants, for instance—back on. At one point they put a sock on the
microphone, then asked why.
Bassichis’s alter ego can often be found creatively misappropriating leftist political
concepts and the current lingua franca of community expectations—boundaries, consent, trust,
self-care. At the performance of Damned if You Duet that I saw, they announced at one point that
there were “too many faces” in the room. “Having a face is a form of uncompensated labor,”
they said gravely as the stage lights dimmed, “and we’re going on strike” (Bassichis, Damned).
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The embattled “we” in Bassichis’s songs often seems to be a radical or marginalized
community—some version of the collectives that narrate traditional protest songs like “We Shall
Overcome” or “We Shall Not Be Moved,” but usually, here, on the cusp of dissolution. In “The
Porn Song,” Bassichis enumerates a list of things an unspecified ensemble has stopped doing—
“We don’t eat anymore/ We don’t cook meals/ We don’t go to the library store anymore/ We
don’t do those meditations anymore/ There’s no time”—before they get to the punch line that
explains why everyone is so busy: “So much porn.” This is a dystopia that even we could fall for.
***
A theater kid raised by social worker parents in a progressive Boston suburb, Bassichis
adopted their mom’s political fervor as well as her musical tastes, which ranged from jazz
vocalists like Sarah Vaughn to folk singers like Holly Near. For a decade after college, they
worked as an anti-prison organizer and educator in San Francisco. In 2013 they moved to New
York, initially intending to give Broadway a shot. “I got my headshot taken like, ‘Alan
Cumming, when you’re done in Cabaret, here I am,’” Bassichis joked (Bassichis, Perosnal
Interview). Instead, they found a home among veteran performance artists like Jibz Cameron
(known onstage as Dynasty Handbag) and emerging artists like the filmmaker Tourmaline; this
spring, their work will be featured in the Whitney Biennial.
Bassichis remains “a real show person,” said Malik Gaines, a founder of the performance
troupe My Barbarian and a professor of performance studies at New York University.
In Damned if You Duet, Gaines joined them for a tribute to George Michael that ended with the
two shrieking the Wham! song “Freedom” while leaping around the stage in socks and
underwear. “I don’t want your freedom!” they sang, shaking their fists, like queer kids putting on
a show in someone’s basement, or protesters who have turned on each other.
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The video and performance artist Gregg Bordowitz compared Bassichis’s work to
Brecht’s Lehrstücke, or learning plays, which created a jarring mix of affects intended to
sensitize audiences to the contradictions governing their lives. Leaving a Bassichis show, he
added, sometimes brought back memories of heading home from ACT-UP meetings in the
1980s: “energized and enervated; motivated but thoughtful about what steps to take next;
preoccupied by how much one can do.”
My own fantasy about Bassichis’s work also takes place in the ’80s: I walked out
of More Protest Songs with the weird sensation that I already knew the songs, that they were
returning to me from my early childhood, as though they had long ago been recorded on a
cassette tape that had just been lost, for many years, under a seat in my mom’s car.
Last month, Bassichis presented a new performance, Klezmer for Beginners, which
included both an interpretation of Amy Winehouse’s “Back to Black” that highlighted the
klezmer roots of its sound, and a group singalong of an old protest song Bassichis described as
“‘Fuck tha Police’ in Yiddish” (Bassichis, Klezmer). Like More Protest Songs and Damned if
You Duet—a collaboration with the composer Ethan Philbrick—the show was an attempt,
Bassichis explained, “to approach a genre with fresh eyes.” It was also another occasion for
political and historical reflection, this time responding to the way that “the accusation of antiSemitism is being used as an intense wedge in social movements,” Bassichis said.
There was a surge of interest in klezmer in the 1980s, they added, when leftist Jews
responded to this kind of weaponization by “looking for forms of Jewishness that were
purposefully diasporic and rooted in internationalism.” Many of the musicians behind that last
klezmer revival—some of whom collaborated on Klezmer for Beginners—have remained active
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as performers and organizers for decades, a living riposte to the commonplace that only younger
Jews affiliate with the left.
Artists run the risk of dabbling in nostalgia and sentimentality when they make work that
explicitly invokes radical movements of the past or imagines those we might see in the future.
But the children and older artists who appear in Bassichis’s work—whether in person or
channeled by Bassichis—simply seem to belong there. Entering Bassichis’s world, we encounter
a riotous vision of what an intergenerational left might look like—one in which everyone is
loopy, but no one is alone.
—The Nation
May 23, 2019
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True Lies

At the time he was compared to Jean Genet, but to be honest, the books don’t add up to
much on their own. J.T. LeRoy wrote three. The first and most ambitious was Sarah, a novel
about a gender-fluid child named Cherry Vanilla growing up among truck stop prostitutes in
West Virginia. The lot lizards’ world is dangerous and dirt poor, but it is also—seen through the
eyes of a boy who likes lipstick and cock—a queer utopia. Cherry Vanilla is instructed in the arts
of love and adored for his girlishness by pimps, truckers, and older sex workers like his mother,
Sarah. Cherry Vanilla slyly hopes to surpass her at her trade, and so he sets off on a dangerous
adventure to a truck stop over a mountain ridge, where he takes on Sarah’s name and gender.
Like Dorothy in Oz, Cherry Vanilla finds some of this new world beautiful, and some of it not
very nice at all. Finally, he is rescued by cross-dressing lot lizards from his past and discovers
there’s no place like home.
Sarah, published in 2000, was a surprise best seller, and LeRoy followed up with a shortstory collection, The Heart Is Deceitful Above All Things (2001), which handled similar material
with a grittier tone. The third book, Harold’s End (2004), was a slight fable about street kids and
their pets buttressed by an introduction from Dave Eggers and reams of celebrity
acknowledgments—but by this point, LeRoy’s persona had eclipsed his writing altogether, only
to be eclipsed in turn by its unraveling.
LeRoy had turned up in San Francisco at the age of thirteen around 1993, abandoned
there by his meth-using mother after a cross-country drive. Addicted to heroin and maybe HIV
positive—the story changed a lot—LeRoy called a suicide hotline one day and connected with a
psychiatrist who encouraged him to write. His talent was as obvious as his need, and he quickly
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found champions in the tight-knit queer literary scene in and beyond the Bay Area; soon he was
calling writers like Dennis Cooper and Mary Gaitskill at all hours, looking for emotional
guidance and literary advice. (He spoke to these mentors only by phone and email, explaining
that he was too incapacitated by trauma or illness to meet in person.) When Sarah—marketed,
like his later books, as autobiographical fiction—became a cult hit, the author moved on to new
confidants like Billy Corgan and Winona Ryder. He appeared in public only in a Warholian
disguise of a blond wig and sunglasses, saying little and letting an overbearing British woman
named Speedie, who claimed to be his assistant, speak for him. At his own packed readings, he
would loiter offstage while a coterie of devoted celebrity fans read on his behalf. Then things got
weird.
From early on, rumors had circulated that LeRoy was not who he said he was. Could he
be a front for Cooper, who was completing a cycle of critically acclaimed novels about gay punk
boys? In 2005, a journalist named Stephen Beachy cracked most of the case. LeRoy was the
invention of Laura Albert, a forty-year-old veteran of the Bay Area punk scene. A gifted mimic
who had worked as a phone sex operator, Albert created LeRoy as an alter ego she slipped into
when seeking help from hotline workers. It was Albert who spent years on the phone with
LeRoy’s mentors, playing both the writer himself and supporting characters like Speedie. (She
wasn’t really British.) As LeRoy’s star rose, he grew into a kind of family business: Albert was
assisted in the charade by her partner Geoffrey Knoop and, eventually, by Geoffrey’s younger
half sibling Savannah Knoop, the figure in the wigs and sunglasses. A few months after Beachy’s
bombshell, the New York Times solved the remainder of the mystery: It was Savannah—an
adorable, androgynous recent boarding school graduate bumming around San Francisco—who
had become a darling of the fashion industry, dominating red carpets without having to say a
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word, and seduced the glamorous Italian actress and director Asia Argento, who adapted The
Heart Is Deceitful Above All Things into a film.
Faced with these allegations, LeRoy tried to dig in. He insisted, in a final statement, “As a
transgendered human, subject to attacks, I use stand-ins to protect my identity.” But the jig was
up. Friends and fans poured out accusations of betrayal. The production company that had
optioned the rights to Sarah sued Albert for fraud. The San Francisco Chronicle called the case
“the greatest literary hoax in a generation” (Benson). And it was. The story of J.T. LeRoy has
become a minor but persistent modern myth, a tale we keep retelling. Two documentaries on the
scandal have appeared in the past several years. This spring, Laura Dern and Kristen Stewart
starred in a feature called J.T. LeRoy; in a wink at the audience, Courtney Love played a
Hollywood producer unconvinced that LeRoy is real.
The most compelling scammers of our age are figures like Anna Delvey and Billy
McFarland, who acquire capital from literal or figurative investors by faking the extent of the
capital they already have. The hoaxers of the 1990s and early 2000s were different. A string of
fake memoirists, among whom LeRoy was only the most brilliant example, emerged at a
moment when audiences couldn’t get enough trauma. In the wake of sensations like Frank
McCourt’s Angela’s Ashes, publishers churned out devastating true stories sometimes referred to
in the press as “misery lit.” Opportunists chimed in with ersatz narratives as upsetting and neatly
packaged as baby shoes, never worn. LeRoy’s clearest forerunner was Anthony Godby Johnson,
who presented himself in his book A Rock and a Hard Place as a teenage boy living with AIDS
after enduring years of sexual abuse by his parents and their sadistic friends. Johnson turned out
to be the alias of a middle-aged woman.
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Whether authentic or faked, the childhood-trauma memoirs that proliferated in this period
promised unvarnished access to the real. Their jacket copy emphasized their authors’ helpless
honesty and blunt lack of style. LeRoy, with his folksy diction, agonizing memories, and
irrepressible youth, played by some of the same rules. But he was ultimately a one-of-a-kind
creation. Like his persona, his work—always classified as fiction, although he presented it as
autobiographical—embraced perversity and artifice. The children in his books are assaulted with
adult knowledge, but they also seek it out. They are deviants with complex emotional and erotic
attachments to their own abuse, sometimes deliberately provoking punishment from caretakers in
order to feel loved or aroused. They lie and cheat for the fun of it, as though modeling LeRoy’s
own extravagant duplicity. LeRoy camped up his own fictitiousness, sometimes claiming to
himself be spreading the rumors that Cooper or Gus Van Sant had written his books. To Gaitskill
he confessed, “I feel like this is just another hustle, like maybe I’m hustling the literary world”
(qtd in Press). But these announcements only amounted to part of the hustle.
LeRoy appeared at a time when queer writers who had survived the AIDS crisis were
grappling with the shape their lives would take after the worst of the epidemic had passed.
Recent documentaries suggest that, for all the complexities of the case, the community was
deeply scarred by an unbearably simple extraliterary discovery: A vulnerable young person they
had cared for did not exist. Those once closest to LeRoy talk about him as though they’d known
a ghost. In the end, though, the most unsettling chronicler of the LeRoy years is Laura Albert
herself. Since being exposed, Albert has consistently maintained that J.T. was not intended as a
hoax at all. He was, she claims, an “avatar,” a second self she entered in order to process her own
history of trauma (“My Avatar”). Albert grew up in a middle-class Jewish household in
Brooklyn that she describes as physically and sexually abusive. As a teenager, she was sent to
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live in a group home for girls. She prayed nightly—as she puts it in the film Author: The J.T.
LeRoy Story—to “wake up as a cute, blond-haired, blue-eyed boy . . . that a man would love and
want to fuck.” Albert found solace calling abuse and suicide hotlines in the guise of such a boy.
“It never, ever occurred to me to call as myself,” she remembers. “What reaction would there be
besides ‘You’re fat and ugly and disgusting and deserve it’?” (Author)
Albert was not the only turn-of-the-twenty-first-century literary impostor to claim that the
shattering experience of real trauma forced her to fabricate the imaginary kind. But we can read
her in a different way, too. What if Albert, as she tells us over and over, really was channeling
the boy she wanted to become? Despite having effectively lived a double life across gender lines,
the author was never discussed as a trans figure in her own right at the time of her unmasking.
We seem to have assumed that she was too loud and curvy and ornamented and even maternal—
Albert gave birth to a son around the time J. T. was born—to be, in effect, a good candidate for
something we might recognize as a trans identity. It seems reasonable to conjecture that Albert
on some level believed this herself; that the prospect of transition seemed so distant, it was easier
to invent a new person from scratch. J.T. LeRoy, the new feature film, takes this once-elusive
insight almost as a given. The movie’s central conflict is not the tension between truth and
falsehood, but between eager, jealous Laura Albert and quiet, self-possessed Savannah Knoop, a
girl—now identifying, in real life, as nonbinary—who could pass as a boy.
Like Albert, I’ve long had dreams of inhabiting a soft, complicated boyhood, and like
her, I’m not an obvious candidate for the part. I was obsessed with the LeRoy affair at the time,
but it never occurred to me to trust either Albert or myself to know what we wanted. Yet when I
decided earlier this year to take some experimental steps boyward, it felt less like uncovering a
secret desire and more like recognizing the seriousness of a long-running gag—or like admitting
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my own sense of imposture might be real. Everyone’s an impostor, naturally; or so we say until
we meet one in the flesh. This, of course, we learned from J.T. LeRoy.
—Bookforum
Summer 2019
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The Right Kind of Continuity

Real-life conspiracies pose a certain challenge for political analysis. Take the case of
Jeffrey Epstein, the financier whose indictment in early July has produced revelations shocking
even in an age of cartoon villainy. What is there to say about an international pedophilia ring
linked to former US presidents and mitteleuropean aristocrats, which operated for decades with
near impunity thanks to the prominence of its participants, at the behest of a billionaire whose
private plane was nicknamed the Lolita Express?
It is likewise awkward for Jews when a Jewish public figure so perfectly embodies an
antisemitic caricature. And here too—even with Woody Allen atop the alphabetical list of
associates whose names appear in Epstein’s leaked little black book (Brock), and Alan
Dershowitz allegedly availing himself of Epstein’s underage girls even while getting him a
sweetheart deal in court (Rice)—it has been difficult to know quite what to say. After all,
Epstein’s friends also included plenty of prominent non-Jews (Donald Trump, for instance). But
two stories that broke last week have turned the Epstein case into a specifically Jewish debacle—
not the generic kind an antisemite might dream up, but one rooted in the particular realities of the
contemporary US Jewish establishment.
At a glance, these new disclosures have little in common. The first, a story reported by
the Forward, detailed fallout within the Jewish community over the formerly close ties between
Epstein and Leslie Wexner, a lingerie billionaire and a major Jewish philanthropist (Feldman).
The second revealed that—in the deadpan words of the New York Times—Epstein had long
“hoped to seed the human race with his DNA by impregnating women at his vast New Mexico
ranch” (Stewart et al). Only the former story explicitly dealt with the Jewish world—and yet it
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was the latter that elicited widespread social media responses like the writer Ayelet Waldman’s.
“I just keep muttering to myself, ‘Oh my god this is so so so so so so so so so so bad for the
Jews,’” Waldman wrote. “Am I the only one?” (Waldman). (She was not.)
Looking at these stories side by side, we might ask: what can it mean that someone so
very bad for the Jews has operated so close to the center of power in the American Jewish
community? And we might observe that the Jewish philanthropic world’s own ongoing attempts
to engineer reproductive behavior within the community have deeply stultified its sexual
politics—rendering its adjacence to an abuser at Epstein’s scale of ambition all the more
unnerving.
***
Over the past few weeks, Wexner—whose retail empire includes Victoria’s Secret and
Express—has mostly appeared in the news in response to a persistent question: where did Jeffrey
Epstein’s money come from? For a man who owns private islands, Epstein’s assets appear to be
relatively meager (Shubber). The financier seems to have acquired much of his wealth in the
1990s and early 2000s through the largesse of ultra-rich friends like Wexner;
Epstein called Wexner his mentor, and the press has often described him as Epstein’s “only
known client” (George-Parker). In addition to cash, Wexner gave Epstein power of attorney,
which allowed him to perform financial transactions in Wexner’s name. He also gifted Epstein
his Upper East Side manse, then handed over the Boeing 727 that Epstein would turn into his
infamous party plane. Though Wexner has not been directly accused of wrongdoing, he appears
to have tolerated Epstein’s habit of gaining access to Victoria’s Secret models by posing as a
talent scout for the company. Wexner claims he knew nothing of Epstein’s abuses against
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women until the latter pled guilty to solicitation charges in 2008; at that point, Wexner and his
foundation say, they ended the relationship.
Within the Jewish institutional world, however, Wexner’s relationship with Epstein is
significant in a different way. Wexner is among a small number of Jewish community
megadonors, billionaires who provide an outsize and growing proportion of funding for
communal organizations and to a large extent determine what those organizations look like.
Along with Sheldon Adelson, Charles Bronfman, and a few others, he has spent millions of
dollars on institutions ranging from Birthright Israel—which has sent over 500,000 young
diaspora Jews on free trips to Israel—to the Jewish Theological Seminary, where Conservative
rabbis are ordained. The Wexner Graduate Fellowship, a prestigious and often career-making
award, sponsors leadership training and graduate school tuition subsidies for an elite cadre of
future rabbis, educators, and other Jewish professionals. Epstein was closely involved with
Wexner’s charitable giving; together, for instance, the two men helped fund the construction of a
new building for Harvard’s Hillel (McCafferty and Ryan). Tax filings suggest that Epstein spent
six years as a trustee of the Wexner Foundation, and that the foundation gave millions of dollars
to pet projects of his own. (Epstein also donated to Jewish charities himself, though at a
comparatively modest level [Pink]).
These ties are now stoking anxiety and division behind the scenes at Jewish institutions
led by Wexner-affiliated professionals. Last month, the Forward reported, a former student at
Mechon Hadar—a co-ed egalitarian yeshiva in New York—emailed the school’s listserv with a
plea for the institution to cut ties with Wexner in light of the unspooling allegations against
Epstein. Mechon Hadar’s president, a prominent rabbi (and a stepson to former US senator Joe
Lieberman), responded by censuring the student, implying that he would be unwelcome in the
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Hadar community until he performed teshuvah—repentance—for having “called out” the
connections between Wexner, Epstein, and the school in a community forum (Fishman).
Wexner-backed institutions may well hope that any outrage currently directed at their benefactor
goes the way of allegations against Michael Steinhardt, the Birthright co-founder and
megadonor accused last year of serial sexual harassment—which is to say nowhere.
Steinhardt remains on Birthright’s honorary board; his money will likely continue to be welcome
throughout the mainstream Jewish world (Dreyfus).
Lacking a broad base of support, Jewish organizations are increasingly dependent on
alms from an ever older, richer, and more conservative donor class (Berman). In this sense, the
likelihood that the Jewish world will continue to harbor high-level sexual assailants is simply a
matter of odds: the violence of rich and powerful men against women, as we continue to confirm,
is staggeringly commonplace. A community reliant on the generosity of such men is thus
particularly vulnerable to their abuse.
On another level, though, the problem is even more circular than these practical
considerations would suggest. The donors who rose to power in the Jewish community at the end
of the 20th century built their philanthropic vision around the promotion of what came to be
called “Jewish continuity.” They commissioned extensive surveys of American Jewry and found
that the kind of Jews they recognized seemed to be disappearing: synagogue membership and
affinity for Israel were in decline, interfaith marriage was up, and Jewish fertility rates were
down. In response to this perceived crisis, the Jewish establishment poured millions of dollars
into programs intended to reproduce the community “in its own image,” as the sociologist Shaul
Kelner put it in an article by that name (Kelner). Reproduction itself, both biological and social,
is at the heart of Jewish continuity programming. The demographer Steven M. Cohen, who
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produced countless statistical reports on the community at the behest of the donor class, liked to
put it bluntly: if institutions wanted American Jewish life to continue, they would have
to prioritize the goals of “creating more Jewish marriages and filling more Jewish baby
carriages” (Cohen).
Feminist critiques of continuity discourse have become increasingly audible within the
mainstream Jewish world, intensifying last year after Cohen himself was accused of serial sexual
harassment (Unger-Sargon). “How surprised can we be that a man whose entire worldview
hinged on women having more babies turned out to have no respect for women when it came to
personal sexual boundaries?” the writer Rokhl Kafrissen asked in the Forward. In practice,
though, Jewish organizations designed to promote a large-scale reproductive project have
continued to do just that—and to enable the abuses that come along with it (Kafrissen). “We’re
tantalizing you with ‘you will hook up and you will marry,’” a former Birthright staffer
told Jewish Currents in our investigation of sexual misconduct on the Israel tours (Seltzer). “The
trips promote allegiance and a lack of critical thinking. And to talk about rape culture, you have
to be able to think critically.”
Cut to Epstein’s New Mexico ranch, where, according to the New York Times, the
financier intended to have 20 women at a time inseminated with his sperm. Epstein was
interested in transhumanism, a theory of human perfection via technological manipulation that—
like its predecessor, eugenics—is shot through with racist and reactionary ideas. Allegedly
inspired by a defunct operation to stockpile the sperm of Nobel laureates, Epstein cultivated
relationships with Harvard scientists whom he believed could help him in this and other
transhumanist endeavors: he hoped to improve the human genome, to cut aid to the poor as a
bulwark against overpopulation, and to cryogenically freeze his own brain and (allegedly egg-
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shaped) penis (“Watch Jeffrey”). Donations to Harvard got Epstein, who did not attend college
himself, in the door; he was welcomed as a patron and interlocutor by high-profile researchers
even as some, like the neuroscientist Steven Pinker, eventually distanced themselves.
Dershowitz, who as a Harvard Law professor regularly attended lunches Epstein hosted for the
scientists, told the Times he was “appalled” to learn about Epstein’s eugenic ambitions, but their
friendship continued.
These revelations suggest that Epstein is not only a sexual assailant on a grand scale, but
one who believes, on the basis of bloodlines, in the righteousness of some version of his sexual
politics. Clearly, Harvard—even if it knew nothing of Epstein’s predation—should be held
accountable for inviting someone promoting these views into a prominent role at a research
institution. Is the same true for the Wexner Foundation? No evidence has yet emerged
connecting Epstein’s eugenic ambitions to his Jewish philanthropic ones. It should concern us
that Epstein long had Wexner’s ear, but then, we were already concerned.
***
All scandals aside, Jewish establishment donors and leaders obsessed not only with
Jewish continuity but the right kind of continuity—ardently pro-Israel children of two Jewish
parents—have failed on their own terms. Perhaps the most publicly identifiable organization of
millennial Jews is IfNotNow, which rages against the moral obstinacy of the establishment. Jews
of color, drastically undercounted by establishment demographers even as they have been
instrumentalized as Zionists, are demanding recognition (Feldman). And Steven M. Cohen’s
research, with its dire predictions about American Jews intermarrying into extinction, has
been called into question for its narrow definition of Jewishness (Sales, “Fall”). The language of
continuity “told people who fall outside of the parameters set primarily by men that their ways of
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being Jewish are not valued or valuable,” three Jewish women professors—Kate Rosenblatt, Lila
Corwin Berman, and Ronit Stahl—wrote in a Forward op-ed last year (Rosenblatt et al).
These are consequences of the Jewish establishment’s tacit bargain with billionaire
donors, which realigned Jewish institutions with a set of priorities never agreed upon by the
wider community. This bargain created a communal leadership disconnected from many of the
Jews it claims to represent, and proximate to figures like Epstein.
Rather than endlessly tracing these webs of influence, we might do better to listen for
ideological echoes. With his insemination plan, Epstein conjured a eugenicist fantasy a Nazi
could love—and one that, in the context of his proximity to Jewish philanthropy, also feels like a
crude parody of Jewish summer camp seen from the perspective of a megadonor. Of course, his
plan was nakedly about his own mass reproduction, while the Jewish philanthropic establishment
aims to reproduce an entire community. But the establishment has projected its own face onto
that community, refusing to recognize deviations that would disturb this image—including the
deviation posed by women’s reproductive autonomy. Which is the greater narcissism?
—Jewish Currents
August 7, 2019
coauthored with Noah Kulwin
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How White Nationalists Aligned Themselves with the Antiabortion Movement
Last fall, speaking to a far-right Austrian magazine, the Iowa Republican congressman
Steve King succinctly laid out his theory of Western decline. The problem, he suggested, was a
demographic born at the nexus of reproduction and immigration. “If we continue to abort our
babies and import a replacement for them in the form of young violent men, we are supplanting
our culture, our civilization,” King said (McCarthy).
King had already called attention to himself the previous year for retweeting a cartoon
that depicted the nativist Dutch party leader Geert Wilders as a bulwark against invading Muslim
hordes. “Wilders understands that culture and demographics are our destiny. We can’t restore
our civilization with somebody else’s babies,” King wrote (Bump, “Rep”).
This month, King was back in the headlines. Speaking to a conservative group outside
Des Moines about his support for a total ban on abortion, he asked: “What if we went back
through all the family trees and just pulled those people out that were products of rape and
incest? Would there be any population of the world left if we did that?” (Foran).
King’s questions were startlingly direct in their implication that sexual violence, at least
if it led to childbirth, was a good thing. His frank misogyny almost overshadowed another
implication of his words: When King refers to world population, he’s not talking about
everybody.
King is only the most notorious of the politicians who have recently justified their
opposition to abortion by linking it to their anti-immigration politics (Weiss; Holt). Conservative
lawmakers and right-wing vigilantes alike have adopted a seemingly new language for
describing their antiabortion stance: the white nationalist discourse of the “great replacement,” a
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conspiracy theory that holds that nonwhite immigrants are demographically “replacing” whites
throughout the West (Eligon).
For reproductive-rights supporters in the United States, it’s long been easy to see the
Republican Party’s hard-line antiabortion politics as a kind of grotesque hypocrisy. How can a
political body that has aligned itself against school lunches and for machine guns claim to
support “life?” This juxtaposition has been particularly cruel over the past year, as revelations
about the imprisonment of migrant children in concentration camps have coincided with
a wave of draconian antiabortion legislation (Nash). (Just last week, a federal appeals court
approved Trump administration rules cutting off federal funds from health-care providers that
offer abortions or even discuss the procedure with patients, effectively slashing the budget of
organizations like Planned Parenthood [McCammon]). But understanding this confluence as
ironic can actually mislead us. In fact, as King and his white nationalist allies have become
increasingly comfortable admitting, state crackdowns on reproductive and immigrant rights are
inextricably linked.
Well over a century ago in the United States and elsewhere, fears about immigration and
other forms of racial “contamination” became the explicit basis for the curtailing of reproductive
freedoms. From Theodore Roosevelt’s United States to Nazi Germany to the ultranationalist
regimes that dot contemporary Europe, governments have alleged that immigrants—or others
considered inferior—are multiplying too quickly while white women are failing to reproduce.
Notoriously, they have often used this claim to justify antinatalist policies intended to limit the
reproduction of groups they deem unfit. But they have been equally obsessed with the attempt to
enlarge “desirable” populations through pronatalist policies designed to ensure certain women
bear children—including laws that restrict contraception and reproduction across the board.
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Like their eugenicist forebears, today’s increasingly visible white nationalists “are
obsessed with falling birthrates, and by extension they are obsessed with the recruitment—and
total control—of women’s wombs,” as the writer Mona Eltahawy recently put it (Eltahawy).
They have latched onto antiabortion extremism in an attempt to bolster white population growth,
while aiming to restrict the growth of nonwhite populations through campaigns of terror against
immigrants. In some cases, antiabortion politics provide cover for white nationalist sentiments,
allowing sympathizers to speak broadly about “population” rather than race, even as they value
some unborn lives over others.
In the United States since the 1970s, the antiabortion movement has taken on a life of its
own, obscuring this history until its sudden reappearance in the national spotlight. But the
connection between immigration and reproduction was never lost on the movement’s white
nationalist fringe—nor should it be lost on supporters of reproductive rights.
***
In the late 19th century, states across the United States banned abortion and contraception
after extensive lobbying from groups, including the American Medical Association, that claimed
white Americans were in the process of committing what would come to be known as race
suicide. Adherents to this eugenic fantasy, ultimately including such prominent figures as
Roosevelt, blamed both women who failed to bear children and immigrants diluting the gene
pool for what they feared was the end of white dominance in the United States. As historian
Leslie Reagan has noted, “White male patriotism demanded that maternity be enforced among
white Protestant women” (Reagan 11). The Catholic church, too, joined forces with eugenicists
against birth control advocates. Over the next several decades, U.S. borders would gradually
close.
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Fascist regimes took these ideas and policies to their logical extreme, while also
promising to reestablish patriarchal authority: “Kinder, Kirche, Küche”—children, church,
kitchen—as per a 19th-century German slogan Hitler adapted during his rise to power. Nazis
employed both pronatalist (or “positive”) eugenic practices designed to propagate the Aryan
population and antinatalist (or “negative”) ones aimed at keeping the Jewish population down.
“Nazi doctrine, founded on the distinction between ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ life, enforced
selective breeding by increasing penalties for abortions and prohibiting birth control,” the
German feminist scholar Claudia Koonz wrote in a landmark study of women under Nazi rule. In
the years just before the concentration camps, the imposition of strict penalties on “Aryan”
women seeking abortions—which would eventually come to include the death penalty—and the
forced sterilization of Jewish women were twin facets of the same strategy (285, 189).
Antiabortion activists in the United States have long attempted to invert the historical
relationship between eugenics and reproductive rights, suggesting those who favor reproductive
rights are the real eugenicists. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, for example,
recently called abortion “an act rife with the potential for eugenic manipulation,” despite the lack
of evidence that women of color are being encouraged to have unwanted abortions, or that
practices like sex selection are happening in the United States on a discernible scale (Lithwick).
Meanwhile, a near-total abortion ban passed in Alabama in spring included language claiming
that abortion was a larger-scale genocide than the Holocaust—a sinister tactic in the antiabortion
arsenal that simultaneously links these unrelated phenomena and plays down the horrors of the
Shoah (Gerson).
In reality, sterilization—not abortion—has always been the technology of choice for
governments seeking to keep populations down, for the obvious reason that it can be
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administered en masse and that its effects are permanent. Millions of third-world women were
sterilized during the Cold War under U.S.-backed global health programs, as delusions of race
suicide gave way to anxieties about a “population bomb,” as the best-selling popular science
writer Paul Ehrlich put it, set off by overly fertile women in the global south. In the United
States, sterilizations peaked during the 1970s, overwhelmingly administered to women of color,
often poor or in prison; women seeking aid from the welfare system were often pressured to
undergo the procedure as a condition for receiving benefits (Fixmer-Oraiz 9). In an especially
perverse twist, the same population of women undergoing forced sterilization was effectively
barred from abortion care after the passage of the Hyde amendment in 1976, which prohibits
Medicaid from covering the cost of abortions for low-income women. (An entirely different
system applied to middle-class white women, who were deterred from voluntary sterilization
even when they sought it out [Fixmer-Oraiz 9].)
While abortion access itself is in no way an expression of eugenic ideology, mainstream
reproductive rights organizations for too long made a truce—and even found common cause—
with supporters of eugenics. Margaret Sanger, the Planned Parenthood founder who has proved a
useful target for antiabortion activists, first rose to prominence as a socialist feminist and public
health nurse who placed “voluntary motherhood” for working-class women at the center of her
agenda (Solinger 80). Initially, as the scholar Aiko Takeuchi-Demirci notes, Sanger had little
patience for the eugenicists she described as “masculine ‘race suicide’ fanatics,” nor were they
keen on the notion that women should be able to access birth control of their own volition (109).
But hoping to legitimize her cause in the 1920s, Sanger sought the support of eugenicists and
adopted their anti-immigrant views. The association lasted decades. In the 1960s, an
ophthalmologist named John Tanton, alarmed about overpopulation, established Planned
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Parenthood clinics in northern Michigan. Tanton would go on to become a father of the
contemporary anti-immigration movement (O’Connor).
But those developments are just one part of the story. The reproductive justice movement
led by women of color has long argued that the struggle for abortion rights should not be framed
as one side of a metaphysical battle between the values of “life” and “choice” (Ross and
Solinger). Instead, the right not to bear children—including the right to terminate a pregnancy—
should be recognized as one aspect of women’s bodily autonomy, inalienable but also
inextricable from the right to bear children, and to the resources necessary to parent in a safe and
healthy environment. It took the work of feminist movements around the world to begin
separating reproductive rights from population policy—ground we now seem to be losing.
***
The battle to center women in reproductive politics is being fought today as the language
of race suicide has come back in full force among right-wing nationalists. Earlier this month in
El Paso, a white nationalist mass shooter is believed to have left a statement rationalizing killing
as an act of resistance against the immigrants he claimed were replacing white Americans. He
named as a predecessor Brenton Tarrant, who is accused of killing 51 people at mosques in
Christchurch, New Zealand. Tarrant’s manifesto opened by repeating a single line summing up
his justification for murder: “It’s the birthrates.”
Contemporary pronatalist campaigns that draw on similar anxieties have already been put
into practice elsewhere in the world. Italy, for instance, created a Ministry for Policies on the
Family in 2007 to address an alleged crisis of falling birthrates and increased migration. “This is
a country that is dying from low birthrates, from the aging of the population, from a migratory
flow so massive that it renders integration difficult since there is no longer an Italian society into
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which non-EU immigrants can integrate,” the country’s Undersecretary of the
Family proclaimed the next year. “If this is the trend, in two or three generations, Italians will
disappear” (Marchesi 39). Former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi’s government offered “baby
bonuses” to mothers of multiple children; only European citizens were eligible to apply.
(Children born in Italy to undocumented migrants are not granted Italian citizenship at birth.)
Although abortion remains legal in Italy, it has been made widely inaccessible (Fox and Donato).
While Italian women are castigated for being insufficiently fertile, migrant women
are accused of having both too many children and too many abortions (Marchesi 43).
Variations on this phenomenon can also be seen in countries with right-wing
governments outside the coordinates of white nationalism. Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan has advocated for young women to be trained as “well-educated future mothers,”
encouraging Turkish Muslim women to have at least three children and discouraging them from
the use of birth control; in 2012, his government limited the availability of Caesarean sections,
on the grounds that the procedure makes it difficult for women to give birth multiple times
(Kale). Such measures are necessary, Erdogan has suggested, in part because families from “the
terrorist group in Turkey”—an apparent reference to the country’s Kurdish minority—“have at
least 10 to 15 children” (Stockholm). Here, too, abortion, which Erdogan has equated with
“murder” and has tried to prohibit, is technically legal, but impossible for many women to access
(Ahmadi).
The contours of the abortion debate in the United States can make these dynamics harder
to see. Explicit pronatalism itself has largely been privatized and stripped of its most overt
ideological markers. While government-sponsored subway ads in Poland encourage citizens to
“breed like rabbits,” in the United States marketing campaigns for parenthood are more likely to
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come from purveyors of assisted reproductive technologies and other industries that market to
well-off women, warning of biological clocks and inventing new standards of motherhood
(Associated Press).
As border controls tighten, though, the links between pronatalism and nativism have once
again become visible. Inspired by Steve King’s admiring remark about Geert Wilders, Ayla
Stewart, creator of a popular white nationalist blog called Wife with a Purpose, issued a “white
baby challenge” that went viral in alt-right circles; the mother of six asked audience members “to
have as many white babies as I have contributed” (Kelly). Meanwhile, as replacement discourse
enters the conservative mainstream, talk of birthrates comes along with it. “Our people aren’t
having enough children to replace themselves. That should bother us,” JD Vance, author of the
bestselling “Hillbilly Elegy,” told his audience at the National Conservatism Conference last
month (Vance, “Beyond”); earlier this year, he described himself as “appalled” by Democrats’
permissive attitudes toward abortion (Vance, “Towards”). Vance did not spell out exactly who
was included in the word “our.” He didn’t need to.17
—Washington Post
August 27, 2019

17

Note: the Post removed the last several lines of this piece after publication, following an outcry by conservatives
who claimed that the piece mischaracterized Vance’s remarks. I disagree with the change, and have restored the
original ending here.
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Both Sides Now

Shortly after Donald Trump’s inauguration, the journalist Lewis Raven Wallace posted a
short piece on Medium with the provocative title “Objectivity is dead, and I’m okay with it.” In
those first surreal days of the new regime, mainstream media outlets reacted to Trump’s shockand-awe tactics by doubling down on their own self-regard. Even as they rushed to normalize the
new administration, news purveyors like the New York Times and NPR suggested that their own
unbiased, verifiable content—in a word, their objectivity—was the best antidote to the
president’s unchecked mendacity.
Wallace—who worked, at the time, as a reporter for the nationally syndicated public
radio show Marketplace—disagreed. He questioned the liberal media’s insistence that
journalistic objectivity was a noble aspiration, let alone an achievable goal, at a moment marked
by grotesque injustice and escalating terror. Wallace used himself as an example. As a
transgender writer, how could he possibly serve as an unbiased observer of political forces
arrayed against his existence? Instead of striving for an impossible neutrality, he argued,
journalists should be unapologetic about the political nature of their task. “As the status quo in
this country shifts,” he wrote, “we must decide whether we are going to shift with it” (Wallace,
“Objectivity”). Wallace’s post circulated over social media and was spotted by his bosses at
Marketplace, who asked him to take it down. He refused, and was fired.
In The View from Somewhere, Wallace responds to his dismissal with a thoughtfully
researched series of essays on journalistic objectivity, placing himself squarely on the side of the
concept’s discontents. While the tone of his original blog post was affirmative, emphasizing the
role of the journalist as a public servant, his book paints an often damning picture of a news
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industry that uses the rhetoric of neutrality to serve the powerful. Historically and today, Wallace
argues, media outlets have sought out the perspectives of writers unmarked by social difference
or radical ideas, and granted these perspectives the status of “unfiltered reality”; writers outside
this narrow frame are tagged as inherently biased. In times of crisis, he suggests, it should
become only more obvious to us that this kind of sophistry amounts to moral failure.
***
In the early years of laboratory science in Restoration England, one method of
establishing an experiment’s validity was to secure the presence of gentlemen witnesses. These
self-appointed natural philosophers were not expected to possess special technical knowledge. In
fact, as Donna Haraway writes, the ostensibly generic quality of their gaze—“modern, European,
masculine, scientific” (23)—was the whole point. For Haraway, the “modest witness,” whose
social stature gave him the privilege to disappear into his observations, was key to the invention
of scientific objectivity. When he wrote down his laboratory notes, “his narratives ha[d] a
magical power—they los[t] all trace of their history as stories” (24). The View from Somewhere
is in large part about the construction of the journalist as a kind of contemporary modest witness.
Wallace’s own experiences with the slipperiness of scientific objectivity—he notes that he was
diagnosed in 2005 with gender identity disorder, which would cease to exist as a medical
category by 2013—help to inform his critique of media pieties. He shows that journalistic
objectivity, a seemingly self-evident ideal with its own scientific aspirations, was in fact
assembled gradually out of specific technical practices marshaled toward the maintenance of the
status quo.
Wallace makes his case by carefully tracing the history of so-called objectivity in
journalism. His story begins in the 1830s with the birth of the penny newspaper. Where
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newspapers had once been the organs of political parties and business interests, this new kind of
mass-circulation daily, funded by advertising and pitched to a growing urban working class, was
independent. But what should journalistic independence look like?
For some newspapermen, it meant the freedom to engage in active political combat along
the lines of principle rather than party affiliation. Horace Greeley, the legendary founding editor
of the New York Tribune, placed abolitionism at the center of the Tribune’s mission and
disdained the “gagged, mincing neutrality” of outlets that took a less determined stance
(Wallace, View 42). But other nineteenth-century publications touted their impartiality and
established the signposts that would come to signify as much: boundaries between the publishing
and editorial sides of a newspaper, and between news and opinion sections; sourcing and factchecking; the “inverted pyramid” structure of news stories, in which the most important
information appears at the top (hence the injunction not to “bury the lede” [40]). In the early
twentieth century, this model became dominant as journalism professionalized. Early guides to
journalistic ethics called for newspapers to model their craft on the scientific method, and they
did (54-55).
Media outlets, Wallace writes, “adopted ‘objectivity’ first as an aspiration, but they
transformed it too quickly into a bludgeon, a weapon to regulate who gets to tell stories” (63).
When newspapers created rules against accepting bribes from sources, they protected the
integrity of their journalism. But when they adopted policies forbidding conflicts of interest “real
or perceived,” they got into the murkier territory of adjudicating the appearance of impartiality
(73). The language of objectivity became a euphemistic way for outlets to dismiss reporting—
and, crucially, reporters—that made them uneasy, often on the basis of race or gender. An 1894
New York Times editorial rewarded Ida B. Wells for her groundbreaking investigative work on
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lynching by calling her “a slanderous and nasty-minded mulattress” (qtd in Wallace, View 50). In
1990, the Los Angeles Times media critic David Shaw could ask, with faux politesse, “Can
Women Reporters Write Objectively on Abortion Issues?” (127).
This double standard became particularly insidious in the hands of conservative media
magnate Henry Luce. “Show me a man who thinks he’s objective, and I’ll show you a man
who’s deceiving himself,” Luce remarked in 1923, when he cofounded Time (56). The idea that
no one could be objective may at first glance appear democratizing, but in fact this kind of
cynicism only exacerbated the problems with the discourse of journalistic neutrality, doubling
down on the media’s gatekeeping function. If objectivity is both desirable and impossible, the
role of the modest witness becomes rarified, granted to or withheld from the job candidate at
will. Journalistic objectivity, then, is a labor issue. In Luce’s newsroom, Wallace argues, “the
trick wasn’t to aspire to fairness, truth, and nonpartisanship—it was to not be caught by your
boss being a human with opinions, especially if those opinions went against the grain in some
way” (64).
This trap has been remarkably durable. I worked as a reporter for three years and my
modesty remained unquestioned until 2010. Near the end of my time as a staff writer at Tablet, a
Jewish web magazine then tacking sharply to the right, I was told a piece I’d written about
Israeli-American anti-Zionist college students would require dramatic revisions because it had
“an agenda.” I stood up for my own objectivity—the piece was properly sourced, featured
dissenting voices and expert data—and my boss switched gears. “No one is objective,” she told
me pityingly, as though it were the first day of class at a low-ranked J-school.
Something snapped in that exchange: the clubby mutual recognition of the strangeness of
journalism and the people who perform it, straining toward the paradox of achieving objectivity
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through subjectivity like mad scientists. Suddenly all that was left was a wage relation, and
because I was twenty-five and about to quit for grad school, I chose that moment to bring up my
discovery that a junior male coworker was making a salary much higher than my own. My boss
laughed and asked what recourse I thought I had. “You’re not in a union,” she said. Questions of
journalistic independence and media organizing are inextricable, and Wallace’s book is in part a
history of the latter, from the first known newsroom strike, in 1935 at the black New York paper
the Amsterdam News, through a series of Supreme Court cases that have addressed speech
protections for journalist organizers (61-66). Since the 1930s, Wallace reports, publishers have
resisted journalists’ demands for union recognition in part through the astonishing claim that
“union members could not be objective” (62). Sometimes the ruling class protests too much.
In Wallace’s telling, the ideology of journalistic neutrality in the US reached its apex
during the liberal consensus of the postwar period, then suffered a serious blow during the
Vietnam War, when even “the most basic facts” about the conflict were up for grabs. In the
1970s, right-wing think tanks and politicians took up the language of objectivity with a
vengeance, systematically accusing media outlets of shilling for the left and successfully pushing
them to the right; public media outlets like NPR and PBS, which rely on insecure sources of
government funding, have been particularly vulnerable to this kind of attack. As his story moves
into the present, Wallace compellingly argues that collective action can remedy traditional
reporting’s blind spots. Black Lives Matter, for instance, has transformed coverage of police
brutality from local “crime” stories into inescapably political national news (24-38). He also
draws attention to the work of lesser-known groups like Indigenous Rising Media working to
develop reporting techniques that allow journalists to collaborate with marginalized communities
rather than merely “extracting” their stories for consumption (199).
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When it comes to the work of individual journalists, though, Wallace is too quick to treat
“perspective” as something self-explanatory, emanating directly from a writer’s social position.
In reality, a writer’s point of view consists of more than her relationship to structures of power;
she crafts her ideas through her prose. The View From Somewhere profiles a range of exceptional
reporters; perhaps my favorite was Sandy Nelson, a beloved lesbian socialist reporter at the
Tacoma News Tribune who was reassigned to the copy desk when new management decided to
punish her for doing activist work while off the clock (she sued, and her case made it to the
Supreme Court, which found against her [119-124]). But because Wallace does not attend to an
irreducible element of journalism—the writing—all of his subjects wind up sounding like
Wallace. The neglect of texture ironically homogenizes the very diversity the book is meant to
champion. Even a chapter on “Public Radio Voice” has almost nothing to say about voices,
beyond basic observations about NPR’s whiteness; indeed, much of the book is itself written in
public radio voice, sometimes lending it the quality of a podcast that has become sentient and
begun to inquire into its own origins.
Come the revolution, what formal elements of news journalism’s objective style will we
want to preserve, and where do we want to experiment? How can perspective be communicated
in a way that acknowledges our entanglements, as Donna Haraway would put it, without selfreflection taking over? I would happily read a book that engaged with these questions; for now,
journalism must speak for itself.
—Bookforum
forthcoming, November 2019
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Meditations in an Emergency

This summer in Iceland, the country’s prime minister and a few dozen other government
officials and scientists hiked to the site of Okjökull (Ok for short), a glacier that passed away
four years ago. They held a memorial service on the naked rocks and affixed a plaque, with a
message in Icelandic and English, to the ground. “Ok is the first Icelandic glacier to lose its
status as a glacier,” the plaque explains. “In the next 200 years all our glaciers are expected to
follow the same path. This monument is to acknowledge that we know what is happening and
what needs to be done. Only you know if we did it (Luckhurst).
As the plaque suggests, there is a lot we already know about the accelerated climate
change that is coming. We know that it will occur even in the most optimistic scenario, which we
are far from achieving. We know that it will entail devastating consequences everywhere, but
especially in poor countries close to the equator, which will confront unprecedented droughts,
floods, and heat waves; as a result, increasing waves of migrants will seek refuge in rich
countries that are already experimenting with astoundingly cruel strategies to repel them. We
know that a global transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy must happen now if we want
to reduce the scale of the catastrophe, and that such a transition, if it is to be effective and just,
must also include a shift toward socialism.
Like any time capsule, the Icelandic plaque expresses a hope that the future will at least
produce understanding historians. And yet the gap between what we know and what we don’t
about what lies before us is bewildering, not just scientifically or politically or emotionally, but
also metaphysically. The kind of exhaustive doubt that plagues stoners and early modern
philosophers—the kind that asks, with David Hume, why the sun rising today should be any
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indication that it will rise tomorrow—cannot be easily banished once glaciers begin to melt.
Climate change is angry-god stuff, scrambling the coordinates of space and time that mortals use
to anchor themselves to their world. “Plants and animals are increasingly out of sync with each
other,” Astra Taylor reports in a recent essay in Lapham’s Quarterly: birds show up late for
spring, flowers bloom and fade before bugs arrive to pollinate them (Taylor). Climate change,
producing sulfur emissions and insect swarms, is regularly described by way of the torments of
the Old Testament.
In short, climate change presents—among other things—a spiritual problem concerning
what we often casually refer to as the end of the world. In another era one might have expected
to find the Jewish community embroiled in theological disputes about the nature and timing of
the messiah. Indeed, as leftist Jews living in a period of planetary devastation, we’ve often
thought of Walter Benjamin; the best-known Jewish sage to dwell on such questions in the
modern era, he imagined history from the perspective of an angel caught in a storm called
progress, flying with his back to the future as trash piles up endlessly in his line of sight.
But this association just as soon leads us elsewhere. In 1940, shortly after he wrote his
“Theses on the Philosophy of History,” Benjamin died while attempting to escape Nazi-occupied
Europe; Spanish border guards informed the group of refugees he was traveling with that they
would not be permitted to enter Spain, and Benjamin overdosed on morphine rather than risk
being sent back to Vichy France. He was obsessed with the ending of worlds—the world of 19thcentury Paris, the world of his Berlin childhood—but it is impossible to read him now without
thinking in particular of the Holocaust and the destruction of European Jewry; he is as bound to
that catastrophe as Noah was to his flood.
This is often the way it goes, today, when we seek out Jewish ideas about end times: we
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immediately come upon an actual world that ended just a human lifespan ago. As the angel of
history could tell you, Jews have this experience of total loss in common with a great many
people and other creatures. Capitalist imperialism has been a particularly effective machine for
the destruction of worlds, accompanied by the denial that they were ever there in the first place.
Yet at the same time, the Holocaust is never merely an example; it has taken on a uniquely
metonymic relationship to apocalyptic catastrophe as the result of both its actual singularity and
reactionary attempts to isolate it from history altogether. As new endings approach, we’ve seen a
spike in struggles over its memory.
***
One thing we know about the future, because we are already seeing it, is that for many
environmental migrants, it will likely hold concentration camps. Yet when Congresswoman
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez accurately applied this language to ICE detention centers in June,
American conservatives replied that the comparison was despicable, that the past must be kept
safe from the present (Stolberg, “Ocasio-Cortez”). The right’s treatment of Holocaust memory
has become so cynical as to border on denial, oscillating between policing serious political
discourse and trivializing the Shoah themselves. A few months after the excoriation of OcasioCortez, the conservative columnist Bret Stephens implied in the New York Times that a (Jewish)
Twitter user who jokingly compared him to a bedbug was engaging in the kind of hate speech
directed at Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto (Knowles).
In his book Remnants of Auschwitz, the philosopher Giorgio Agamben recalls being
accused, in a letter to the editor of a French newspaper, of obscuring “the unique and unsayable
character” of Hitler’s camps in an article he’d written. Agamben reflects that to create a taboo in
which the horrors of Auschwitz, like the name of God, become “unsayable” serves to sacralize
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the Holocaust, “confer[ring] on extermination the prestige of the mystical” (31-32). And yet in a
different sense, he continues, those horrors are unsayable. The Nazis sought to create what Carl
Schmitt, national socialism’s most prominent jurist, called an Ausnahmezustand, a state of
emergency or exception in which unchecked authoritarian power seizes control of the rule of
law. This state of exception was exemplified by the camps; in those microcosms of hell,
Agamben writes elsewhere, “everything bec[ame] possible” (Time 106). In the wake of the
Shoah, the extremity of these conditions would become a hole in the middle of Holocaust
testimony, isolating survivors in the incommunicability of their experience (Remnants 33).
This duality—the simultaneous importance and impossibility of rendering the Holocaust
“sayable”—is reflected in the current Holocaust discourse in American politics. The Jewish left,
particularly young organizations like IfNotNow and Never Again Action, has forcefully rejected
the grotesque misappropriations of Jewish history employed by the right. Though the insistence
that we recognize the grim antecedents of contemporary US policy is necessary and admirable, it
ultimately raises more questions than it settles. As Masha Gessen observed in The New Yorker,
the fracas over the description of immigrant detention centers was only superficially about
language. “Ocasio-Cortez and her opponents,” Gessen writes, “agree that the term ‘concentration
camp’ refers to something so horrible as to be unimaginable.” The actual disagreement, then,
concerned the question of whether the unimaginable could be imagined into present-day
America—an “immeasurably more difficult” task “not so much because it is contentious and
politically risky . . . but because it is cognitively strenuous. It makes one’s brain implode”
(Gessen).
***
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At the Standing Rock encampment that attempted to halt the construction of the Dakota
Access Pipeline, the historian Nick Estes recalls in Our History Is the Future, protesters
developed a chant that could easily be mistaken for a more familiar one about democracy: “Tell
me what the prophecy looks like! / This is what the prophecy looks like!” (14). A Lakota
prophecy from the late 19th century had foreseen the Zuzeca Sapa, an enormous black snake,
stretching itself across Lakota land and bringing on the end of the world. When work on the
pipeline began in 2016, it became clear to many in the area that the Zuzeca Sapa had arrived.
A recent strain of climate quietism has dismissed climate activism precisely on the
grounds of its eschatological resonance. Climate activists, Jonathan Franzen wrote in September
in The New Yorker, are like “religious leaders” who offer the masses “a false hope of salvation”
in exchange for good works like biking to work or avoiding air travel. It’s not hard to see that the
analogy relies on a caricature of political action peculiarly out of tune with the spirit of
contemporary climate radicalism, which is all too aware that even the most dramatic successes
will still be partial. But in order to ridicule activists as quack theologians, Franzen must
caricature theology as well. “Other kinds of apocalypse, whether religious or thermonuclear or
asteroidal, at least have the binary neatness of dying: one moment the world is there, the next
moment it’s gone forever,” he writes. “Climate apocalypse, by contrast, will be messy”
(Franzen).
Climate apocalypse will be messy—but what religion imagines the end of the world
unfolding neatly? In Benjamin’s Marxist recasting of Jewish messianism as the struggle for a
classless society, the persistent salience of meditations on end times emerges from the fact that
we’re in them already, and always have been. In the Jewish messianic tradition, as in the Lakota
version, history continually threatens to burst into the present. In the course of such explosions,
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Benjamin’s follower Agamben explains in his book The Time That Remains, the olam hazeh
(this world) collides with the olam habah (the world to come), creating a temporal rupture in
which “the present is able to recognize the meaning of the past and the past therein finds its
meaning and fulfillment” (142). In religious terms, this might look like the realization of a
prophecy: a moment when ominous signs from the past become newly legible, revealing—as
Benjamin puts it in his “Theses”—“a secret protocol between the generations of the past and that
of our own” (172).
But Benjamin represents this claim in environmental terms as well. At the close of the
same text, he quotes a “recent biologist” who observes that “[i]n relation to the history of organic
life on earth, the miserable fifty millennia of homo sapiens represents something like the last two
seconds of a twenty-four hour day.” The biologist’s view is like the angel’s: it pictures time on
earth at a radically defamiliarized planetary scale, contracting the “entire history of humanity”
into a “monstrous abbreviation.” From a contemporary perspective, we might say that we cease
being climate change denialists only when we stop waiting for a sign that the world has begun to
end and recognize that the million sites of crisis are the single overarching catastrophe.
Messianic time, here, describes not a particular epoch but the ongoing potential that we
will come to see the world in a condition of perpetual crisis, as the angel (or, today, the biologist)
does. For Benjamin, the task before us is to transform this de facto state of emergency—he uses
the same term as Schmitt, Ausnahmezustand—into a real state of emergency: a revolution. From
this perspective, the Ausnahmezustand that Hitler sought to establish was already latent in the
experience of everyday life under capitalism. What were the camps, after all, but a vision of the
status quo militarized beyond recognition, transformed into the Nazis’ own hideous utopia? And
what would it look like to usher in a real state of emergency as the seas rise?
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Today, Hitler’s camps stand between Jewish thought and the strange emergent timescale
of climate change. When we conferred on extermination the prestige of the mystical, limiting our
concept of the emergency to the one the Nazis created for us, we also became alienated from our
own tradition of messianic thought—even as the ongoingness of Jewish life after the Holocaust
offers the bleakest consolation that the destruction of a world is often incomplete, that life goes
on after the disaster. As we head toward new confrontations, we are imagining a plan for a new
kind of Holocaust memorial, one that remembers the camps as modernism’s most ambitious
laboratory for a scorched earth. The memorial consists of a simple plaque recording the words of
a midrash: If the messiah comes while you are holding a sapling, plant it.
—Jewish Currents
November 2019
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